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English summary 
This thesis analyzes the institutional framework around risk management in Danish agriculture, 
with the two main sectors, the hog and the dairy sector in mind, and it suggests a new more active 
role for the cooperatives in these sectors, with regard to the reallocation of price risk among mem-
bers. 
 
The thesis consists of a general introduction, three linked but independent and self-contained papers 
and a conclusion. The first paper introduces a measure of credit capacity using Data Envelopment 
Analysis. This is a novel application of a well-known methodology from production economics on 
financial issues. The paper was motivated by the fact that most literature on risk management ex-
plains the rationale for risk management activities such as hedging, with increased ability to obtain 
finance via debt. However, no hedging had been performed on the output side for Danish pig or 
dairy farms, while access to debt capital seemed abundant. It seemed that farmers may have been 
thinking “Why hedge, if you can borrow?” The perception of the abundant availability of liquidity 
in the form of credit reserves may have been an explanation for the absence of other risk manage-
ment activities in the sectors and why a measure and empirical analysis of the development in credit 
capacity was needed. However, existing measures of access to credit had focused on the dichoto-
mous question of whether firms are financially constrained or not, while the relative unconstrained-
ness of firms (farms) would have explained the absence of risk management. An analysis of some 
92,000 farm accounts from 1996 to 2009 found that access to credit roughly doubled during the 
period. This may have been an important explaining factor for the (absent) development of risk 
management institutions.  
 
The second paper provides a cross-country comparison of the development in hog marketing in the 
U.S. and Denmark over time. While the technological and structural development in the hog sector 
in Denmark and the U.S. has been somewhat similar, the marketing arrangements in the U.S. have 
changed dramatically while the status quo has been maintained in Denmark. Over the past 20 years, 
the marketing of hogs in the U.S. has shifted from being predominantly based on spot-marketing to 
a situation where backward vertical integration, production and marketing contracts are the domi-
nant marketing arrangements. This development is usually explained using transaction costs and/or 
risk management arguments, which may omit important complementary effects of the financial en-
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vironment. In contrast to the U.S. development, the Danish modus operandi when it comes to the 
process of selling finished hog to further processing stages in the value chain (the marketing ar-
rangement) have been very stable, being dominated by cooperatives the entire period, cooperatives 
being a hybrid form of forward vertical integration. The second paper suggest that the status quo in 
Danish hog marketing is due to complementary effects between the cooperative processing and 
marketing of pork and a financial system providing ample access to credit.  
 
The cooperative organization of marketing reduces transaction costs, but it does not allow the 
members to individually manage price risk, while it also reduces the relevance of market-based 
price risk management such as hedging with futures. Provided a financial environment with ample 
access to credit is present, the absence of price risk management institutions is irrelevant, as it is a 
redundant risk management tool when credit reserves are abundant. However, in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis, the financial environment is changing which may result in the disappear-
ance of one of the complementary factors that made price risk hedging irrelevant. Cooperative mar-
keting will, however, still reduce the relevance of futures-based hedging, as basis risk will be sub-
stantial.  
 
Danish farmers may be left in a situation in which the access to credit that crowded out market-
based risk management has disappeared and cooperative marketing inhibits effective use of poten-
tially emerging market-based risk management instruments. The third paper suggests and analyzes 
the possibility of cooperatives organizing the reallocation of price risk among cooperative members 
in the situation described above. Given sufficient heterogeneity in member risk preference and suf-
ficiently low direct transaction costs, the potential gains from reallocation will be substantial.   
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Dansk Resume (Danish Summary) 
Denne afhandling analyserer de institutionelle rammer for risikostyring i dansk landbrug med de to 
hoveddriftsgrene, svineproduktion og mælkeproduktion i tankerne. Afhandlingen foreslår en mere 
aktiv rolle for andelsselskaberne i disse to sektorer med hensyn til omfordeling af prisrisiko iblandt 
andelshaverne.    
 
Afhandlingen består af en generel introduktion, tre indbyrdes tilknyttede, men selvstændige og uaf-
hængige artikler samt en konklusion. Den første artikel introducerer et mål for kreditkapacitet base-
ret på Data Envelopment Analysis. Dette er en nyskabende anvendelse af velkendt metode fra pro-
duktionsøkonomien på finansielle forhold. Artiklen er motiveret af det forhold, at meget eksisteren-
de risikostyringslitteratur forklarer anvendelsen af instrumenter til afdækningen af prisrisiko med 
øget adgang til fremmedfinansiering. Det forholder sig dog samtidig sådan, at der stor set ingen 
afdækning af prisrisiko foregår på salgssiden blandt danske svine- og mælkeproducenter, mens ad-
gangen til gældsfinansiering har været rigelig. Det ser ud til at have været en tilstand, hvor danske 
landmænd kan have tænkt ”Hvorfor afdække priserne, når jeg i forvejen kan låne?” – Opfattelsen af 
rigelig adgang til likviditet i form af kreditreserver kunne potentielt forklare fraværet af andre risi-
kostyringsaktiviteter, hvorfor der var behov for et mål for og en empirisk analyse af udviklingen i 
kreditkapaciteten. Eksisterende mål for adgangen til finansiering var imidlertid fokuseret på det 
dikotomiske spørgsmål om virksomheder var finansielt begrænsede eller ej, mens den relative grad 
af finansielle (u)begrænsninger kunne forklare fraværet af andre risikostyringsaktiviteter. En analy-
se af 92.000 landbrugsregnskaber over perioden fra 1996 til 2009 fandt, at adgangen til kredit rundt 
regnet blev fordoblet over perioden. Dette kan være en vigtig forklarende faktor for fraværet af ud-
vikling af de institutionelle rammer for risikostyring.   
 
Den anden artikel leverer en sammenligning af udviklingen i markedsføringsstrukturen mellem svi-
neproduktionssektoren i USA og i Danmark. Mens den teknologiske og strukturelle udvikling i svi-
neproduktionssektoren i USA og i Danmark har været sammenlignelig, så har udviklingen i mar-
kedsføringsstrukturen i USA medført dramatiske forandringer, mens en status quo tilstand er blevet 
opretholdt i Danmark. Over de seneste 20 år er markedsføringsstrukturen i den amerikanske svine-
sektor gået fra at være domineret af et spotmarked til en situation, hvor baglæns vertikal integration, 
produktions- og markedsføringskontrakter er de dominerende markedsføringsstrukturer. Denne ud-
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vikling er normalt forklaret ved hjælp af transaktionsomkostnings- og/eller risikostyringsargumen-
ter. Disse forklaringer kan udelade vigtige komplementære effekter af det finansielle institutionelle 
miljø. Den danske markedsføringsstruktur i svinesektoren har i modsætning til den amerikanske 
været meget stabil med andelsselskaber som den dominerende faktor i hele perioden. Andelsselska-
ber er en hybrid form for forlæns vertikal integration. Artiklen finder, at den stabile markedsfø-
ringsstruktur i Danmark kan forklares ved hjælp af komplementære effekter mellem afsætningen via 
andelsselskaberne og et dansk finansielt system, der har stillet stor adgang til kredit til rådighed.  
 
Afsætningen via andelsselskaber i Danmark reducerer transaktionsomkostningerne, men på den ene 
side, så giver det ikke andelshaverne mulighed for individuel styring af prisrisiko og på den anden 
side reducerer afsætningen via andelsselskaber værdien af markedsbaserede instrumenter til reduk-
tion af prisrisiko såsom futures. Under tilstande, hvor det finansielle institutionelle miljø leverer 
rigelig adgang til kredit, er fraværet af andre risikostyringsinstrumenter ikke så væsentlig, idet de 
ville være overflødige værktøjer i sammenhæng med rigelige kreditreserver. Efter den globale fi-
nansielle krise er det finansielle miljø imidlertid under forandring og en af de komplementære fak-
torer, der gjorde afdækning af priser unødvendig, kan være ved at forsvinde. Afsætning via andels-
selskaber vil dog stadig vanskeliggøre individuel styring af prisrisiko via futures o.l., idet basis-
risikoen mellem variationen i futures priser og de priser, der modtages i det fysiske marked via an-
delsselskaberne, vil være betydelig.  
 
Danske landmænd kan være havnet i en situation hvor den store adgang til kredit, der fortrængte 
markedsbaserede risikostyringsinstrumenter, er forsvundet, mens afsætning via andelsselskaberne er 
en hindring for effektiv brug af potentielt kommende markedsbaserede risikostyringsinstrumenter. 
Den tredje artikel foreslår og analyserer muligheden for, at andelsselskaberne organiserer realloke-
ring af eksponeringen over for prisrisiko blandt andelshaverne i en situation som ovenfor beskrevet. 
Såfremt andelshaverne er tilstrækkeligt heterogene i deres evne til at bære risiko og såfremt transak-
tionsomkostningerne ved omfordelingen kan holdes tilstrækkeligt lave, vil værdien af omfordeling 
af risikoen være betydelig.                 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
“New markets do not emerge, nor do they appear. They are made by the activities of firms. New 
markets are created when firms correctly sense (by accident or by design) a latent need and com-
municate their solution to that need: markets spring into being when economic actors shift resources 
to that firm’s solution. The most visible way to create a new market is to offer a product/service that 
is novel, thereby addressing needs that were not met (and perhaps not even sensed)”  
 (Anderson and Gatignon, 2005, p. 1) 
 
The major industry-related contribution of this thesis is the suggestion to the pork and dairy cooper-
atives in Denmark to create markets for the reallocation of price risk among their members. Recent 
developments in the institutional framework of Danish agriculture suggest that some needs are not 
met, and perhaps not even sensed yet. These developments relate to the institutional framework for 
risk management and they consist of, in broad terms, changes in agricultural policy, changes in the 
world market price (volatility) of agricultural commodities (the food crisis), changes in the financial 
environment (the global financial crisis (GFC) and Basel accords) and changes in domestic envi-
ronmental and land-ownership regulation.     
 
The main overarching research question of the thesis is how the different elements of the institu-
tional framework around agricultural risk management interact, how they are affected by exogenous 
shocks to the institutional matrix and how the process of adaptation to such shocks can be facilitat-
ed. In this sense the thesis deals with the adaptive efficiency (North, 2005) with respect to agricul-
tural institution related to risk management. The thesis is focused on the implications of interaction 
between whole farm risk management, finance and the organization of the agricultural value chain.  
 
The term whole farm risk management is used to stress the point that it is the management of the 
whole farms risk exposure that is of concern in the thesis. Farms are thought of as sole proprietor-
ships or alternatively partnerships or closely held corporate entities. The point is that it is the 
farmer’s management of his or her overall personal economic risk exposure that is of concern, and 
not the management of specific risks. That said the thesis will revolve around the need and possibil-
ity for Danish livestock farmers, to manage output price risk exposure and how this need interacts 
with the financial and organizational environment.  
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This is not to say that this specific risk exposure is important in and of itself, but as a major contrib-
utor to the overall whole farm risk exposure, price risk management may be important in some cir-
cumstances.  
 
A casual look at risk management practice in Danish livestock farming will show that there is next 
to no individual management of output price risk exposure. The thesis will explore the idea that the 
interaction between risk management and finance is one important reason for the absence of output 
price risk management in Danish livestock farming. The thesis will show that access to credit, his-
torically, has been quiet easy for Danish farmers. This may have influenced the farmers toward a 
perception of large credit reserves, which in turn may reduce their demand for output price risk 
management. Farmers may have been asking themselves the rhetorical question; Why hedge, if I 
can borrow?   
 
Shocks to the institutional matrix or the institutional framework around agricultural risk manage-
ment may upset the existing equilibrium. Changes in agricultural policy may increase the price vol-
atility exposure that farmer perceive, The GFC and the following changes to the financial systems 
(formal and informal) may reduce the farmers perceived credit reserves. The general change in 
world markets for agricultural commodities (the food crisis) may increase the price volatility that 
farmers perceive, and so on.      
 
The terms institutional matrix and institutional framework are synonymously used to describe “the 
complex interdependent, institutional structure that characterizes the modern human environment” 
(North, 2005, p. 156). Following North (1991) institutions consist of formal and informal rules and 
the enforcement of both. This means that the terms above cover a very broad framework of rules 
among other things covering personal belief systems (culture), formal rules in the form of govern-
ment legislation and private rules in the form of contracts etc. as well as the interaction between 
these rules and their enforcement systems.      
 
The changes mentioned above are, in effect, shocks to the institutional framework around risk man-
agement, and may initially result in an institutional vacuum, where the existing risk coping mecha-
nisms no longer are sufficient. Eventually the institutional framework will adapt to the shocks, but 
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the adaption process may be fare from efficient, and the new equilibrium may be one out of a num-
ber of possible equilibriums, and not necessarily the socially optimal equilibrium. 
  
The changes will likely affect the latent need for price risk management institutions in Danish agri-
culture; institutions that cannot be expected to emerge or appear, but can be made by the activities 
of firms central in the sector, such as the pork and dairy cooperatives.  
 
Creating market solutions that enable farmers to manage price risk exposure individually may be a 
way of adapting to changes in the institutional environment that increase existing price risk expo-
sure (e.g. agricultural policy) and / or changes that decrease the effect of existing risk coping mech-
anisms (e.g. credit reserves). These market solutions may eventually become institutionalized them-
selves.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to improve the understanding of the consequences of changing financial 
and organizational frames for risk management. With this aim in mind, the thesis provides three 
papers prepared for academic journals, related to the developments mentioned above.  
 
The complexity of the overarching research question leads to a need for the formulation of a num-
ber of more concrete research questions for the thesis: (How) does the financial system affect risk 
management in Danish agriculture? (How) does the financial system interact with organization of 
the agricultural value chain? And how can organizations in the agricultural value chain respond to 
changes in the financial system affecting the farmers’ whole farm risk management? In sum, what 
implications for whole farm risk management follow from the interaction of finance and organiza-
tion and how does this affect the adaption to changes in these institutional domains?      
 
The thesis is based on the research hypotheses that credit reserves are affected by institutional envi-
ronment around finance and that credit reserves potentially have major effect on the overall risk 
management practice of farmers. As such the thesis builds on the hypothesis of the risk balancing 
principal first formulated by Gabriel and Baker in (1980). The risk balancing principal has widely 
been use to criticize agricultural policies that target farmers risk exposure, with the argument that 
farmers will respond to a policy driven change in a specific risk exposure with a risk balancing be-
havior to adjust the farmer’s total risk to the individual target level. For example farmers may re-
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spond to income stabilizing agricultural policies (e.g. policies that reduce the farmers business risk) 
with an increase in financial risk to adjust the overall total risk exposure for the farmer.   
 
The risk balancing concept can be seen as the theoretical background for the crowding out effect  
that some agricultural policies may have  on market based risk management possibilities 
(Meuwissen et al., 2008; OECD, 2009, 2011). The point being that market based solutions may not 
emerge or survive if agricultural policies cover most of the latent need that the market based solu-
tion potentially could satisfy. The thesis works with the research hypothesis that financial environ-
ment can have an crowding out effect on market based risk management (e.g. hedging) similar to 
the crowding out effect of agricultural policies. A further introduction to and discussion of the risk 
balancing concept and the crowding out effect is given in section 1.2.6 below.   
 
The thesis also explores the hypothesis that interdependencies between the financial environment 
and organization of economic activity exists and that this interdependent relationship is a codeter-
mining factor for risk management practice.       
 
The first paper develops a measure of the development in the financial environment of Danish agri-
culture up to the GFC. A change in the credit capacity and the level of utilization of this capacity is 
identified with the measure. Increasing credit reserves for Danish farmers up to the GFC may have 
affected the institutional framework for risk management by crowding out market-based price risk 
management instruments. The paper is mainly focused on the methodological development of the 
credit capacity measure, this also constitutes the main contribution to the literature, however, the 
paper also reemphasizes the effect of credit reserves which to some extent does not get the attention 
it deserves and the paper provides empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that the financial 
environment can have a crowding out effect on other risk coping mechanisms. The paper has been 
accepted for publication in the Agricultural Finance Review (Pedersen and Olsen, forthcoming). 
 
The first paper relates to the overall theme of the thesis by documenting the abundant credit capaci-
ty prior to the GFC, which suggests a crowding-out effect of credit reserves on other risk manage-
ment instruments and suggests serious changes to this effect in the wake of the financial crisis. As 
such the paper gives a partial answer to the research question: (How) does the financial system af-
fect risk management in Danish agriculture? The empirical findings of the paper support the crowd-
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ing out effect of finance on other risk coping alternatives, which is based on the theoretical founda-
tion of the risk balancing, there is however no specific test of the risk balancing hypothesis in the 
paper as it focusses on the development of the measure for development in the financial environ-
ment. 
 
The second paper compares the development in the marketing arrangements in the U.S. and Danish 
hog industry and suggests complementarities between some financial environments and some or-
ganizational arrangements, specifically the Danish financial system and the dominant cooperative 
form of organizing agricultural marketing in Denmark. Changes in the financial environment after 
the GFC can affect this complementarity and possibly affect the way risk is managed in the value 
chain. The manuscript presented in this thesis is an extended version, linking papers I and paper III 
and providing a more thorough presentation and discussion of theory as well as data than would be 
possible in a normal research paper format.   
 
The second paper focuses on the possible interaction effect between the institutional environment 
with regard to finance and the organization of the value chain. The paper presents an exploratory 
qualitative cross country comparisons, comparing only two cases, thus the results are rather weak 
and should not be over emphasized. However, the paper contributes to the literature by raising the 
issue of the possible effect of finance and risk management on organization of agricultural value 
chains which to some degree may be omitted in the existing literature (James et al., 2011). 
 
The paper provides a partial answer to the research question: (How) does the financial system inter-
act with organization of the agricultural value chain? The theoretical discussion of the paper sup-
ports the hypothesis that the financial system constitutes an important part of the institutional matrix 
and that this affects the organization of the agricultural value chain, furthermore the organization of 
the value chain may affect the way risks are managed. The empirical finding from the case study 
suggests that a financial environment where access to credit is relatively easy complements cooper-
ative organization of marketing in agricultural value chains. However the empirical evidence for 
this finding is very weak, and should not be over emphasized.       
 
The motivation for the thesis is rooted in my work with agricultural risk management and reoccur-
ring situations, where I found myself considering questions like, ‘How will the organization of risk 
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management in Danish agriculture adapt to changes in the surrounding institutional environment? 
Especially, how will the sector adapt to the changes in the financial environment, in the wake of the 
financial crisis?’ The question most likely came to my mind due to my belief that the agricultural 
financial environment has affected organization and risk management thinking in Danish agricul-
ture. Whether or not this belief reflects the truth is investigated in papers I and II of the thesis.  
 
The third paper investigates a possible element in an adaptation process, where marketing coopera-
tives assume a more active role in facilitating risk management options for their members. The pa-
per is a mechanism design paper which suggests and analyzes the potential for the reallocation of 
price risk among cooperative members. This is found to be a possible element in the adaptation to 
the changes in the institutional frames for agricultural risk management in Denmark, implied by the 
two first papers.  
 
The paper provides a partial answer to the research question: How can organizations in the agricul-
tural value chain respond to changes in the financial system affecting the farmers’ whole farm risk 
management? The paper suggests one possible response to the changes in the institutional environ-
ment. Obviously many other options exist.   
 
The rest of this chapter consists of two main sections. The first provides a broad introduction to 
risk, risk management and financial theory related to Danish agriculture and the research hypothe-
sis. The aim of the section is to define what is meant by risk, uncertainty and risk management in 
the thesis; to establish the theoretical foundation of risk management and financial theory upon 
which the thesis is built, especially the risk balancing concept, and to introduce the financial situa-
tion in the Danish agricultural sector. The second section introduces New Institutional Economics 
(NIE), which represents the main methodological approach of the thesis, and discusses the structure, 
methodological approach and issues of the three individual papers.  
 
1.2 Risk Management 
1.2.1 RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND AMBIGUITY 
This subsection will introduce and discuss the concepts of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity and de-
fine what is meant with the term risk in this thesis.   
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The terms “risk” and “uncertainty” are often used synonymously. However, the terms Knightian 
risk and Knightian uncertainty are sometimes used to stress the distinction between risk and uncer-
tainty used by Knight (1921), where risk refers to a situation where outcomes are drawn from a 
known distribution, such as the throw of a dice, while uncertainty refers to outcomes without full 
knowledge of the underlying distribution. This leads to a distinction between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion, where risk aversion refers to the preference for lower variance of outcomes, while 
ambiguity aversion refers to the preference for known risk over uncertainty, as illustrated by the 
Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg, 1961; Fox and Tversky, 1995).  
 
The distinction between the terms may also relate to value assignment, where uncertainty is a value-
free statement about an outcome distribution, while risk is a value-charged statement, which usually 
indicates aversion (Hardaker et al., 2004).  
 
Knightian risk and ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty can be seen as two extremes on a continuum. 
In business, very few situations can be characterized by risk in the Knightian sense. However, many 
situations are quantified probabilistically with actuarial methods to approximate an underlying dis-
tribution. In this sense, risk assessment can be seen as a subjective process, which may be aided by 
quasi-objective methods and procedures, but ultimately relies on the judgment of the decision mak-
er. In this case, the distinction between risk and uncertainty reduces to statements about the process 
of risk assessment. Risk management is not only the management of risk in the Knigthtian sense, 
but also the process of assessing or estimating the distribution of uncertain events, and the manage-
ment of these (Moschini and Hennessy, 2001). In this thesis, risk management is just as much a 
question of uncertainty management as it is a question of management of risk in the Knigthtian 
sense. 
 
The risk perceived and subjectively assigned by the decision maker is important. Whether this en-
tails objectively applying a methodology or whether it be a subconscious process is of less rele-
vance in this thesis, where risk is defined as the decision makers’ subjective perception of the out-
come distribution, as risk in the Knightian sense has very little relevance in business related to agri-
culture.  
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Uncertain events are often treated as if they were risky events because assigning a probability dis-
tribution eases communication. As long as awareness about the uncertainty of the underlying distri-
bution is kept in mind, this can help communication about uncertain events. However, the risk1 that 
probability distributions are taken too literally is introduced.  
 
1.2.2 BERNOULLI’S PRINCIPLE – THE SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESIS  
This subsection will introduce and discuss the subjective expected utility hypothesis and alternative 
behavioral assumptions in decision theory.   
 
The subjective expected utility (SEU) hypothesis is the state of the art in analysis of decisions under 
uncertainty with regard to agricultural risk management (Huirne et al., 1997). In general decision 
theory the SEU was first proposed by Bernoulli (1738) but gained important impact on economics 
and management thinking after von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) structured decision making 
under (Knightian) risk and Savage (1954) extended the framework to decision making under uncer-
tainty.  
 
The SEU hypothesis integrates the risk preferences and the subjective probability of the decision 
maker. That is, the utility function and the subjective beliefs about the probability of specific out-
comes are integrated. Following Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977) the SEU hypothesis can be 
deduced from four axioms listed below:   
 
1. Ordering 
2. Transitivity 
3. Continuity 
4. Independence 
 
With ordering it is meant that decision makers faced with two risky prospects are able two order 
them (state preference of one over the other) or is able to state indifference. 
 
                                                 
1The term risk is here used without reference to a known distribution  
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With transitivity it is meant that a decision maker that prefers the risky prospect  over the risky 
prospect  and also prefers  over  is assumed to prefer  over .  
 
With continuity it is meant that for a decision maker preferring   over   and   over , this 
decision maker will be indifferent between the choice of a lottery that yields   with subjective 
probability () and  with probability 1 − () and the risky prospect . 
 
With independence it is meant that if a decision maker prefers  to  any lottery that yields  
and any other outcome , will be preferred to a lottery that yields  and  as outcomes 
(when () = () ). This is known as the sure-thing principle (Nau, 2007). 
 
The SEU hypothesis states that for a decision maker who accepts these axioms there exists a utility 
function  which associates a single utility value () with any risky prospect . The utility of a 
risky prospect is the expected utility of the prospect derived from the subjective probability 
weighted outcomes, as follows (Hardaker et al., 2004): 
 
	
 =  	
() (1) 
 
Where  is the state of nature and () is the continuous probability distribution.  
 
Early critique of the SEU was raised by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). The Allais paradox is a 
compelling decision problem that violates the independence axiom of the SEU and the Ellsberg 
paradox questions whether uncertainties can be translated into subjective risk. The Ellsberg phe-
nomenon can be viewed as ambiguity aversion or as a source-dependent attitude toward risk (Nau, 
2007). 
 
In the 1980s the critique of the SEU picked up in intensity and a number of alternative decision the-
ories were developed by behavioral economics as extensions to the SEU models. Most famously the 
work on prospect theory by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahnemann and coauthor Amos Tversky 
(Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
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Prospect theory is a variation of the more general rank-dependent utility (RDU) models that where 
developed independently by Quiggin (1982), Schmeidler (1989), Luce and Narens (1985) and Yaari 
(1987) and address the violations of the independence axiom. The key difference between RDU 
models and SEU models is the replacement of the independence axiom (in SEU) with the weaker 
comonotonic independence axiom (in RDU) (Nau, 2007; Wakker et al., 1994). 
 
In response to the critique raised by the Ellsberg paradox a number of extensions to the SEU has 
been made. Two examples are the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1987) 
and the more nuanced second order utility functions (Chew and Sagi, 2007; Ergin and Gul, 2009; 
Klibanoff et al., 2005; Nau, 2006).  
 
1.2.3 UTILITY ASSUMPTIONS – OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS APPLIED IN THE THESIS 
This subsection will discuss the behavioral assumptions applied in this thesis.   
 
The thesis applies two models with behavioral assumptions for the decision makers (farmers) in 
question; the models are Gabriel and Baker (1980) and Collins (1997). The models are based on 
liquidity concerns and wealth maximizing objectives (further introduction and discussion below)   
and are interpreted as focusing on the risk (and uncertainty) of cash insolvency (Donaldson, 1961).  
 
The research assumption regarding decision making can be formulated as follows: Farmers are as-
sumed to maximize wealth (future consumption possibilities) under uncertain economic conditions 
subject to immediate consumption needs and subject to the risk of cash insolvency leading to bank-
ruptcy.  
 
This means that farmer try to maximize their consumption possibilities “tomorrow” under consider-
ation of the level of consumption “today” and under consideration of a reasonable risk (uncertainty) 
of going out of business.  
 
This assumption deviates from usual behavioral assumption that focus on income level and varia-
tion (return and variation), in the way that it is not income variation per say that is assumed to be of 
concern to the farmer, but rather the risk of bankruptcy (terminal equity under some disaster level), 
which may be influenced by (down side) income variation, and the risk that income variation will 
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restrict consumption. The assumption is however normal in the agricultural finance literature (Barry 
and Robison, 2001; Hardaker and Lien, 2005; Just, 2003).     
 
With regard to the thesis’ research assumptions on decision making under risk and uncertainty the 
models applied satisfy the SEU hypothesis. The main results of the thesis are however robust with 
regard to relaxations of the axioms of the SEU. 
 
The Collins model is used as a convenient framework of analysis in the third paper. This model 
builds on the behavioral assumption that “the manager wants to maximize expected wealth subject 
to the constraint that the chance that terminal equity is less than some disaster level” (Collins, 1997, 
p. 495) is below some acceptable level. This can be thought of as the farmers’ subjectively accepta-
ble level of bankruptcy risk but can also represent any other minimum acceptable level of equity.    
 
A RDU model relying on decision weights rather than subjective probabilities in the SEU models 
can be interpreted in the Collins framework as applied in the thesis. The key assumption in the the-
sis is that farmers are able to rank different risk management options that trade off the level of risk 
(and ambiguity) against the expected monetary value, as they are perceive by the individual deci-
sion maker.     
 
As elicitation of specific utility functions is not a key objective of this thesis the specific behavioral 
assumption is not a major concern. Despite the limitations of the SEU it is still considered the best 
normative model for decision analysis (Hardaker and Lien, 2005).  
 
Following (Hardaker et al., 2004) asset integration is assumed in the thesis, this means that financial 
losses or gains form a risky business decision is viewed as an equivalent to changes in net assets or 
wealth.  
 
It is also a central assumption that most farmers are risk averse. This is no to say that they do not 
take risks. But they only do so provided there is a sufficient incentive. That is, a risk premium (RP) 
that yields a certainty equivalent (CE) of the risky prospect above the certainty equivalent of the 
‘sure thing’. It is not assumed that no one has risk preferences or that no one is risk neutral or that 
everyone has the same level of risk aversion. In fact it is a key assumption in the third paper, that 
  
13 
 
there is heterogeneity in the CE of farmers stemming from the assumptions that farmers are hetero-
geneous in the perception of and attitude towards uncertainty as well as in their capacity to carry 
risk in the eyes of external financial partners. The third paper exploits the profit opportunity of in-
ter-agent differences in risk aversion and subjective perceptions of uncertain outcomes.    
 
The expected monetary value of a risky prospect minus the CE equals the RP (when all pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary aspects are valued in money terms). This is also referred to as the cost of risk in 
paper III following terminology of Chavas (2011). 
 
The main focus of this thesis is the coping strategies of agricultural decision makers with regard to 
their perceived exposure to risky and uncertain farm-related events. Resent research suggests that 
farmers’ subjective beliefs and their degree of risk aversion are related, which affects their risk 
management strategies (Menapace et al., 2012). The farmers’ perception of risky prospects is taken 
as given in this thesis and it assumed that the farmer is able to rank them. 
 
1.2.4 RISK MANAGEMENT 
This subsection will introduce and discuss the basic purpose of risk management and define the 
term as it is used in this thesis.  
 
Risk and uncertainty are omnipresent. This is especially true in agriculture, where the major produc-
tive factors are relatively exposed to the natural environment, while major political interest in the 
sector may change agricultural and trade policy, foreign or domestic, thereby having a significant 
impact on farmers who are exposed to general economic conditions just like any other business 
(Moschini and Hennessy, 2001). Farm businesses, which are typically small in terms of the number 
of employees, are susceptible to human risks such as sickness, injury or cognitive lapses.    
 
The range of different types of risk includes operational risk, economic risk and strategic risk 
(Andersen and Schrøder, 2010). Finance and organization potentially have implications for the 
management of all risk categories. This thesis primarily focuses on the implications for risk man-
agement of changes in finance and organization, while acknowledging that other aspects of risk 
management can be affected as well.     
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Figure 1.1: The dual aim of strategic risk management.2  
Source: Adapted from Andersen and Schrøder (2010) 
 
The dual aim of risk management is represented by the tradeoff between minimizing the probability 
of financial failure, and maximizing the probability that the strategic goals for the farm will be 
achieved. Figure 1.1 illustrates the dual aim of strategic risk management which is to, on the one 
hand, seek opportunities and, on the other, manage the risk of crippling losses (The Institute of Risk 
Management, 2002).  
 
By identifying, assessing and coping with risk and uncertainty, risk management balances this 
tradeoff. Risk management must therefore be an integrated part of strategic management. This the-
sis deals primarily with the question of which risk coping strategies are open to farmers and how 
this is affected by institutional factors. Questions concerning the identification and assessment of 
risk and the optimal choice among the open risk coping strategies are beyond the scope of this the-
sis.  
 
The strategic goals of the farmer are taken as given in this thesis and acceptable levels of perceived 
exposure to risk and uncertainty is assumed to be an integrated part of strategic goal formulation 
(although this may be a subconscious process). Risk management is defined as the part of manage-
ment that deals with the perceived risks and uncertainties that are associated with reaching the stra-
tegic goals. As such risk management is associated with most choices in farm management, as al-
most no choices are independent of some level of risk or uncertainty.  
                                                 
2 Note the axes are not equidistant. 
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1.2.5 RISK COPING ALTERNATIVES 
This subsection will introduce and discuss the four basic risk coping alternatives. The theme of the 
thesis is closely related to these alternatives as it explores interaction between different coping al-
ternatives.  
 
There are four major categories of risk coping strategy; Accept, Reduce, Transfer and Avoid. These 
strategies are depicted in Figure 1.2. Avoiding risk means not engaging in the risky activity, e.g. not 
flying due to a fear of crashing, or not marrying due to a fear of divorce, etc. At first glance this 
strategy seems attractive as the possibility of losses connected with the activity is eliminated. How-
ever, the possibility of returns from the activity is also eliminated. The saying: “Noting ventured, 
noting gained”, moderates the avoidance strategy. This is, however, an integrated part of most peo-
ple’s everyday lives, we are just not consciously aware of all the things we do not do because they 
involve risk.  
 
Figure 1.2: The four major categories of risk coping strategies. 
 
Transferring or sharing risk can be illustrated by the archetypical risk management instrument, in-
surance. Buying fire insurance for the home for example transfers part of the risk of a serious loss 
on a primary asset for many families. Hedging of price risk in agriculture is also a risk transfer or 
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risk sharing strategy, as the farmer transfers the price risk exposure to the counterpart in the hedging 
arrangement, for example by use of a futures or a forward contract.   
 
The reduction of risk is another example of risk coping that is so integrated in everyday lives that 
we often do not think about it. Looking both ways before crossing the street is an example of a risk 
coping strategy that greatly reduces the risk of getting run over. Many risk reduction strategies in 
agriculture are so integrated with general farm management that it is hard and pointless to distin-
guish them. One risk reduction strategy does however deserve special attention. Diversification is a 
risk reduction strategy that mitigates the impact of exposure but not the probability of incurring 
losses. It is illustrated by the phrase “don’t put all your eggs in one basket” which has a clear agri-
cultural reference. Diversifying the portfolio of activities and/or investments in a farming business 
reduces the risk of devastating losses as the probability of everything going wrong at the same time 
reduces with an increasing number of activities. The chances are that with a well-chosen portfolio, 
bad outcomes in one line of activity will be mitigated by good outcomes in other lines of activity. 
Markowitz (1952) formalized the diversification strategy by proposing a solution to the portfolio 
selection problem.  
 
In agriculture, like many other sectors, there is a distinct trade-off between diversification gains and 
specialization gains (Benni et al., 2012). Many, in principal diversifiable, risks are not diversified 
away, because this would mean foregoing the gains of specialization and exploiting economies of 
scale. The risk of adverse weather conditions, for example, could in principal be diversified away 
by having many small farms all around the world. Yet, this is not a common strategy for the very 
good reason that the gains from specialization and economies of scale would be lost.  
 
The last major category of risk coping strategies is acceptance of risk or risk retention. In a business 
such as agriculture, some risks must be accepted, preferably those that have a low economic impact 
and low probability of occurrence. Risk that cannot be effectively mitigated by any other means 
must be retained, effectively being the key word, as there are always tradeoffs between the different 
coping strategies. The risk management challenge is to optimize the use and combination of the 
different strategies. The upside of the term “nothing ventured, nothing gained” is that gains or prof-
its are associated with risk retention. There may not be such a thing as riskless return, but there is 
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such a thing as return-less risk. Retaining risk with adequate reward, reducing or transferring risk at 
minimum possible cost or avoiding the return-less risk is at the core of risk management.  
 
1.2.6 BASIC FINANCIAL THEORY 
This subsection will introduce and discuss basic financial theory. This is the roots of the literature 
on the interaction between the firms risk exposure, finance and the separation of risk pertaining to 
the firm in a fully equity financed situation and the risk associated with the use of debt in the fi-
nance of the firms activities.    
 
The Separation Theorem, attributed to Tobin (1958), says that the optimal choice of an investment 
portfolio can be separated into two steps. The first step is the construction of the efficient portfolio, 
as shown by Markowitz (1952), while the second is combining this efficient portfolio with a risk-
free asset through borrowing or lending to construct a “ray of dominant sets” (Tobin, 1958, p. 84), 
i.e. separating the choice of where to be on the efficient portfolio frontier from the decision maker’s 
risk preference. The ray of dominant sets later became known as the Capital Market Line in the 
framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964) illustrated in Figure 1.3.  
 
Figure 1.3: Capital Asset Pricing Model 
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While the separation theorem and the CAPM are keystones of financial economics and are very 
strong in illustrative power, the notion of a riskless asset does however seem to have next to no 
practical relevance for agricultural risk management from a farmer’s point of view. The positive 
holding of cash seen as a riskless asset with no or low return may have some practical merit, but 
negative holding (shorting) of the riskless asset, e.g. borrowing, at the riskless interest rate is not 
usually a relevant option for farmers, and when it is,  only to a limited extent. This is well recog-
nized by Sharpe (1964), but may be less well recognized by some of the economist  applying the 
theory. The key insight; that all practical alternatives possibly included in a portfolio should be tak-
en into account when analyzing risk exposure, is however valid. For agriculture, this includes posi-
tive and/or negative holdings of financial instruments such as cash, corporate stock and bonds, as 
well as borrowing and related instruments such as interest rate swaps and foreign exchange rate 
exposure, and obviously the core agricultural activities (Hardaker et al., 2004) which usually consti-
tutes a somewhat diversified portfolio.  
 
The Separation Theorem can also be seen a source of inspiration for the distinction between busi-
ness risk and financial risk in the Gabriel and Baker (1980)  concept, although this is not referenced 
specifically. Extensions of Gabriel and Baker, however, do make the explicit connection (Barry and 
Robison, 1987; Barry et al., 1981; Collins, 1985). 
 
When the transfer of risks is institutionalized, the notion of borrowing at the riskless interest rate 
becomes more relevant. There is an important difference between an institutional investor’s per-
spective and that of an individual farmer. Insurance is a classic example of risk transfer from the 
farmer’s (insurers) point of view. However, institutionalizing the risk transforms the issue to a mat-
ter of diversification (risk reduction) via reinsurance from the insurance company’s point of view.    
 
The extent, to which risks are institutionalized, as well as the form in which they are institutional-
ized, is related to the risk uncertainty continuum discussed above. Generally, the higher the degree 
of confidence in quantitative assessments of the risk, the more likely the case that some form of 
market institution will be in place to transfer the risk. For example the availability of the market 
institution ‘insurance’ rest upon the applicability of actuarial calculations and the law of large num-
bers (Andersen and Schrøder, 2010) among other conditions for insurability.    
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Policy initiatives may be in place where markets have failed, in the case of the EU Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP), price risk have been reduced, but the risk of discontinuation of the policy has 
also been introduced, effectively transforming market risk into policy risk. The interaction of the 
different institutional frames for farming and business in general are complex. For example, the 
CAP has probably crowded out market-based risk management instruments (OECD, 2011). The 
first paper of this thesis proposes that the financial environment has had a similar crowding out ef-
fect on market-based risk management. Changes in the institutional frames for finance can have 
important implications for a number of different risk management aspects. The implications with 
regard to organization and price risk management will be in focus the thesis.         
 
1.2.7 FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
This subsection will briefly introduce and discuss the corporate finance tradition for measuring ac-
cess to credit. The first paper of the thesis develops an alternative to this approach.   
 
A firm’s internally generated cash flow is a key concern for risk management. A major rationale for 
hedging has been the increased ability to raise external capital in the form of debt due to more stable 
internal cash flows and lower default risk (Froot et al., 1993). Thus, the rationale for hedging as a 
risk management tool is to increase access to finance, to facilitate the execution of investment plans 
and to improve the ability to achieve strategic goals. The results of Reynolds et al. (2009) suggest 
that smaller firms, which presumably face steep costs of accessing external funds, are hedging with 
derivatives to smooth their cash flows to reduce default risk and improve the availability of external 
funds for investment. This rational connects risk management with issues related to access to fi-
nance.  
 
Access to finance is commonly regarded as a key requirement for economic growth. In numerous 
studies in corporate finance as well as in the development and agricultural economics literature, the 
existence and importance of financial or credit constraints have been examined (Petrick, 2005). 
With regard to credit constraints in agriculture, the concept has been investigated thoroughly for a 
long period of time, but the majority of investigations have focused on the omnipresent credit con-
straints in the immature credit markets in the developing countries or former Eastern Bloc countries 
(Briggeman et al., 2009). Research on the impact of mature credit markets in developed countries is 
more limited, although some research exists (Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992).  
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One of the major research questions in corporate finance has revolved around the extent, effect and 
measurement of financial frictions, reflecting how the institutional environment, with regard to fi-
nance, has a number of policy implications.   
 
The literature on the measurement of financial constraints has been shaped by the question of 
whether investment-cash flow sensitivities are appropriate measures for financial constraints, or not. 
In their seminal paper, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (FHP) (1988) establish that underinvestment 
will occur when external capital is more costly than internal finance. However, Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) criticize the above authors for their dependency on the assumption of monotonicity, whereby 
investment sensitivity increases monotonically in the degree of financial constraint, as the authors 
did not provide a well-grounded theoretical foundation for their assumption. Kaplan and Zingales 
(2000) stated that “Investment-cash flow sensitivities are not valid measures of financing con-
straints,” which was countered by Fazzari et al. (2000) who maintained that “Investment-cash flow 
sensitivities are useful”.  
 
There are still unresolved issues when it comes to quantifying financial constraints (Bond and Van 
Reenen, 2007). However, the impact of financial constraints on firm behavior is important. The 
bulk of research on these issues in the general corporate finance literature is concerned with what 
Barry and Baker (1971, p. 222) call “External credit rationing” and is narrowly focused on the di-
chotomous categorization of firms being either financially constrained or unconstrained and thereby 
ignores the important dynamics of self-imposed limitations on credit use which Barry and Baker 
(1971) emphasize in the agricultural finance literature. Focusing narrowly on whether firms are fi-
nancially constrained or not will greatly limit the understanding of the interaction between invest-
ment, finance and risk management behavior.  
 
Dealing with unlisted and non-incorporated agricultural firms (farms) poses some additional me-
thodical challenges to the usual setting of incorporated and listed firms that are traditionally the 
subject of corporate finance. The investment cash flow sensitivity measure’s reliance on Tobin’s q 
to control for investment opportunities is one important example, as most agricultural firms (farms) 
are not traded on stock exchanges and thus there is no observable market valuation from which to 
calculate Tobin’s q.  
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Models which attempt to navigate around this problem (Petrick, 2005) tend to build up a large 
number of poorly supported behavioral assumptions (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). The difficulties 
identified with existing measures related to access to credit led my co-author and I to propose an 
alternative approach to the problem which culminated in paper I, which is presented in chapter 2.  
 
The paper develops a measure for access to credit and the utilization of this access and thus repre-
sents a measure of credit reserves which are an important part of liquidity reserves which in turn is 
an important part of the whole farm risk management considerations.  
 
The general focus on the relationship between risk management and finance is that represented by 
Froot et al. (1993) which basically say ‘manage risk and you shall borrow’ however the line of in-
quiry pursued in this thesis stress the reverse relationship, that emphasizes the effect of the manag-
ers perceived credit reserve on risk management, this follow the focus of Donaldson (1961) among 
others.      
 
Investment cash flow sensitivity measures that have been the focus of corporate finance say nothing 
about the credit reserves of firms, and thus ignore the link between finance and risk management. 
Paper I address this problem by proposing a novel measure of credit access.      
 
1.2.8 LEVERAGE AND LIQUIDITY 
This subsection will introduce and discuss the role of credit reserves as a risk coping alternative. 
The key models applied in the thesis are introduces as well as the key concepts of risk balancing 
and the crowding out effect.   
 
Baker (1968) emphasized the link between liquidity, risk management and finance in the agricultur-
al finance literature. Gabriel and Baker (1980) formulated a model in which the probability that 
some critical cash demand cannot be met is a function of the net cash flow, fixed debt servicing 
obligations, liquidity reserves and minimum liquidity requirements.  
  
Keynes (1936) also realized the importance of liquidity in the description of three types of motives 
for holding cash; the income-motive, the business-motive and the precautionary-motive, and stated 
that: “The strength of all these three types of motives will partly depend on the cheapness and the 
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reliability of methods of obtaining cash, when it is required, by some form of temporary borrowing, 
in particular by overdraft or its equivalent. For there is no necessity to hold idle cash to bridge over 
intervals if it can be obtained without difficulty at the moment when it is actually required” 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 196). Note that Keynes says that price as well as non-price mechanisms affect the 
use of borrowing, “cheapness” and “reliability”. Non-price mechanisms generally do not receive the 
attention they deserve. The current post financial crisis situation is characterized by low interest 
rates (cheapness), but difficult (unreliable) access to credit for many economic agents.  
 
Because a debt contract involves a fixed commitment to repay the principal and interest, it is nor-
mally considered to increase both the potential profit and the possibility of loss (Donaldson, 1961). 
This is what is reflected in the Separation Theorem. The real option value of “debt capacity as a 
reserve against the unexpected rather than as a continuous source” of liquidity is however an im-
portant safeguard against cash insolvency (Donaldson, 1961, p. 78).    
 
Related to the value of credit reserves, there are two main arguments against the current use of debt. 
One is framed in a positive sense and one in a negative. Credit reserves may be held to ensure the 
financial ability to exercise major investment opportunities promising unusual returns on invest-
ment in the unknown future, and credit reserves may be held in anticipation of possible negative 
future cash flow from operations (Donaldson, 1961).  
 
As a risk-coping mechanism, the maintenance of credit reserves is a universal tool that covers most 
risk exposures. Other risk-coping tools tend to be much more specific. For example, credit reserves 
can be used to cope with uncertainty with regard to future revenue from crop production. Alterna-
tive risk management instruments, e.g. operational risk management such as weather insurance or 
price risk management instruments such as hedging with forwards or futures, are often much more 
specific and a holistic approach to risk management becomes a much more complicated task with 
these specific instruments, as their use has to be coordinated (Coble et al., 2000).     
 
Gabriel and Baker (1980) formulate a model where the liquidity considerations mentioned above 
are explicit. The paper introduces the risk balancing concept defining it as “the adjustment in the 
components of total risk (i.e., business risk and financial risk) that results from an exogenous shock 
to the existing balance” (Gabriel and Baker, 1980, p. 561).  
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In Gabriel and Baker (1980) the shock is represented by a change in business risk (e.g. insurance, 
government programs, weather modification, technological or market innovations). In this thesis the 
major shock is represented by a change in financial risk in the wake of the GFC.  
 
Gabriel and Baker (1980) look at risk in a probabilistic sense which is a convenient way of com-
municating about risk and uncertainty even though it may be a simplification. They define total risk 
as “the probability, α, that one will be unable to generate a minimum level of funds needed for 
home consumption as well as business requirements after having serviced debt (Gabriel and Baker, 
1980, p. 562). Mathematically expressed as follows:  
 
( +  −  ≤ ) ≤ [(̅ +  − ) − ] ≤  (2) 
where:  
 α = probability that some critical cash demand cannot be met (default risk) 
cx = net cash flow 
cx = expected net cash flow 
μ = liquidity reserves 
I = fixed debt servicing obligations 
z = minimum liquidity requierment 
σ = the subjective variance of net cash flow 
 
The measure developed in paper I is a useful proxy for  in the Gabriel and Baker (1980) model 
above. Preliminary empirical evidence of Gabriel and Baker build on the change in land price to 
proxy for change in μ. We provide a more refined and micro-oriented measure of change in credit 
availability. Escalante and Barry (2001) provide empirical evidence for the risk balancing hypothe-
sis of Gabriel and Baker (1980), Barry (1983) and Barry and Robison (1987).  
 
Barry, Baker and Sanint (1981), Collins (1985) and Barry and Robison (1987) provide variations of 
the risk balancing hypothesis based on the expected utility mean variance approach.    
 
It is well established that agricultural policy affects the risk management of many farmers. This can 
be seen in terms of policy impact on the level and way of hedging (Berg and Kramer, 2008; Coble 
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et al., 2004; Gray et al., 2004) or in terms of the policy impact on diversification in the farming ac-
tivity (Lien and Hardaker, 2001; O’Donoghue et al., 2009). 
 
Implications for policy effect under risk balancing is specifically addressed by Featherstone et al. 
(1988), that point out that income stabilizing policy may induce a risk balancing farmer to increase 
financial risk in response to a policy that reduces business risk as well as in response to income 
augmenting policies. Turvey and Baker (1989, 1990) stress the role of farm capital structure in rela-
tion to policy and market based risk management (hedging).  
 
Crowding out effect is used by OECD (2009) as a label for the effect of agricultural policy on risk 
coping alternatives (e.g. hedging or insurance with market based instruments), Meuwissen, van As-
seldonk and Huirne (2008) and Garrido and Bielza (2008) also use the term. A general definition of 
the term can be “when the presence of one institution undermines the functioning of another” 
(Bowles, 2004, p. 495) and as such it can be seen as the opposite of institutional complementarity. 
This is a term that will be used in this thesis as well. OECD describes the effect as follows:    
 
“Interaction among policy measures has been shown to be very significant […]. In particular there 
is scope for crowding out market measures that cover the same type of risk as government pro-
grams: deficiency payments or price stabilization schemes tend to crowd out price hedging through 
futures and options. There is also evidence that insurance subsidies may increase specialization of 
the farm […]. This effect of crowding out other strategies diminishes the capacity of such mecha-
nisms to reduce variability and improve welfare” (OECD, 2009, p. 40).  
 
In addition to the effect of policy on market measures, the term crowding out, will also be used in 
relation to the possible effect of the financial system on market measures in this thesis. Specifically, 
the hypothesis that the perception of large credit reserves may crowed out market measures in a way 
that is similar to the crowding out effect of some policies.  
    
The interaction among policy, risk management and finance is well established. The main focus has 
been the impact of policy on risk management. In this thesis however the impact of the financial 
environment on risk management is emphasized.  
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In the Gabriel and Baker model in equation (2) risk management can be interpreted as activities that 
adjust  cx and  for example via hedging or diversification. Policies that stabilize income (reduce 
) may induce the farmer to increase leverage which will increase I as well as  cx and  (as a 
function of increased scale) via risk balancing.  
 
A central tenant in this thesis is that it is the perceived as well as the actual available credit reserves 
that are important with regard to decision behavior. Furthermore, the credit capacity is not constant, 
as the lenders’ “eagerness for new loan opportunities varie[s] from time to time as the flow of funds 
into the capital market varie[s] and as their particular portfolio requirements [are] shifted. Thus it 
might be that an unusually large flow of funds available for investment could lead to a temporary 
though perhaps modest relaxation in the risk standard of the lender. The timing of the particular 
loan request therefore had some bearing on the risk decision” (Donaldson, 1961, pp. 129–130). The 
GFC may be characterized as the culmination of a period with an extraordinarily significant relaxa-
tion in the risk standard, the effect of which is reflected in a recently published model by Eggertsson 
and Krugman (2012) where a sudden and unexpected change in access to credit spurs economic 
instability similar to the current crisis. “An extended period of steady economic growth or rising 
asset prices will encourage relaxed attitudes towards leverage. But at some point this attitude is like-
ly to change, perhaps abruptly – an event known variously as the Wile E. Coyote moment or the 
[Minsky]3 moment” (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012, p. 1475).  
 
The financial environment is represented by μ, in the Gabriel and Baker model, as liquidity reserves 
are the sum of liquid asset in reserve and credit reserves as emphasized by Donaldson (1961). The 
impact of a shock to the financial system (e.g. the GFC) will affect the balance between risk man-
agement, policy and finance and may initiate an adaption process. This is the theme of this thesis. 
Paper I develops a novel measure that can proxy for μ, paper II explores the interaction between 
organization and risk management in the light of the policy and financial environment and paper III 
explores a possible part of the adaption process involving cooperative organization of marketing 
that dominates the Danish livestock sector.  
 
                                                 
3 Typo, original text reads ”Minksy” but should read ”Minsky” 
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Paper III is based on an extension of the Collins (1997) model supporting a positive economic theo-
ry of hedging. Like Gabriel and Baker (1980), Collins (1997) takes the approach to risk that it can 
be formulated as a probability of cash insolvency or in the words of Gabriel and Baker (1980, p. 
562) being “unable to generate a minimum level of funds needed for home consumption as well as 
business requirements after having serviced debt”. Following Collins (1997), the model is: 
 
 = ! + ["#$ + "%&(1 − $)]' − *' − ,- − . (3) 
 
Where  is the terminal equity, ! is the initial equity, "# is the forward price of hedged output, $ 
is the hedge ratio, "%& is the stochastic cash price of the unhedged output, ' is output, * is variable 
costs, , is the interest rate paid on debt, - is debt and  . is fixed costs. Given stochastic cash price 
of output, terminal equity is a stochastic function of not only realized cash price and the quantity 
hedged, but also the financial leverage of the firm.  
 
Let () be the probability density function for terminal equity. The objective function in the Col-
lins (1997) model is: 
max  =   ()
/
0/
 
s. t.   () ≤ 
3
0/
 
(4) 
 
This means that farmers are assumed to try to maximize their wealth subject to the constraint that 
the risk of wealth under some subjective disaster level is under some acceptable level. The disaster 
level can be thought of as the risk of insolvency, but may represent any other minimum level of 
wealth acceptable for the farmer.       
 
This thesis revolves around the question of what happens to the interaction between risk manage-
ment, finance and organization before and after a Minsky moment. Liquidity reserves, being the 
sum of liquid assets and the credit reserves defined as the maximum amount of unused credit 
(Baker, 1968), are a major risk management tool, not least in Danish agriculture. In a Minsky mo-
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ment, credit reserves and thus liquidity reserves can by reduced dramatically introducing the need 
for alternative means for the management of risk.  
 
The first paper of this thesis provides empirical evidence suggesting that attitudes towards the use 
of debt were relaxed up to the GFC. The concept of business risk and financial risk suggests that 
this relaxation of access to credit will have affected the risk management practices used by Danish 
farmers. The GFC, which can be seen as the culmination of Minsky moment and the chaotic period 
after, suggest changes to the crowding out effect of finance on other risk coping mechanisms.  
 
Paper II explores the possibility of interactions between finance, risk management and organization. 
If there are important interactions and if there are important changes to the financial environment in 
the wake of the financial crisis, this will possibly have an effect on risk management and organiza-
tion.  
 
Paper III explores a possible organizational reaction to the changes in the agricultural business envi-
ronment after the GFC. Specifically the Danish marketing cooperatives ability to empower their 
members with the possibility of individual (output) price risk management.  
 
Unlike the universal nature of risk-coping via credit reserves, the alternative risk management in-
struments are likely to be more specific. The misuse of specific risk management instruments may 
increase the exposure to related risk aspect. For example in the case of forward pricing under opera-
tional risks the cost of operational failure may be amplified by the cost of failure to meet contracted 
quantities. This leads to the question of the optimal hedge ratio (Hull, 2002).          
 
1.2.9 RISK MANAGEMENT IN DANISH AGRICULTURE 
This subsection gives a brief historical account of the development in risk management and related 
institutional domains in Danish agriculture to place the thesis in context. It describes the in-
put/output asymmetry in the hedging opportunities for Danish farmers which the third paper seeks 
to address. The section continues by discussing the possible impact of the GFC on the institutional 
matrix.     
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Structural changes in Danish agriculture have affected the way risk has been managed during the 
past forty years. Danish agriculture was still diversified on the farm level up to the 1970s, but then 
specialization in pigs, dairy and cash crops began to dominate the sector to such an extent that hard-
ly any diversified farms are left today (Hansen, 2010). However, diversification took another form 
in the 2000s, when some farmers increased their off-farm investments, often by leveraging their 
existing farm asset portfolio. While there has been a lot of productivity gain from specialization in 
the recent decades, there has also been an increase in risk exposure, which has been further ampli-
fied by an increase in financial leverage.  
 
One reason for this development is likely due to the development of the EU (EC) Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP), which stabilized prices and to some extent converted business risk to policy risk 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Agricultural policy probably crowded out market-based risk manage-
ment instruments and institutions (OECD, 2009), which is consistent with Gabriel and Baker’s 
(1980) and Turvey and Baker’s (1990) theory of risk balancing between business risk and financial 
risk, where a exogenous reduction in business risk, due to agricultural policy, leads the farmer to 
increase financial risk (leverage) to a level where total risk reaches the status quo. As will be shown 
in the first paper, access to credit increased during the 2000s, which may be an additional explana-
tory factor for the absence of risk management in Denmark, as agricultural policy may crowd out 
risk management institutions as may abundant access to credit in a credit cycle boom. This effect is 
generally not well recognized.  
 
Contracting is somewhat asymmetric in livestock production in Denmark. Farmer’s hedge inputs 
such as feedstuffs, etc. but they do not hedge outputs, such as milk and meat. The expected behavior 
of a risk adverse farmer with weak positive correlation between input and output would be to hedge 
symmetrically or not to hedge at all (Pennings and Wansink, 2004). Given a high debt level in the 
sector, it could be presumed that hedging is a prerequisite for access to finance (Froot et al., 1993). 
However, this has not been the case. The relatively easy access to credit may in fact have dimin-
ished the need for risk management and prevented risk management institutions from developing. If 
access to credit becomes harder in the post GFC world, it is important to understand the reasons for 
the absence of the institutional framework for risk management and to stimulate the development of 
risk management institutions which empower farmers to cope with risk at the farm level.   
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The financial markets have changed tremendously in the aftermath of the GFC. Obtaining access to 
credit for investments is (and for some time is expected to be) much harder than it was before the 
crisis. This means that Danish famers, and their stakeholders in the agribusiness and financial indus-
tries, will move toward a financial environment in which risk management is an important factor in 
determining access to external finance for investments. An implication of this development is that 
more constrained firms, if possible, will use derivatives more than the less constrained firms. Risk 
management has not been a key management topic in Danish agriculture until recently. This leads 
to the flipside of the Froot et al. (1993) argument which suggests that, in the presence of abundant 
access to external finance, there is little reason for the hedging of cash flows, which means that a 
situation in which no financial institutions (products and markets) have the ability to transfer risk 
between hedgers and other market participants, will develop, simply because of the lack of demand. 
Farmers may have been asking the rhetorical question: Why hedge, if you can borrow? This implies 
that a long period of relatively easy access to credit may devalue more market-based risk manage-
ment (hedging) and explain why risk management institutions are not well developed in Danish 
agriculture. The recent development in agricultural finance and the overall credit supply calls for 
institutional entrepreneurship with regard to risk management institutions.  
 
1.2.10 AGRICULTURAL FINANCE IN DENMARK 
This subsection continues the historical account of the development in the institutional domain with 
special focus on finance. The section compares capital structure in Danish agriculture with EU agri-
culture to illustrate that there is something special about the financial environment of Danish agri-
culture.    
 
Blancard et al. (2006, p. 351) state that “farmers’ operations and investments heavily depend on 
internal financing,” which is consistent with the EU average self-financing rate in Figure 1.4. In 
2009, the Farm Accountancy Data Network (2012) (FADN) data show a EU level average debt-to-
asset ratio of 15.6 %, which is consistent with Barry and Robison (2001). The average Danish debt-
to-asset ratio was, however, significantly higher at 52.0 %. For farms in the economic size units >= 
100 in the FADN (2012) database, the 2009 EU average debt-to-asset ratio was 28.4 % while the 
Danish average was 60.3 %.  
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Investments in Danish agriculture have been relativity high compared to other EU countries. This 
may be due to relatively easy access to credit for investment in Denmark compared to other EU 
countries. Defining the self-financing rate as the cash flow over gross investments for European 
Size Units >= 100 in the FADN (2012) database, shows that the self-financing rate in Danish agri-
culture is lower than all other regions and is falling faster than most other regions with a compara-
ble data stream. The EU average self-finance rate over the period from 1989 to 2009 was 2.062 with 
almost no development over the years. In comparison, the Danish average self-finance rate was 
0.708 and falling by approximately 5 percentage points a year. The Netherlands is the only compa-
rable region in EU and even here the level of the self-financing rate is 0.57 above the Danish level 
on average.  
 
 
Figure 1.4: Self-finance rate in selected EU regions from 1989 to 2009  
Source: FADN (2012) (European Size Units >= 100) 
 
Many characteristics of Danish agricultural finance are similar to those of agricultural finance in 
other developed economies. Agriculture is heavily reliant on non-depreciable assets, such as farm-
land, in which much of the economic return occurs as capital gains or losses. It has been shown by 
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Barry and Robison (1986) that the debt-carrying capacity of non-depreciable assets is considerably 
lower than that of depreciable assets under traditional loan repayment arrangements. It is, therefore, 
logical to expect lower aggregate debt-to-asset ratios for the farm sector (Barry and Robison, 2001). 
Danish agriculture does not, however, exhibit significantly lower debt-carrying capacity than other 
sectors. 
 
Figure 1.5: Self-financing rate 
 
Figure 1.6: Cash Flows 
 
Figure 1.7: EBIT/Assets and EBIT/Debt 
 
Figure 1.8: Total Assets, Debt and EBIT 
 
Figure 1.9: EBIT/Assets, EBIT/Debt and  
                    interest rates 
 
Figure 1.10: EBIT 
Source: Figures 1.5-1.10 Statistics Denmark (2010) 
 
Since 1994, the self-financing rate of Danish agriculture has declined (Figure 1.5). Investments per 
year increased reaching a peak level in 2006 after which they declined rapidly in the following 
years during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 (Figure 1.6). Since 1994, the total assets of Dan-
ish agriculture measured at book value have increased at an accelerating rate. Debt in Danish agri-
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culture has also increased over the period and debt-to-asset ratios have been almost constant. Sector 
level earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) have been relatively constant over the period of in-
creasing asset valuation and debt. The sector level EBIT has fluctuated roughly between one and 
two billion Euro per year, except in 2009 when the level fell by nearly 600 million Euros (Figures 
1.8 and 1.10). EBIT over assets and EBIT over debt have declined over the period. For EBIT over 
assets, the level has been close to the level of the Danish ten year government bond (Figures 1.7 and 
1.9).   
 
During the period there have been large (partly unrealized) capital gains in the sector, which is not 
reflected in the EBIT. It appears that factors other than increasing EBIT may have driven the large 
and increasing investments in the sector up to the financial crisis. Expectations of continuing large 
capital gains may be an explanation. A decreasing interest level combined with a constant sector 
level EBIT may rationally explain (some of) the increase in the asset value. Capital gains are ex-
pected on farmland in the long run, as Barry and Robison (1986, p. 388) argue: “… accounting 
measures may not provide a valid basis for comparing the true profitability of farmland investments 
with that of other assets”. Accounting rates of return have been relatively low in Danish agriculture 
along with agricultural returns in other countries. Economic returns, though, have been relatively 
high due to higher leverage and high capital gains. This relatively high economic return is thus as 
much a return on financial positions as it is a return on agricultural activity.   
 
If investors lower their (weighted average) cost of capital, the present value of future cash flows 
increases. This may (partly) account for the increasing asset values and higher willingness to pay 
for agricultural assets, especially land. Whether or not investors have fully accounted for discrepan-
cies in the duration of underlying agricultural assets and the duration of financing is questionable. It 
may even be that the discrepancy has increased, as Danish farmers, to an increasing extent, have 
made use of variable interest loans. Variable interest rate loans have carried a low interest rate, but 
they may also have affected the cost of capital that farmers (unconsciously) have used in their in-
vestment decisions, making the profitability more sensitive to interest rate changes. Lower interest 
rates and a larger discrepancy between the duration of finance and the duration of fundamental as-
sets may have driven over-investment, as access to credit does not seem to have been a constraining 
factor.  
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The Danish Mortgage Bond System is characterized by the balancing principal which ensures that 
each loan from the mortgage bank is matched or balanced by bonds of the same amount. Based on 
collateral in real estate, borrowers can loan up to a legally determined loan to value limit. The mort-
gage bank issues bonds to the borrower and usually sells them on the behalf of the borrower in the 
financial market. The borrower receives the revenue from the bond sale which may be different than 
par. The borrower now pays the mortgage bank quarterly installments which are composed of inter-
est, principal repayments and administrative fees. The borrower has the option to prepay the loan at 
par or to buy bonds of the series behind the loan. The Danish mortgage banking system plays an 
important role as a source of debt finance for fixed enterprise investments, such as agricultural land 
and buildings, especially for small and medium enterprises. The mortgage bond system’s “position 
in the market is supported by the fact that the structure of private enterprise in Denmark is dominat-
ed by small and medium-sized enterprises. Unlike bigger companies, they cannot issue corporate 
bonds, and instead rely on funding of their fixed assets through mortgage credits.” (United Nations, 
2005, p. 30).   
 
The Gabriel and Baker (1980) concepts of business and financial risk stress the importance of credit 
reserves. The first paper in the thesis introduces a measure for access to credit which can be used to 
identify credit reserves. The measure supports the hypothesis of increasing access to credit up to the 
financial crisis. Inflated credit reserves would have reduced the need for business risk management 
(hedging) according to Gabriel and Baker’s (1980) risk-balancing concept. This lack of demand will 
have crowded out the need for risk management, adding this to the crowding out effect of agricul-
tural policy. Thus the lack of an institutional framework for market-based risk management in agri-
culture is not surprising. However, the role and interaction effect of the financial system does not 
play a major role in the policy debate, exemplified by the lack of focus in OECD (2009, 2011) re-
ports on risk management in agriculture. This is a serious caveat. 
  
1.3 Research Approach 
1.3.1 NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS  
This subsection gives a brief introduction to New Institutional Economics which is the main re-
search approach of the thesis addressing the overarching research question of the implications of 
interaction of finance and organization on whole farm risk management. In the individual papers of 
the thesis, the NIE approach is most clear in the second paper as this paper applies an explorative 
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comparative institutional analysis. In the first paper the link to NIE should be seen through the em-
pirical support for an institutional crowding out effect (Bowles, 2004) by a financial system that 
provides easy access to credit. The third paper is a mechanism design paper proposing new designs 
in response to institutional change, integrating NIE and mechanism design as suggested by Hurwicz 
(1987).   
 
The trade-off between diversification and specialization mentioned above illustrates an important 
fact realized by Ronald H. Coase (1937). The fact is that the coordination of activities internally in 
firms and externally between firms involve costs and whichever costs are lowest determines the 
efficient boundary between the firm and the market. Coordinating activities on the aforementioned 
hypothetical farm with activities diversified all over the globe would be very costly, which explains 
why this is not the usual way of organizing farming. One way of mitigating these coordination costs 
is to establish joint stock farm operations along with other farmers all over the world, taking the job 
as a hired farm manager on one of them and holding a portfolio of stocks in all the farms. However 
this is not the usual way of organizing farming either. The diversification of activities locally, e.g. 
producing grain, meat, milk, eggs, etc. on the same farm was, however, the usual way of coping 
with risk not so very long ago. New Institutional Economics (NIE) has some very good explana-
tions for agricultural organization. Allen and Lueck (1998) is one example of a NIE explanation for 
the organization of farms as owner-operated enterprises. The interplay between seasonality and ran-
domness creates moral hazard, a situation where the optimal level of effort is higher for the owner 
operator than for a hired farm manager. This, along with limits to the gains from specialization and 
timing problems, results in sole proprietorships becoming the optimal organizational form. The suc-
cessful mitigation of seasonality and randomness does, however, lead farm organization to converge 
towards corporate ownership. Such a trend is illustrated by the development in modern livestock 
farming where confinement systems shield production from the effects of seasonality and random-
ness.         
Table 1.1: New or Neo-institutional Economics? 
 
Zero Transaction 
Costs 
Perfect 
Information 
Rationality 
Neoclassical Economics + + + 
Neo-institutional Economics - - + 
New Institutional Economics - - - 
Source: (Sykuta and Chaddad, 1999) 
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New Institutional Economics and Neo-Institutional Economics relax some of the major assumptions 
in Neoclassical Economics. Transaction costs and imperfect information are introduced in both 
New and Neo-Institutional Economics, while New Institutional Economics takes a step further and 
adds bounded rationality to the complexity and realism of economic models (Sykuta and Chaddad, 
1999). The realization that institutions matter and the focus of research on the way different institu-
tions work and interact with each other is central to NIE.  
 
There are three different ways of using the term ‘institutions’. First, the term may mean organiza-
tional establishments in casual conversation (e.g. financial institutions such as banks or mortgage 
institutions). Second, the term may refer to ‘the rules of the game’ (North, 1990) and third the term 
may refer to the ‘equilibrium strategy’ of the game (Aoki, 2001, 2007). 
 
The term ‘the institutional framework around finance’ will be used to distinguish the financial insti-
tutions as part of the institutional matrix and financial institutions as organizations (e.g. banks) in 
this thesis.  
 
The second and third use of the term needs further explanation. The institutions as ‘rules of the 
game’ (North) refers to the formal and informal rules in society such as constitutions, laws, property 
rights and taboos, customs, traditions, etc. According to this view “rules are exogenously pre-
determined outside the domain of economic transactions” (Aoki, 2007, p. 1). The use of the term as 
an ‘equilibrium strategy’ of a game can be seen as an elaboration of the rules of the game view. In 
this view the institutions are endogenously determining each other.  
 
The major open questions in the ‘rules of the game’ view of institutions is how the rules are deter-
mined and who enforces them, “who enforces the enforcer” (Aoki, 2007, p. 5). The major open 
question in the ‘equilibrium strategy’ view is a variation of the knowledge problem (Hayek, 1945). 
How can bounded-rational and asymmetrically informed agents find mutually consistent choices?  
 
Aoki tries to reconcile the rules of the game view and the equilibrium strategy view with the follow-
ing definition: 
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 “An institution is self-sustaining, salient patterns of social interactions, as represented by meaning-
ful rules that every agent knows and are incorporated as agents’ shared beliefs about how the game 
is played and to be played” (Aoki, 2007, p. 6).     
 
This thesis approaches risk management from a NIE perspective. Against the background of a reali-
zation that institutions matter and that great changes to financial systems may result from the finan-
cial crisis, the NIE approach is an effort to try to understand the process of institutional change, the 
interaction effects between finance, organization and risk management and how adaptive change 
can be stimulated in an appropriate manner. 
 
Williamson (2000) refers to four levels of social analysis where NIE is principally concerned with 
the second and third levels. Institutional governance (Williamson, 2000) or institutional arrange-
ments (Klein, 1999) at the third level are defined within the institutional environment of the second 
level. Figure 1.11 depicts an adaptation of Williamson’s framework in which finance and risk man-
agement examples which link changes at the four levels have been added. Although changes at the 
top level, the social embeddedness level, are usually very slow, Williamson recognizes occasional 
abrupt changes spurred by events like wars or financial crises. Whether or not the current financial 
crisis is appropriately placed at the top level (L1) is a matter for discussion. On the one hand, the 
frequency of financial crises does not seem to correspond with the frequency in the Williamson 
framework, whereas on the other hand, it seems clear that the level of trust and the perception of 
risk changed radically at the outbreak of the financial crisis. This can best be characterized by 
changes in informal institutions, placing them at the social embeddedness level. These changes have 
stimulated a host of changes in the formal institutions of level two (L2) such as the regulation of the 
financial sector, the ongoing work with the implementation of Basel III being a prominent example. 
The changes in level one and two affect the governance level, level three (L3), affecting access to 
credit, the governance of existing (debt) contracts and the choice between debt and equity. The 
changes at level three go on to affect level four (L4) where, among a number of other decisions, risk 
management decisions are made in an effort to align actual risk exposure with target risk exposure, 
under the recognition of the costs of reducing risk.  
 
NIE is a highly diverse field affecting “economics, political science, law, strategy, sociology, 
growth and development, history and other disciplines” (Klein, 2000, p. 479) and employing differ-
  
37 
 
ent theoretical and empirical approaches from Moral Hazard and Agency Theory to Transaction 
Cost Economics at the third level (L3) of analysis as well as a broad range of analytical approaches 
the second level (L2) ((Klein, 2000)).    
 
The ‘rules of the game’ view on institutions tends to focus on the downward pointing arrows on the 
left hand side in Figure 1.11, as oppose to the upward pointing arrows on the right hand side (punc-
tuated). This illustrates the exogenous view, whereas the endogenous view puts more equal focus on 
the factors determining the institutional framework. The Williamson (2000) figure does however 
also illustrate that ‘exogenous’ is too radical a label for the ‘rules of the game’ view, as the upward 
pointing arrows can be seen as an recognition of some level of endogeneity.   
 
 Level: Frequency: 
(years) 
Purpose: Example: 
L1 
Embeddedness: 
Informal institu-
tions, customs 
traditions norms 
religion 
102 to 103 
Often noncalculative; 
spontaneous 
The global financial crisis 
changes the level of trust in 
markets and beliefs such as “the 
price of real estate never falls” 
     
     
L2 
Institutional  
environment: 
formal rules of 
the game 
10 to 102 
Get the institutional 
environment right 1st 
order economizing 
Basel III; the GFC induces 
changes to financial regulation 
on national and international 
levels 
 
     
     
L3 
Governance: 
play of the game 
1 to 10 
Get the governance 
structures right 2nd  
order economizing 
Change at L1 and L2 affects the 
access to credit (abruptly) 
     
     
L4 
Resource  
allocation and 
employment 
continuous 
Get the marginal  
conditions right 3rd  
order economizing 
Changes in access to credit af-
fect risk management decisions, 
as credit reserves are dimin-
ished 
 
Figure 1.11: Economics of Institutions with consequences of the financial crisis.  
Source: Adaptation from Williamson (2000). 
 
Paper I 
Paper II 
Paper III 
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The interdependence of the institutional framework is not only a matter of interdependence across 
institutional levels as depicted above, but also a matter of interdependence across institutional do-
mains. Aoki (2007) use the four prototype domains: economic exchange, organizational exchange, 
political exchange and social exchange.  
 
The first paper in this thesis is concerned with a measure for the gradual increase in access to credit 
in Danish agriculture up to the financial crisis and suggests abrupt changes in this access to credit 
occurred with the financial crisis, situating the paper at level three and level four in the Williamson 
(2000) framework.  
 
The second paper introduces NIE more thoroughly and contributes to the field by stressing the im-
portance of including financial institutions and related interaction effects in NIE analysis. The paper 
applies an inter-temporal cross-country comparison of hog marketing arrangements in Denmark and 
the U.S., based on this exploratory case study it suggests that differences in the institutional envi-
ronment, with regard to agricultural finance, affect the evolution of the marketing arrangements. 
This paper is situated at level two and level three in the Williamson (2000) economics of institu-
tions framework.     
 
The third paper is an exercise in institutional entrepreneurship and mechanism design, where a 
model for reallocation of risk among members in agricultural cooperatives is introduced and ana-
lyzed. This model is a suggested adaptive change, in the face of a changing financial environment. 
As such this paper can be seen as a feedback, from level four to levels two and three in the William-
son (2000) economics of institutions framework. The model for reallocation will satisfy the latent 
need for risk management which emerged when the “Minsky” moment reduced farmers’ liquidity 
reserves.   
 
There may exist institutional complementarities or the opposite, institutional crowding out, among 
institutions in different domains. Institutional complementarity exits if institutional alternatives in 
one domain are positively affected by institutional alternatives in another domain. One example of 
institutional complementarity that will be proposed in this thesis is the possible institutional com-
plementarity between the institution ‘easy access to credit’ in the domain of finance, and the institu-
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tion of ‘cooperative processing and marketing’ of agricultural products in the domain of organiza-
tion.   
 
Cooperative processing and marketing is proposed to complement easy access to credit by reducing 
the marketing risk of the individual farmer. Farmers that are members of cooperative do not have to 
worry about finding a buyer for their products in the short term. This is an attractive property not 
the least for lenders to the farmer. The existence of some level of marketing security is proposed to 
increase the farmers’ access to credit.  
 
In turn, relatively easy access to credit is proposed to complement cooperative processing and mar-
keting. Cooperatives depend on debt from the financial markets and equity from there members to 
finance their activity. Easy access to finance may complement the institution of cooperative pro-
cessing and marketing in two ways, directly via easy access to debt financing of the cooperatives 
activity and indirectly via easy access to debt financing of the members private activity, making it 
easier for members to accept that the cooperative retains earnings to build equity.  
 
The thesis builds on the research assumption that institutional crowding out exist in institutional 
linkages between the domain of finance and the domain of risk management (hedging possibilities). 
Institutional crowding out is when the presence of one institution undermines the functioning of 
another (Bowles, 2004). In this thesis the institutions of easy access credit in the domain of finance 
leads farmers to the perception of having large credit reserves. This makes the farmer reluctant to 
use risk management tools such as price risk hedging via futures or forwards, as the risk of being 
unable to meet liquidity requirements is mitigated by large credit reserves. This reduces demand for 
this type of risk management tool to a level where the tool will not be offered at competitive market 
prices or not offered at all.  
 
Another example of institutional linkages is that of bundling, which is a type of linked game (Aoki, 
2007). Bundling occurs when multiple similar domains are grouped and change the equilibrium 
strategy. The third paper of this thesis can be seen as a suggestion of a third party bundling institu-
tion  (Aoki, 2007). The paper suggests a reallocation mechanism for price risk exposure for mem-
bers in cooperatives in the livestock sector (milk and meat). In principal, members in these coopera-
tive could reallocate price risk bilaterally by betting with each other on the cooperative price. How-
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ever, this behavior is not observed, likely because transaction costs, stemming from search cost and 
counterparty risk, are prohibitively high, this means that the equilibrium strategy is no exchange. 
The paper suggests a mechanism that reduces or eliminates these costs where the cooperative act as 
a form of auction and clearing house for this exchange. Bundling (non-existing) bilateral risk real-
location with a double auction mechanism may institutionalize risk reallocation and enhance the 
number of possible risk coping alternatives available to the farmer / cooperative member, the equi-
librium strategy changes with the introduction of institutional innovation. The establishment of this 
institution is not only dependent on the two parties of the exchange, but also the motivation of the 
third party  (Aoki, 2007), in this case the cooperative. Improving the risk management possibilities 
for their members may improve the investment possibilities of their members which is in the inter-
est of the cooperative, as this improves their long term supply chain.                  
 
1.3.2 METHOD 
This subsection discusses methodological issues with regard to the individual papers as well as the 
overall thesis. The thesis consists of three papers with different but complementary methodological 
approaches. The central ideas in the thesis are based on an institutional approach to risk manage-
ment based on New Institutional Economics (NIE), but the focus of the papers shifts and may be 
outside or at the perimeter of most definitions of NIE.    
 
The research question for the thesis is ‘what implications for whole farm risk management follow 
from the interaction of finance and organization and how does this affect the adaption to changes in 
these institutional domains?’  
 
The individual papers deliver partial answers to this question as part of a comparative institutional 
analysis (Aoki, 2001, 2007; Greif, 1998) to answer the overall question. However, given the com-
plexity of the question the thesis should be seen as an improvement of the understanding of the in-
stitutional dynamics related to agricultural risk management rather than definitive answers. Realiz-
ing that interaction between the institutional domains in question exists may however be an im-
portant first step in the understanding of institutional change.  
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The overall research question 
Being part of an industrial PhD project the thesis provides a normative recommendation to the co-
operatives in the Danish livestock sector, suggesting that they facilitate reallocation of price risk 
among their members. The recommendation builds on positive analysis of the context in paper I and 
paper II and a positive analysis of the suggested mechanism in paper III. The third paper is however 
normative in the sense that it analysis the mechanism in question compared to the status quo. As 
such it is not a global optimum but rather a discrete improvement that is suggested, other possible 
improvement is likely to exist.     
 
The dependent variable of the overall research question of the thesis should be seen as the risk cop-
ing alternatives open to farmers. The main explanatory variables of the thesis is the institutional 
framework around finance, specifically the crowding out of finance on market based price risk 
hedging and the likely change in this effect after the GFC, and the institutional framework in the 
domain of organization, specifically complementary effects between Danish organization of pro-
cessing and marketing of meat and milk and the Danish financial environment. 
 
Figure 1.12 The relation between the three papers and the overall research question. 
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Figure 1.12 illustrates the how the three papers support the overall research question. Papers I and II 
address the institutional frames, specifically a crowding out and a complementary effect. Paper III 
addresses the process of institutional change by analyzing one possible institutional adaption in re-
sponse to the exogenous shock to finance caused by the GFC.  
 
While the dependent and explanatory variables are defined, is should not be taken as an indication 
of independence. Figure 1.13 illustrates the main interaction effects of interest in this thesis. Fol-
lowing Aoki (2007) endogenous institutions and institutional change is assumed.    
Figure 1.13 Interaction between the main institutional domains of interest in the thesis. 
 
The role of technology in institutional economics is somewhat disputed, but key scholars emphasize 
the importance of integrating technological, institutional and organizational aspects in economic 
analysis (Aoki, 2001; North, 1991; Williamson, 2000). 
 
The first paper 
The first paper is mainly a methodological contribution to the finance literature. It suggests a novel 
measure for credit capacity based on the estimation of a debt possibility frontier. This frontier is 
estimated with Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which is well known in production economic 
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applications. The results of the paper show an increase in access to credit up to the financial crisis, 
suggesting increased credit reserves and a possible crowding out effect on alternative risk manage-
ment instruments. In this way, the possible consequences of changing financial institutions on risk 
management practices are illustrated.  
 
The paper does not provide a test of the financial crowding out hypothesis; it lays the groundwork 
for such a test in future research by introducing the novel measure for credit capacity. The signifi-
cant difference between this measure and more conventional measures, such as debt-to-assets or 
debt-to-equity ratios is the avoidance of statistical noise from accounting practice especially valua-
tion of assets is tricky in agricultural accounting as the main asset, land, is unique and market price 
observations are unreliable. Introducing this new application of DEA a number of methodological 
and communicational choices have been made.  
 
As mentioned in the paper the use of varying returns to scale (VRS) following Wheelock and Wil-
son (1999) introduce the problem of ill-defined change scores, for this reason the use of the VRS 
decomposition is contested in the modern literature. However, it is a choice between two sub-
optimal methodological alternatives, as the alternative is a reliance on an assumption of constant 
returns to scale. My co-author and I made the choice of VRS acknowledging the discussion in the 
literature.  
 
As the central point of the paper is to introduce the measure and the idea of a debt possibility fron-
tier the model is kept as simple as possible. A lot of further development and alternative model 
specifications are possible, these are only discussed to a limited degree in the paper to hold focus on 
the central point. Application and variations of the measure could be the subject further research. 
One weakness of the measure and applicability in future research and applications is the reliance on 
quite large data requirements, which may be a challenge in many situations.  
 
The paper holds a discussion on the lenders’ strategic behavior during the credit cycle bust, as this 
behavior may imply serious problems for the reliability of the measure during these periods. During 
a credit cycle boom the method is proposed to give a valid measure of change in credit capacity. A 
discussion of the strategic behavior of the lenders during the credit cycle boom might have been 
appropriate, however, this is a very large discussion and not seen as central to the point of the paper. 
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Giving an adequate discussion of the strategic behavior of the lenders during the credit cycle boom 
is beyond the scope for the paper and for this thesis, as this strategic behavior is likely to be a cen-
tral part of the reason for the GFC.  
 
However, one brief comment on the strategic behavior of lenders may be reflected in the now 
(in)famous quote by former Citigroup CEO Charles Prince to Financial Times in June 2007: “As 
long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance." This has been taken to reflect that the 
incentive structure of bank employees tended to promote a relaxed attitude towards leverage. If you, 
as an individual banker, were worried about leverage another bank was there to take the deal from 
you. You would not perform to the benchmark and risk losing bonus, promotion or even your job. 
As long as most banks fueled the leverage driven economy ‘the music was playing’ and your indi-
vidual incentive was to follow the crowd ‘and dance along’. 
 
Even if there was some level of awareness of the problem in the (top level of) banking sector, 
bounded rational borrowers responding to the signals in the market cannot have been expected to 
predict the GFC. Perception of large credit reserves when assets were increasing in value seem a 
fair assumption.      
 
The second paper 
The second paper is a more mainstream NIE paper. The paper applies a cross-country comparative 
analysis, based on the method of difference, to induce a theoretical explanation for different organi-
zational developments in agricultural value chains based on risk management and finance in combi-
nation with more traditional transaction cost arguments. It compares two environments otherwise 
similar, where the phenomenon, organizational change, differs. The paper finds that cooperative 
marketing and relatively unconstrained access to credit may have important complementary effects 
on the process of organizational change which is often seen as a consequence of technological 
change driving investment in specific assets. Due emphasis on the implications of the financial en-
vironment is often omitted in transaction cost explanations of organizational change.  
 
Following Grief (1998) and Aoki (2001) the paper presents a comparative institutional analysis 
(CIA), balancing the synchronic problem of understanding the institutional matrix in equilibrium 
with the diachronic problem of understanding the mechanism of institutional change.  
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“Institutional arrangements can be diverse across economies even if they are exposed to the same 
technological knowledge and are linked through the same markets. Thus we need to rely on com-
parative and historical information to understand why particular institutional arrangements has 
evolved in one economy but not in others. By this we imply that an institutional analysis must be 
also comparative and historical” (Aoki, 2001, p. 3)  
 
The paper compares the development in hog marketing arrangements in the U.S. and Denmark. The 
significant change seen in the U.S. hog marketing arrangements is usually explained by coordina-
tion and risk management needs (MacDonald and Banker, 2004; MacDonald and McBride, 2009; 
MacDonald et al., 2004; Martinez and Zering, 2004; Martinez, 1999, 2002). It is argued that this 
explanation neglects controlling for the state of financial institutions. Specifically, this omission 
leads to a failure of the theory to explain why the developments in the U.S. hog marketing arrange-
ments have not been mirrored in Denmark. Complementary effects of the financial environment and 
cooperative marketing may refine the theoretical explanation and improve the predictive power to 
cover the Danish as well as the U.S. case. 
 
The historical and comparative case study is explorative in the sense that it relies on secondary re-
search describing the development in hog sector, especially the development in marketing arrange-
ments in the U.S. and in Denmark. As such the analysis may be biased by the availability of sec-
ondary research.  
 
The level of research and the comparability of research within the domains of interest are unbal-
anced across the two countries. This leaves the analysis with areas that are relatively unsupported. 
Specifically the domain of agricultural finance does not have an in depth comparative analysis, and 
the paper relies on the assumption that the financial systems differ significantly, which may be sup-
ported by casual observations, furthermore the paper relies on the assumption that access to credit 
was easier in Denmark than in the U.S. during the period of analysis. While I believe this assump-
tion to hold it is admittedly only weakly supported in the paper. Further research efforts could be 
directed at comparative analysis of financial systems (credit markets). This could possibly comple-
ment the fairly large literature following La Porta et al. (1997) on legal origin which is used to ex-
plain differences in equity markets in the corporate finance literature. 
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Many important factors are omitted in the paper, as the focus is on the claim that financial institu-
tions matter, in the process of organizational adaption to technological change. The point of the 
paper is that financial institutions also matter, it is not that only financial institutions matter. By 
omitting many of these factors in the analysis the ability to control for these factors and asses the 
relative importance of the institutional financial environment is foregone. The same thing may how-
ever be said about the analysis that omit financial factors, if it is accepted that these play some role 
of unknown relative importance. In this light the contribution to the wider institutional literature is 
that of raising the question of whether or not the omission of controlling for financial institutions is 
a serious bias. The paper suggests that this might be the case.         
 
The first two papers are concerned with the “why” of risk management practice in Danish agricul-
ture, especially the absence of market-based risk management. The papers focus on the financial 
and organizational coping mechanisms which, along with other factors, may explain risk manage-
ment practice. The third paper and the concluding chapter of this thesis are more concerned with the 
“how”, that is, how to adapt existing institutional frames for risk management and organization in 
response to changing institutional frames with regard to finance and policy.  
 
The third paper 
The third paper is a mechanisms design paper. It explores the possibility of the reallocation of risk 
among cooperative members on an internal market, in cases where external markets for the reallo-
cation of price risk are inefficient due to basis risk. The paper finds that there is potential for the 
reallocation of risk among cooperative members if transaction costs are low enough and member 
heterogeneity in their cost of carrying risk is large enough.  
 
The paper can be seen as a reaction to the seemingly asymmetric hedging possibility of Danish 
farmers in the livestock sector where farmers can and do hedge on the input side of the firm but 
have no possibility of hedging on the output side of the firm. For simplicity reasons the hedging 
activity on the input side of the firm is ignored in the paper along with any other stochastic noise 
except the output price risk, as it is not the aim of the paper to specify optimal hedging strategies for 
farmers. The aim of the paper is to show the possibility of reallocative gain via reallocation of price 
risk on the output side of the firm. Naturally the effort of hedging output price risk should be coor-
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dinated with hedging activity on the input side, along with all other risk management activities in a 
whole farm risk management perspective.  
 
The paper builds on the argument that output price risk cannot be hedged effectively on futures 
markets due to prohibitive basis risk, the claim is supported by existing research (Meuwissen et al., 
2008). The magnitude of this basis risk is an interesting subject for further research, but is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.    
 
The global financial crisis may seriously affect the complementary relationship between the finan-
cial environment and the cooperative organization of marketing by reducing access to credit (Paper 
II). The financial crisis removes or reduces the crowding out effect of access to credit on risk man-
agement (Paper I), leaving an institutional vacuum with regard to risk management. The third paper 
suggests a way of filling this institutional vacuum by introducing a model for the reallocation of 
price risk among cooperative members.  
 
The concluding chapter 
Chapter five in this thesis offers some concluding remarks, as well as a brief discussion of alterna-
tive coping strategies.  
 
The Irish cooperative dairy, Connacht Gold’s Chief Executive Officer, Aaron Forde, when talking 
to an audience of Irish farmers in 2010 put the situation like this: "Without the protection of the 
traditional European Union tools of intervention and refunds, we are exposed to the volatility of 
world markets, changes in supply/demand balance, currency fluctuations and climate or food scare 
events. Therefore, the only way we can protect ourselves as businesses and farmers is by having a 
relentless focus on doing things better, […] in the United States and other regions forward contracts 
and hedging instruments act as buffers for farmers against price volatility. Irish and European farm-
ers have no such mechanisms” (cf. Ryan, 2010).  
 
While the absence of effective risk management mechanisms is true, this does not mean that they 
cannot be made. As Anderson and Gatignon (2005, p. 1) teach us: “New markets do not emerge, 
nor do they appear. They are made by the activities of firms.”  
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Chapter 2 
Paper I 
 
Measuring Credit Capacity on Danish Farms using DEA4 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to introduce a novel measure of access to credit suited to 
estimate the relative change in credit reserves.  
Design/methodology/approach – A debt possibility frontier is estimated using Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist index is calculated. The Malmquist index is redubbed the Debt 
Development index and decomposed into “Change in debt capacity” and “Change in debt capacity 
utilization.” Bootstrapping is applied for statistical inference. The method is applied to an unbal-
anced panel of 92,000 Danish farm accounts from 1996 to 2009. 
Findings – We find that credit capacity roughly doubled for Danish farmers over the period, and 
that the utilization of credit capacity generally was proportional to capacity change, utilization being 
higher for dairy and pig farms than for crop farms.    
Research limitations/implications – Changes in credit reserves may have important implications 
for risk management practice, investment and technology adoption and related policy issues. The 
method is limited by the possibility of lenders’ strategic behavior during credit cycle busts. In credit 
cycle booms, the method gives a good basis for estimates of change in credit reserves.   
Practical implications – In a period of increasing credit reserves, risk management institutions are 
unlikely to develop. Like agricultural policy, access to credit may crowd out market-based risk 
management.  
Originality/value – The study represents a novel application and interpretation of a well-known 
method. 
 
Keywords: DEA, Malmquist index, Debt Development index, Access to Credit, Agricultural Fi-
nance, Credit Reserves, Risk Management 
 
Article Classification: Research paper   
                                                 
4 Co-authored by Michael Friis Pedersen and Jakob Vesterlund Olsen. Michael Friis Pedersen is affiliated with the Department of 
Strategic Management and Globalization, Copenhagen Business School, Kilevej 14, DK 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark. Jakob 
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DK 1958 Frederiksberg, Denmark. Both authors are employed by the Department of Business Finance & Management, Knowledge 
Centre for Agriculture, Agro Food Park 15, DK 8200 Aarhus N, Denmark. Michael Friis Pedersen is the corresponding author and 
can be contacted by E-mail: mfp@vfl.dk. The paper has been accepted for publication in Agricultural Finance Review (forthcoming). 
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2.1 Introduction 
This paper contributes to the agricultural finance and risk management literature that recognizes the 
important role of credit reserves by introducing a measure of access to credit, which is suited to 
estimate the relative change in credit reserves. The measure is based on Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and estimates a debt possibility frontier. The Malmquist index is calculated to capture 
change over time and the index is decomposed to identify change in debt capacity and change in 
debt capacity utilization.   
  
C. B. Baker, along with a number of co-authors, has emphasized the important link between liquidi-
ty, risk management and finance (Baker, 1968; Baker and Hopkin, 1969; Barry and Baker, 1971; 
Barry et al., 1981). Major themes in this literature include the relationship between hedging and 
finance (Turvey, 1989) and risk balancing between business and financial risk (Gabriel and Baker, 
1980) and related policy issues.  
 
Most research on related issues in the general finance literature is concerned with what Barry and 
Baker (1971, p. 222) call “External credit rationing”5. We find the holistic approach of Baker with 
co-authors and followers, which focuses on both internal and external credit rationing, more inter-
esting than the narrow focus on external credit constraints that preoccupies the literature. The nar-
row focus on credit constraints fails to explain or predict the behavior of firms or farms in situations 
where constraints are not binding. The dichotomous categorization of firms as being either finan-
cially constrained or unconstrained does not capture the important dynamics of self-imposed limita-
tions on credit use which Barry and Baker (1971) emphasize. Focusing on whether firms are finan-
cially constrained or not will greatly limit the understanding of the interaction between investment, 
finance and risk management behavior.  
 
One reason for the predominant research focus on credit constraints may be the lack of empirical 
measures for credit reserves. Gabriel and Baker (1980) use changes in land prices as a proxy for 
changes in credit reserves in a preliminary attempt to verify their risk balancing hypothesis. We 
provide a refined measure of this proxy based on actual debt obtained on comparable farms. Our 
                                                 
5 This can be illustrated by a comparison of a Google Scholar search on “credit reserves” and “liquidity reserves” as opposed to a 
search on “credit constraints” and “financial constraints.” Credit reserves get 597 hits, liquidity reserves get approximately 1,350 hits, 
while credit constraints get approximately 23,000 hits and financial constraints get approximately 91,500 hits. The more specific 
“investment cash flow sensitivity,” which is focused on empirical measures of credit constraints, gets approximately 1,370 hits. 
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approach is to estimate a debt possibility frontier using DEA and to calculate and reinterpret the 
Malmquist index and its components, two of which are change in debt capacity and change in debt 
capacity utilization. We demonstrate the approach on an unbalanced panel of 92,000 Danish farm 
accounts during the period 1996 to 2009.  An additional feature of our approach is that it reduces 
the reliance on the book valuation of assets which may be biased by changes in accounting practic-
es.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief introduction to the literature on 
measures of credit constraints, to which we provide an alternative. Section 2.3 introduces the DEA 
method in the new application. Section 2.4 describes the data set. Section 2.5 discusses the results 
and section 2.6 provides some implications and concluding remarks.    
 
2.2 Background 
The literature on credit constraints has had a strong empirical focus on access to credit. The exist-
ence and importance of credit constraints has been examined extensively since the late 1980s in the 
corporate finance literature, where it has been typical to test whether investment opportunities are 
exercised according to the assumption of the frictionless market or not. Several assumptions are 
employed when estimating the shadow value of capital or the marginal revenue product of capital. 
These assumptions include perfect competition, constant returns to scale and that the market valua-
tion of the firm is not affected by bubbles or fads (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). One of the biggest 
discussions in the field is on functional forms, i.e. the assumptions of monotonicity (Fazzari et al., 
1988, 2000; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000). With regard to credit constraints in agriculture, the 
concept has been investigated thoroughly for a long period of time, but the majority of the investi-
gations have focused on the omnipresent credit constraints in the immature credit markets in the 
developing countries or former Eastern Bloc countries (Briggeman et al., 2009). In the research on 
households’ access to credit in developing countries, the frictionless market assumption is substitut-
ed by the life-cycle/permanent income hypothesis (Diagne et al., 2000). Research on mature credit 
markets in more developed countries is limited, although some research exists (Hubbard and 
Kashyap, 1992). 
  
The quantitative literature on credit constraints mainly focuses on parametric methods, although 
nonparametric methods are also applied to a lesser extent. Nonparametric measures of credit con-
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straints in agriculture were introduced by Färe et al. (1990) and applied and extended with second-
ary analysis by Blancard et al. (2006) on French panel data from 1994 to 2001. Nonparametric 
methods are relevant to use as they have no distributional assumptions and a minimum of assump-
tions regarding functional forms, as opposed to the parametric measures mentioned above. Howev-
er, it is important to note that the approaches following Färe et al. (1990) cannot grasp the fact that 
agents may be constraining themselves for behavioral reasons related to risk and uncertainty. This is 
recognized as a caveat in the concluding remarks of Färe et al. (1990). The problem is generally not 
well recognized in the parametric line of research on credit constraints. The method introduced in 
this paper differs fundamentally from Färe et al. (1990) and Blancard et al. (2006). These authors 
estimate profit functions using nonparametric frontier analysis, and analyze the effect of expendi-
ture constraints. The approach introduced in this paper estimates a debt possibility frontier directly. 
This paper’s focus on maximum credit obtainable and the relative use of credit capacity, rather than 
the dichotomous evaluation of credit constraints, is a central part of the methodological discussion 
on the survey-based analysis of access to credit in Diagne et al. (2000). Both parametric and non-
parametric credit constraint models are very deterministic, in the sense that farms (firms) are either 
financially constrained or not, and they do not provide answers regarding the extent to which farms 
are credit constrained or the extent of possible self-imposed restrictions on the use of credit (Barry 
and Baker, 1971; Diagne et al., 2000). The method introduced in this paper provides a relative an-
swer to this question both on a sector level and on an individual farm level. These answers may be 
important explanatory factors for behavioral and institutional phenomena related to risk manage-
ment and investments.   
 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
The method introduced here estimates the maximum credit available for individual farms, using 
linear combinations of actual observed debt, obtained by the most indebted comparable farms. The 
maximum credit available less the current debt is the credit reserve, which plays an important role 
in the farmers’ credit risk and liquidity management and thus in whole farm risk management con-
siderations (Barry et al., 1981; Turvey and Baker, 1990). Debt is reliably observable from account-
ing data, but maximum credit available is not directly observable and must be estimated. However, 
once this has been achieved, calculating credit reserves is straight forward.   
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A DEA model is applied to estimate the maximum credit available called the debt possibility fron-
tier and to measure the development of the frontier debt capacity over time. Furthermore, the utili-
zation rate of this capacity is calculated and traced over time. Debt capacity utilization is a measure 
of the amount of debt on a specific farm as a ratio of the maximum debt of comparable farms, taken 
as a proxy for the maximum debt capacity. It is important to note that this is a proxy of maximum 
available credit for the individual farm. The frontier does not estimate the maximum credit available 
for the entire agricultural credit market, but rather the perceived availability of credit to the individ-
ual farmer ceteris paribus.   
 
The non-parametric frontier method DEA was originally proposed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes 
(1978). The frontier estimates the maximum output that can be transformed for any given set of 
inputs. Usually this frontier represents a production technology. However, in this application it rep-
resents a debt possibility frontier. An important distinction between this application and the produc-
tion economic application is that being on the frontier is generally something to aspire to in produc-
tion economics, as it means that the farm is technically efficient. However, in this application, it is 
generally not something to aspire to, but is rather an indication of the maximum debt that could be 
obtained in the event of adverse circumstances. The amount of unused debt capacity is the credit 
reserve. In the traditional production economic setting, this translates into inefficiency, but in the 
setting suggested here it may represent an efficient way of coping with risk.  
 
The output, 45, in this model is debt, where the most indebted farmers, relative to the input of the 
model, generate the debt possibility frontier. The major assumption of this approach is that farms in 
the interior of the feasible debt possibility set can use the frontier as an estimator of the maximum 
credit available. The assumption is that the maximum debt of peers indicates the maximum availa-
ble debt for the farmer. The debt possibility frontier is conditioned on a number of input factors, 
labeled collateral value factors. These are physical assets, farmer characteristics and performance 
measures. A formal description of the model, which closely follows the production economic tradi-
tion, is as follows:  
 
Consider the debt possibility frontier, 65, which models the transformation of collateral value fac-
tors 75 ∈ ℝ:; into debt possibility 45 ∈ ℝ:< (Färe et al., 1994), where > and ? are the dimensions 
of the collateral value factor and debt vectors and @ is time.  
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65 = {(75, 45): 45 is feasible given 75} (5) 
 
The debt possibility frontier, 65, is convex, bounded, and closed for all 75 ∈ ℝ:;. Obtaining debt 
requires some collateral value factors and all collateral factors and debt are strongly disposable, 
which means that debt is not a must in order to hold collateral value items, but is a way of financing 
assets. The debt possibility frontier is unobservable and hence the distance to the frontier is unob-
servable and must be estimated (Wheelock and Wilson, 1999). The debt distance function is esti-
mated as: 
 
C5D(75, 45) = (EF"{G: (75, θ45)  ∈  J5})0 (6) 
 
There are few fundamental properties for feasible production sets in the production economic appli-
cation of DEA. These must also be satisfied for the debt frontier application. Following Coelli et al. 
(2005), the debt possibility set can be defined as:  
 
K(x5) =  {y5: 45 is feasible given 75} =  {y5: (x5, y5)  ∈  65} (7) 
 
For each x5, the output set K(x5) must satisfy:  
 
i. 0 ∈  K(x5); 
ii. non-zero output levels cannot be generated from zero levels of inputs; 
iii. K(x5) satisfies strong disposability of outputs;  
iv. K(x5) satisfies strong disposability of inputs;  
v. K(x5) is closed;  
vi. K(x5) is bounded; 
vii. K(x5) is convex;  
 
In the debt frontier context, i) implies that no debt is a possibility for any given set of inputs, that is, 
it is possible for a farm to be totally equity financed; ii) implies that no debt can be obtained if all 
inputs are zero; iii) implies that if a given debt level is feasible, any non-negative debt level equal or 
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below is also feasible, any debt level below the frontier may reflect internal credit rationing, where-
as the frontier itself reflects external credit rationing; iv) implies that if a given debt level is feasible 
at a given input level, it is also feasible at any input level at or above; v) closedness is a mathemati-
cal requirement with no important financial implications; vi) implies that unlimited debt levels are 
not possible with a given set of inputs; vii) implies that any weighted average of two levels of debt 
capacity is feasible. This requirement implicitly means that all outputs and inputs are continuously 
divisible.  
 
2.3.2 DEBT DEVELOPMENT INDEX 
The DEA debt possibility frontier can be used to estimate the Debt Development index (DDi) which 
is a reinterpretation of the Malmquist productivity index6 (Caves et al., 1982; Färe et al., 1992). This 
index is employed to measure change over time. Rather than computing the DDi for adjacent years, 
we use 1996 as the single base year. This is done to obtain the cumulative debt development, rather 
than the marginal change from year to year. A parallel example from production economic applica-
tions of the Malmquist index is Klein et al. (1992). Using a single base year also avoids problems 
with interpretation, as one should be cautious when interpreting the adjacent year changes over mul-
tiple periods, unless technical change is Hicks-neutral (Bogetoft and Otto, 2010). By debt develop-
ment we mean the change in use of debt relative to the frontier which reflects the debt capacity.  
 
The Debt Development index is defined as:  
--MN5O (P5, 5, P5, 5) =  Q-R&
5(S5, PS5)-R&5(S5, PS5) ×
-R&5(S5, PS5)-R&5(S5, PS5)T

 (8) 
and it expresses the development in debt for a farm , in period @1 to period @2 with reference to a 
debt frontier with constant returns to scale (CRS) given by collateral value factors. In the two di-
mensional illustration of Figure 2.1 it is given by:  
 
--MN5O (P5, 5, P5, 5)
= {[(VWV VWV&)⁄ (XWX XWX&⁄ )⁄ ] × [ (VWV VWV&)⁄ (XWX XWX&)⁄⁄ ]}½ 
 
(9) 
 
                                                 
6 The Malmquist index (or the Malmquist Productivity Index) is a productivity index introduced by Caves et al. (1982), which can be 
used to compare two production functions representing the production technology of two economies, or to compare the production 
technology of a single economy at two different points in time. 
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Figure 2.1: Decomposition of the Debt Development index. 
 
The interpretation of equation (5) can be illustrated by the following example: Suppose you are a 
farmer at time @1, your total liabilities are given by AWA, and amount to € 1,000,000. Your  Z\@1 
frontier debt capacity is given by AWA^ and is € 2,700,000. The Z\@2 frontier debt capacity is giv-
en by AWA^ and is € 4,300,000 which is the frontier debt capacity at time @2, if you have exactly the 
same collateral as you had at @1. At time @2 your total liabilities are given by BWB. Now let’s sup-
pose they have risen to € 2,000,000 and your collateral has also risen which is reflected in the hori-
zontal movement from AW to BW. The Z\@1 frontier debt capacity is given by BWB^ and is 
€4,000,000, the  Z\@2 frontier debt capacity is given by BWB^ and is € 6,300,000.    
 
Numerically, the Debt Development index can now be calculated as follows:  
 
--MN5O (P5, 5, P5, 5) = {[(2 4) ⁄ (1 2.7)⁄⁄ ] × [ (2 6.3)⁄ (1 4.3)⁄⁄ ]}½ = 1.36 
 
(10) 
 
Debt Development indices which are above one indicate relatively increased indebtedness, while 
indices which are below one indicate relatively decreased indebtedness. By relatively we here mean 
the change in the debt of the farm relative to the frontier known as the debt capacity. Hence, the 
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DDi is the development in the relative indebtedness from @1 to @2. In the example above, the farm 
at point B in Figure 2.1 is 36% more indebted than the farm at point A. 
 
Following Färe et al. (1994) and Wheelock and Wilson (1999), the estimate of the DDi can be de-
composed. This decomposition enables us to express the debt development with respect to a debt 
frontier with varying returns to scale (VRS). By VRS it is meant that the relation between debt and 
collateral on the frontier does not have to be constant. This is a weaker and more appropriate as-
sumption for the shape of the debt possibility frontier. The data is more tightly enveloped assuming 
VRS which yields a smaller and more conservative estimate of the debt possibility set K(x5) than an 
estimate based on the assumption of CRS. The Wheelock and Wilson (1999) decomposition goes 
further and is followed in the DDi reinterpretation of the Malmquist index:  
 
                                 --MN5O =  ∆ -@ ",@P F@,,,@, 
                                             × ∆-@ ",@P F@,,,@, @ @ E 
                                             × ∆-@ ",@P × ∆ -@ ",@P @ @ E   
(11) 
Where: 
 
∆ -@ ",@P F@,,@, = Q-R5(S5, PS5)-R5(S5, PS5)T 
 
(12) 
 
 
∆ -@ ".  F@,,@,  @ @ E =  Q-R&5(S5, PS5)/-R5(S5, PS5) -R&5(S5, PS5)/-R5(S5, PS5) T 
 
(13) 
 
 
∆ -@ ",@P = Q-R5(S5, PS5)-R5(S5, PS5) ×
-R5(S5, PS5)-R5(S5, PS5)T

 
 
(14) 
 
 ∆ -@ ",@P @ @ E
=  Q-R&5(S5, PS5)/-R5(S5, PS5) -R&5(S5, PS5)/-R5(S5, PS5) ×
-R&5(S5, PS5)/-R5(S5, PS5) 
-R&5(S5, PS5)/-R5(S5, PS5) T

 
 
(15) 
 
The decomposition is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The components related to scale capture the fraction 
of the change which is related to scale change. These parts are not recognized as pure change in 
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debt capacity or pure change in the debt capacity utilization and do not have an important economic 
interpretation, but they are important controls in the shift from CRS to VRS. The ∆ -@ ",@P 
is the shift in the VRS debt frontier measured as the geometric mean of the shift between the fron-
tiers measured at the position of the farm at the two different points in time. In the two dimensional 
illustration of Figure 2.1 it is the geometric mean given by:  
 
∆ -@ ",@P = {[(XWX XWX∗ ⁄ (XWX XWX∗∗)⁄⁄ ] × [ (VWV VWV∗)⁄ (VWV VWV∗∗)⁄⁄ ]}½ (16) 
 
The change in debt capacity is the change in the frontier, that is the relative movement of the fron-
tier or the change in how much the most indebted farmers can borrow.   
 
The ∆ -@ ",@P F@,,@, is the change in the debt capacity utilization relative to the VRS 
debt frontier measured as the debt capacity utilization at the second period over the debt capacity 
utilization in the first period. In Figure 2.1, this is illustrated by:   
 
∆ -@ ",@P F@,,@, = (VWV VWV∗∗)⁄ (XWX XWX∗)⁄⁄  (17) 
 
The change in debt capacity utilization is the relative change in the actual to maximum debt ratio. 
This is somewhat similar to a change in a debt-to-asset ratio. However, here assets are substituted 
by the estimate of maximum debt. 
 
One important weakness in the Wheelock and Wilson (1999) decomposition is that points like C in 
Figure 2.1 will have no frontier projection for the \5frontier, and ∆ -@ ",@P will be ill-
defined in this case. It is a methodological trade-off between a reliance on the CRS frontier or the 
VRS frontier, with the possibility of ill-defined change in debt capacity scores. We consider the 
latter alternative to be the best and we acknowledge the discussion in the Malmquist index litera-
ture. We omit farms with ill-defined change in debt capacity scores.  
 
The output-oriented efficiency score in the production economic application can be reinterpreted as 
the debt to debt capacity ratio, or more loosely defined as the management adjusted debt to collat-
eral value ratio. We assume that collateral and earnings (EBIT) are the fundamental factors, which 
determine the debt capacity or loan approval on the individual level. The non-utilized amount of 
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debt capacity can be interpreted as credit reserves and in Figure 2.1 the credit reserves at time @1 for 
the farmer represented by the point A are illustrated by the distance between A and A*. This is a 
useful proxy for  in the Gabriel and Baker (1980) model shown in (14).  
 
( +  −  ≤ ) ≤ [(̅ +  − ) − ] ≤  (18) 
where:  
 α = probability that some critical cash demand cannot be met (default risk) 
cx = net cash flow 
cx = expected net cash flow 
μ = liquidity reserves 
I = fixed debt servicing obligations 
z = minimum liquidity requierment 
σ = the subjective variance of net cash flow 
 
Gabriel and Baker (1980) used land price change as a proxy for change in μ in a preliminary empir-
ical test of their risk balancing hypothesis.  We provide a more refined and micro-oriented measure 
of change in credit availability. 
 
2.3.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The requirements listed in section 2.3.1 correspond to the Danish credit market. The Danish agricul-
tural credit market is strongly influenced by collateral-based lending as illustrated by the role of 
loan to value (LTV) limits in the mortgage banking regulation of the Mortgage-Credit Loans and 
Mortgage-Credit Bonds Act and the Financial Business Act (Association of Danish Mortgage 
Banks, 2012). The system is layered with its base in the, in some ways unique, Danish mortgage 
banking system. The mortgage banks offer loans based on collateral in real estate, while additional 
loans are offered by commercial banks, trade credits, etc. Some farmers use leasing arrangements, 
primarily to finance machinery.  
 
The hard lessons learned about collateral based lending during the 1980s in U.S. agriculture (Harris 
et al., 2009), were not learned in Denmark. The U.S. shift from collateral-based lending to cash 
flow based lending has not occurred in Denmark. Figure 2.2 illustrates the U.S. debt to cash flow 
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ratio decline from its level in the 1980s, and the absence of such a decline in Denmark. Note the 
different scales. The Danish reliance on collateral-based lending is substantiated by a qualitative 
study by Jakobsen (2011).  
 
Figure 2.2: Ratio of farm sector debt/net cash flow, U.S. on left scale, DK on right scale. 
Source: Harris et al. (2009) for U.S. data and FADN (2012) for DK data. 
 
We present three variations of a single output model with nine (crop), twelve (dairy) and eleven 
(pigs) inputs in section 2.2.4. The single output is debt in all models and the inputs are collateral 
value proxies, such as assets, earnings and an inverse transformation of age.  
 
The main inputs in the model are assets. These are true collateral items in the sense that the lender 
can repossess them if the farmer is unable to honor the terms of the lending agreement. Some of 
these assets are measured in book value and some in physical terms, as the book valuation of some 
of the assets is inconsistent across time and accounts. Accounting practice behind the data generat-
ing process has changed, notably with regard to the valuation principles of assets. In Danish agricul-
tural accounting, there has been a gradual shift away from the use of public valuation7 towards the 
market valuation of real-estate assets. Since there is no counterpart involved in the valuation of as-
sets that are not traded, one should be cautious when using such data; this is generally a problem 
that is not considered, e.g. Zhao et al. (2008) and Grosen et al. (2012). The method introduced in 
this paper is robust regarding this problem, as the physical measure of assets is unaffected by 
                                                 
7 The public valuation of a real-estate asset is an estimate made every two years, based on the average prices from the preceding two 
years, and is therefore lagged. 
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changes in accounting principles. For the collateral value of financial assets and for the collateral 
value of machinery, the book valuation is used directly for two reasons. First there is no detailed 
information on machinery and financial assets, and second, the book value of these assets is more 
reliably marked to market than real estate assets.  
 
Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) are used as a proxy for management level and debt servic-
ing ability. Age and EBIT serve as inputs to control for management quality; EBIT as the level of 
management quality and an inverse transformation of age as a measure of the persistence of man-
agement quality.  
 
The inverse transformation of age is to satisfy requirement iv), whereas all other requirements in 
section 2.3.1 are satisfied for all practical purposes. Zhao et al. (2008) propose that old farmers have 
better access to credit than younger farmers which is in apparent contradiction to our inverse trans-
formation of age. Barry et al. (2000, p. 928) state that: ‘Older farmers should be less financially-
constrained than younger farmers because they may have longer relationships with their lenders, 
greater equity accumulations, and generally stronger financial measure.’ We agree with this state-
ment. However, we believe that the relation between age and access to credit is due to the indirect 
effects of age on debt capacity. Age itself may have a negative direct effect on access to credit, 
while ‘longer relationships with lenders, greater equity accumulation and generally stronger finan-
cial measures’ are positively related to both age and access to credit. The correlation between age 
and access to credit is spurious and does not necessarily suggest a direct positive causal relationship 
between age and access to credit.  
 
The main assumptions of the model are that lower collateral, lower earnings and higher age (ceteris 
paribus) may cause lower debt capacity. If someone has a given level of debt with a given level of 
input, then anyone with the same level of input can generate at least as much debt. If someone has a 
given level of debt with a given level of input, then anyone with a higher level of input can generate 
at least as much debt. The inputs are determined by the institutional framework with regards to the 
Danish mortgage banking system. This is a fairly robust system for collateral-based lending as it has 
been functioning for more than 200 years, and in this time, no bond holder has suffered a financial 
loss (Association of Danish Mortgage Banks, 2012). During the study period, the corporate owner-
ship of farms was restricted by law in Denmark, making the individual or family ownership of 
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farms the dominant and stable ownership structure. Possible future changes in the ownership trend 
could affect credit availability, and should be controlled for in this case. Under other institutional 
frameworks, for example cash flow based credit systems, the model specification should be amend-
ed to the specific conditions. The fundamental idea of estimating the debt possibility frontier is the 
core contribution of this paper, whereas the specification of the model is state dependent, and the 
applied specification is related to the Danish institutional framework.       
 
One may argue that interest rate considerations are missing from the model. However, Asset Pricing 
Theory suggests that expected future cash flow and interest rates determine the value of the asset. 
Since asset prices, and hence the collateral value of assets, are affected by interest, this has been 
consciously omitted due to endogeneity concerns. In a cash flow based model, interest would cer-
tainly be an important input, but this is not the case in a collateral based model.  
 
An important assumption in the model is that farmers can obtain as much debt as the most indebted 
comparable farmers. This is a reasonable assumption in times of increasing credit supply (in a credit 
cycle boom). However, this also represents the major weakness of the presented approach as the 
potential strategic behavior of lenders in the case of a credit cycle bust may mean that this assump-
tion no longer holds. Some path dependency in lending behavior could be expected in a credit cycle 
bust, where farmers with a large loan arrangement would be able to borrow money for going con-
cern, while farmers in stronger financial positions would be unable to debt finance investments. 
Issuing more credit to weak or insolvent farmers can reduce the expected loss for the bank if there is 
a fair chance that the farmer will make it through the crisis. Furthermore, the bank may expect low-
er losses given default, at a later point in time. Foreclosing on multiple farms at the same time may 
have systemic effects and reduce the value of collateral in the entire agricultural loan portfolio if the 
real estate market is flooded with a supply of farms. Such action would increase the bank’s own 
funding costs and may not minimize the losses given default. A likely strategy for the lenders is 
therefore to foreclose on insolvent and defaulting farmers at a slow pace. In our context, this type of 
lender behavior may pose a methodological problem, in the sense that it may not be possible for 
farmers to borrow in line with the maximum debt of their fellow farmers if they so desire. During a 
credit cycle boom, the model presented is considered a reliable measure of access to credit, while 
during a credit cycle bust, the measure may be weakened by the strategic considerations of lenders.   
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The model may suffer from minor omitted variable bias as off balance sheet assets may represent 
collateral. Some farms may be able to raise collateral from assets which do not appear on the bal-
ance sheet. Notably, family members are known to use their assets to raise collateral for loans to 
other family members. No data is available on the extent of this problem and while it is not a major 
methodological problem in the authors’ view, it is nevertheless a recognized caveat. The inputs in 
the model were chosen as they convey the important factors of collateral value when issuing loans 
in the agricultural sector in Denmark.  
 
2.4 Data 
The data set consists of an unbalanced panel of account data from 1996 to 2009. The data were re-
trieved from the Knowledge Centre for Agriculture’s accounting database, which stores a large 
sample of the accounts made in the partnership Danish Agricultural Advisory Service.  
 
Table 2.1. Number of farms in each subsector in the unbalanced dataset 
Number of farms in each subsector Number of farms relative to years in dataset 
Year Crop Dairy Pigs Years in dataset Crop Dairy Pigs 
1996 897 6,154 3,180 1 1,218 2,346 1,689 
1997 842 5,592 3,072 2 643 2,130 1,522 
1998 795 5,428 2,746 3 443 1,850 1,262 
1999 728 4,760 2,538 4 364 1,573 1,017 
2000 649 4,296 2,517 5 209 1,191 779 
2001 602 4,093 2,552 6 183 1,536 725 
2002 522 3,489 2,212 7 94 857 406 
2003 418 2,338 1,448 8 62 469 237 
2004 627 3,011 1,710 9 35 201 140 
2005 719 3,048 1,858 10 34 166 97 
2006 730 2,855 2,165 11 20 130 88 
2007 793 2,697 1,632 12 16 135 53 
2008 767 2,491 1,428 13 7 88 33 
2009 683 1,411 1,251 14 2 45 34 
Source: Knowledge Centre for Agriculture’s accounting database 
 
The measure of access to credit is based on a benchmarking approach for farmers with homogenous 
production. To secure the homogeneity of the farms, they are split into the three main subsectors of 
Danish agriculture: crop, dairy, and pig production. All farms in the sample had to have a workload 
of at least 1,665 hours per year (full time) and focus on farm production. Therefore, the non-farm 
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assets are less than the farm assets and the farmland makes up at least half of the total amount of 
land (excluding farms which are mainly involved in forestry). These requirements are general to the 
crop, dairy, and pig models, but individual model constraints are applied to secure homogenous 
production for each subsector. Few outliers were detected and deleted which resulted in the dataset 
presented in Table 2.1. The left-hand side of the table depicts the number of farms in each of the 
three models in the analyzed period, while the right-hand side depicts the number of years that 
farms are in the dataset. The main asset and the main source of collateral for farmers is land of 
which there are four types in the model: soil type 1 (clay); soil type 2 (sandy); non-farmland (forest, 
meadows, roads, etc.) and farmland which has been leased out. There are five other inputs in the 
crop model: assets outside agriculture (book value); equipment (book value); EBIT; operator age, 
and the number of slaughter pigs as a proxy for the value of the buildings (it is not uncommon to 
see crop farms with some slaughter pig production). 
 
The model for specialized dairy farms includes the number of cows, the amount of milking quota 
and the number of heifers to adjust for the additional collateral value of the milk production related 
facilities and value of quota. The model for specialized pig farms includes the number of sows and 
the number of piglets produced to adjust for the additional collateral value of the pig production 
facilities. In Table 2.2, the means of all model variables are presented. The ‘Model’ column identi-
fies which models the variables enter. 
 
We find that the book valuation of assets in Danish farm accounts is biased, among other things, 
because of a change in accounting principles as argued earlier. The book valuation and market value 
of agricultural assets have been in an alignment process during the past decade, but the market val-
ue of highly illiquid and highly specific assets, such as those in agriculture, is uncertain. We devel-
op a measure which can capture the development of access to credit using non-parametric methods 
with minimum reliance on the book valuation.     
 
Three inputs are, however, measured monetarily. These are the assets outside agriculture, equip-
ment, and EBIT. Debt and assets outside agriculture are deflated with the consumer price index 
(Statistics Denmark, 2010), while equipment is deflated with the equipment value index (Statens 
Jordbrugs- og Fiskeriøkonomiske Institut, 1994 to 2000; Fødevareøkonomisk Institut, 2001 to 
2009). The crop mix changed in Denmark during the study period. Winter wheat substituted spring 
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barley thereby changing the cash flow and potentially affecting the debt level. This effect is, how-
ever, very minor and therefore is not controlled for in this paper. We have chosen not to correct for 
the development in productivity over time, or price changes in farm products (crops, meat and 
milk). Any development in productivity or prices, which explains a change in profitability, is cap-
tured by our management proxy, EBIT.  
 
Table 2.2. Model input and output means for the crop, dairy and pig models 
Mean of all years Model*) Crop Dairy Pigs 
Clay soil, hectares [C, D, P] 63.8 13.7 37.9 
Sandy soil, hectares [C, D, P] 34.8 49.4 38.7 
Non-farmland, hectares [C, D, P] 7.5 4.9 6.6 
Farmland leased out, hectares [C, D, P] 1.4 0.8 1.5 
Dairy cows [D] - 80.5 - 
Heifers [D] - 79.4 - 
Milking quota; 1,000 kg [D] - 607 - 
Sows [P] - - 192 
Piglets [P] - - 4,242 
Slaughter pigs [C, D, P] 541 70 2,845 
Operator age [C, D, P] 48 46 46 
Assets outside agriculture; 1,000 € [C, D, P] 345 164 261 
Equipment value; 1,000 € [C, D, P] 148 111 175 
EBIT, 1,000 € [C, D, P] 89 77 94 
Debt; 1,000 € (Output) [C, D, P] 965 821 1,155 
*) C = Crop model, D = Dairy model, and P = Pig model.  
Source: Knowledge Centre for Agriculture’s accounting database 
 
The non-parametric DEA-method is sensitive to measurement errors as no stochastic elements are 
inherent in the model. One way to quantify the sensitivity is by use of the bootstrapping method. 
Hence the DDi estimates and the decomposed estimates are bootstrapped with Hall Percentile inter-
vals based on differences (Simar & Wilson, 2000). The basic idea of bootstrapping is to mimic the 
original production set, in this case the debt possibility set, by drawing a random sample and replac-
ing the original data to create pseudo-samples conditional on outputs (Bogetoft & Otto, 2010). The 
random sample is biased, as it is a subsample of the original data. Hence, the data is bias-corrected 
prior to drawing the random sample and afterwards the DDi is calculated based on the random sam-
ple of bias corrected inputs and outputs. Furthermore, the bootstrap estimates are smoothed and the 
temporal correlation between periods is handled as in Simar and Wilson (1999). The bootstrap pro-
cedure is repeated 2,000 times for each observation. Results from bootstrapping of the DDi esti-
  
66 
 
mates are used to analyze sensitivity and to generate confidence intervals for each of the decom-
posed measures.  
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 ESTIMATION OF DEA AND DEBT DEVELOPMENT INDEX SCORES  
The estimations are performed by the FEAR package (Wilson, 2008) for the statistical environment 
‘R’ (R Development Core Team 2010). The results show an increasing average debt capacity during 
the period 1996 to 2009. This is consistent with the hypothesis of increasing access to credit. A 
farmer with a debt capacity change of 2.0 in 2009 could borrow twice as much in 2009 compared to 
1996 when controlled for earnings and when debt and other monetarily measures are deflated.  
 
The debt capacity change and the debt capacity utilization change are the important results of the 
model, while the scale-related changes are minor. The mean of the change scores from the reference 
year 1996 to the year in question is calculated for all farmers with scores defined. The last years of 
the 1990s did not add substantially to debt capacity. In 2004, however, the increase in debt capacity 
in Danish agriculture accelerated. The development in debt capacity change is illustrated in Figure 
2.3 for the three subsectors. 
 
Figure 2.3: Debt capacity change for three production types 
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The mean debt capacity utilization was roughly the same level across the sectors in 1996, with a 
mean utilization of 0.62 for crop, 0.58 for dairy and 0.66 for pigs. The mean debt utilization and the 
results from the decomposition of the DDi are presented in Table 2.3 for the years 2004 to 2009. 
The DDi and the components are listed on the right-hand side.  
 
Table 2.3.  
Mean debt capacity utilization and Debt Development index decomposition from 2004 to 2009  
Year 
 
Mean 
debt  
capacity 
utilization 
No. of 
farms 
both 
years* 
Debt 
Devel-
opment 
index 
Change in 
debt capacity 
utilization 
Scale related 
change in debt 
capacity 
utilization 
Change 
in debt 
capacity 
Scale related 
change in 
debt capacity 
 Crop 
2004 0.61 64 1.346 1.081 0.938 1.296 1.048 
2005 0.62 64 1.617 1.113 0.931 1.500 1.065 
2006 0.52 57 1.436 0.911 0.939 1.608 1.046 
2007 0.46 55 1.515 0.817 0.920 1.923 1.093 
2008 0.50 46 1.654 0.918 0.919 1.875 1.070 
2009 0.50 35 1.958 0.855 0.965 2.334 1.008 
 Dairy 
2004 0.61 617 1.496 1.114 0.919 1.365 1.134 
2005 0.60 538 1.532 1.098 0.919 1.385 1.154 
2006 0.57 437 1.663 1.061 0.899 1.586 1.163 
2007 0.54 364 1.772 1.021 0.918 1.756 1.181 
2008 0.56 295 1.929 1.011 0.905 1.880 1.198 
2009 0.63 152 2.385 1.176 0.905 2.137 1.139 
 Pigs 
2004 0.78 265 1.562 1.252 0.937 1.316 1.070 
2005 0.76 231 1.675 1.142 0.915 1.503 1.122 
2006 0.74 252 1.757 1.133 0.911 1.624 1.112 
2007 0.76 143 2.157 1.168 0.909 1.854 1.149 
2008 0.80 99 2.501 1.221 0.941 2.051 1.090 
2009 0.79 87 2.645 1.204 0.941 2.391 1.151 
* with 1996 as the base year for farmers in the dataset in 1996 and the year in question. 
 
The change in debt capacity utilization is below 1 for crop, close to 1 for dairy and around 1.2 for 
pigs. This reflects the development in the mean debt capacity utilization which fell to 0.50 for crop, 
increased to 0.63 for dairy and increased to 0.79 for pigs in 2009. The debt capacity utilization can 
be interpreted as the change in debt to debt capacity ratio, which is a good measure of credit re-
serves and is closely related to the debt to asset ratio when controlling for management, age, and the 
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lender’s valuation of assets. The scale related changes for both debt capacity and debt capacity utili-
zation range from 0.899 to 1.198 for all three subsectors, which suggests that the change in scale 
does not cause changes in debt structure. The main measure in Table 2.3 is the debt capacity 
change, which roughly doubled in the period, also shown in Figure 2.3. This reflects an outward 
move of the VRS debt possibility frontier.   
 
The interpretation of the numbers in Table 2.3 can be illustrated by the following example: Suppose 
you were a pig farmer in 1996 with total liabilities of €1,000,000 and an estimated maximum debt 
capacity of €2,000,000 based on the most indebted comparable farms. Your debt capacity utilization 
was 50% and your credit reserves were estimated at €1,000,000. In 2009, the change in debt capaci-
ty compared to 1996 was 2.391, which means that the maximum debt capacity increased to 2.391 x 
€2,000,000 = €4,782,000, holding assets and management level constant, adjusted for inflation. If 
the debt of your farm remained constant at €1,000,000 (adjusted for inflation), your debt capacity 
utilization would be 1,000,000 / 4,782,000 = 20.9 % and your credit reserves would be €3,782,000. 
Now suppose that your debt capacity utilization followed the sector level change in debt capacity 
utilization, i.e. 1.204. Then your debt capacity utilization in 2009 would be 50% x 1.204 = 60.2%. 
This means that the total liabilities would be €4,782,000 x 60.2 % = €2,878,764 and your credit 
reserves would be €1.903.236.  
 
The results in Table 2.3 are the means of the scores for farmers in the sample in 1996 and the year 
in question. The measure is biased because it is only calculated for the farmers who were farmers in 
1996. Operator age is used as an input and the farmers in the measure for 2009 are older than the 
average farmer. Also, some farmers start with a small farm and build up a larger farm. Hence it is 
expected that the debt capacity change is measured at the part of the frontier where the farmers are 
older and where the farms are larger. Finally, the number of accounts included in the mean calcula-
tion decreases with time. 
 
The debt possibility set in 2009 consists of 683 farms (see Table 2.1) for the crop producers, and the 
efficiency estimates are calculated on the basis of this debt possibility set. The average DDi change 
for crop producers is estimated based on the 35 farms in the data set in both 1996 and 2009. These 
farms are not representative, as the farmers had been in farming for at least 14 years in 2009, which 
precludes young farmers. This may constitute a survivorship bias. It is important to note, however, 
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that this is not a bias in the estimation of the frontier. As all data are included in this process, the 
possible bias is because development is not measured homogeneously on the frontier. A solution to 
this issue is to measure the mean farm. Each input and output in the mean farm is the mean of all 
farmers for the relevant year within the production type. This average farmer does not age. The re-
sults for the mean farm show no significant difference, which suggests that the bias is minor. Meas-
uring the development at ‘interesting’ places on the frontier may be seen as tantamount to the prac-
tice used in Logit and Probit analysis where we want to measure response to marginal changes in  
at ‘interesting’ values of , which is often, but not always the mean (Wooldridge, 2002). 
  
The change in debt capacity generally drives the change in the DDi over the years. Scale effects 
tend to be minor, while the debt capacity utilization has some positive effects on DDi for dairy and 
pig farms and a negative effect on DDi for crop farms. The ability to raise debt increased from 1996 
to more recent years, which is displayed in Table 2.3. This ability was primarily utilized by the 
Danish dairy and pig farmers, while crop farmers seem to have been self-imposing more restraints 
on the use of credit as change in debt capacity utilization was above one for dairy and pig farmers, 
but below one for crop farmers in 2006 to 2009.  
 
2.5.2 BOOTSTRAP RESULTS  
Bootstrapping makes statistical inference possible based on the empirical distribution of the boot-
strap estimates of the decomposed index. The bootstrap is used to identify the number of farms for 
which there is a statistically significant debt capacity change at the 5 per cent level. Figure 2.4 
shows the share of farms for which there is an expansion in the debt capacity at the 95 per cent con-
fidence level.  
 
In summary, the results show that ease of access to credit increased significantly from 1996 up to 
the global financial crisis with the magnitude of the increase being roughly double. Our debt capaci-
ty measure shows increases in the magnitude of 76 - 92 per cent from 1996 to 2007. From 2004, all 
three subsectors have a large proportion of farms with a significant increase in the debt capacity 
(change in debt capacity > 1, at the 95% confidence level). There is no doubt that access to credit 
was easier in Danish agriculture in 2007 than it was in 1996. What is puzzling about our results is 
that access to credit seemed to increase during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. Our measure 
does not distinguish between debt generated for investment finance and debt generated to cover 
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operating losses. The development in debt is especially difficult to track in transition periods early 
in a crisis when investment finance becomes constrained, but current operations are financed (as 
lenders consider this to be the loss minimizing strategy). With some differences across the subsec-
tors, many farmers incurred losses on financial arrangements as well as losses on current operations 
during the crisis. These farmers experienced increasing debt capacity (utilization), drawing on their 
credit reserves, even though they were experiencing decreasing access to investment finance and 
were possibly credit constrained in executing profitable investments. The measure does not distin-
guish between the behavioral or strategic reasoning behind loan approvals or credit expansion. 
However, we believe that Danish farmers experience greater credit constraints now, than they did 
prior to the financial crisis.  
 
Figure 2.4. Share of farms with a significant increase in debt capacity since 1996 
* Due to computational burden, results for dairy are not reported for 1997. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
We suggest a non-parametric measure for access to credit based on DEA. Our measure is based on 
the decomposition of the Malmquist index which is well-known in productivity analysis. Our meas-
ure captures many aspects of access to credit and credit reserves based on a minimum of assump-
tions. Our alternative measure is a valuable complement to the qualitative surveys produced by cen-
tral banks, for sectors or datasets where parametric models are not applicable. We apply our meas-
ure to Danish farm accounting data, as agriculture is one of the sectors for which we consider our 
measure to be applicable.    
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The central contribution of the paper is the use of non-parametric DEA methods in the credit access 
literature and the notion of a debt possibility frontier. There is great research potential in refining 
the model specifications and exploring applications. One avenue for further research could be to 
look at possible differences in the movement of the frontier at different farm sizes, e.g. different 
input levels. Sectors with relatively homogeneous agents and a lack of a reliable valuation of assets 
seem to be cases where the non-parametric approach could be a relevant alternative to the paramet-
ric approaches used today. Measures of credit constraints are often used in investment-cash flow 
sensitivity analyses which are based on assumptions of farmers as fully rational decision makers. 
Our direct measure is a more appropriate measure to use in such analyses, especially if the financial 
institutions are well developed. 
 
Second stage analysis is a relatively common complement to DEA. There may be interesting ave-
nues of future research in second stage analysis of the debt possibility frontier application. Howev-
er, Simar and Wilson (2011) point to a number of assumptions in these analyses that are not well 
justified. One of the strengths of the methodology suggested in this paper is its simplicity and the 
relatively small number of assumptions, compared to the parametric models in the credit constraint 
literature. Applying second stage analysis may be useful, but one will have to increase the number 
of assumptions and to some extent compromise the above mentioned strengths. This must be bal-
anced. Any further discussion or the application of second stage analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper.    
 
We find that debt capacity in Danish agriculture increased significantly during the period 1996 to 
2009 and that the level roughly doubled. When banks and mortgage institutions are reviewing their 
lending policies, this finding could influence a shift from collateral-based lending to cash flow 
based lending, hopefully causing a healthier debt structure in Danish Agriculture in the future. Fur-
ther, this finding has important implications for risk management and investment behavior. It is 
widely recognized that agricultural policy may crowd out market-based risk management (OECD, 
2009), although the financial environment may also have a crowding out effect and be an important 
explanatory factor in the development of market-based risk management institutions. The usual risk 
balancing discussion is about whether or not an agricultural policy initiative that reduces farmer’s 
business risk will lead farmers to increase their financial risk to hold total risk constant. Variation in 
the liquidity reserves (µ) in the Gabriel and Baker (1980) model, specifically credit reserves, will 
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have a major impact on agricultural risk management policy and should therefore be an integrated 
part of the analysis. However, this is largely ignored, OECD (2011) being a recent example.        
 
In the case of Denmark, where the results of this paper show that access to credit has been increas-
ing over a long period of time, the financial environment may help explain the absence of market-
based risk management in agriculture. Danish farmers may have been thinking “Why hedge, if you 
can borrow?” The post financial crisis financial environment is changing in Denmark. These chang-
es may be increasing the need for the development of market-based risk management institutions. 
Further research on the dynamics of the interaction between risk management, credit access and 
investment in changing financial environments is needed. The measure of access to credit presented 
here may be a valuable tool in this effort.  
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Chapter 3 
Paper II 
 
Financial Institutions Matter8 
The Moderating Effect of the Financial Environment on 
Organizational Adaptation to Change 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The paper explains the role of the financial environment in determining the organization 
of agricultural value chains. 
Design/methodology/approach – The theoretical suggestions are built on induction based on ex-
ploratory observations from a cross-country comparison of the evolution of hog marketing ar-
rangements in the U.S. and Denmark.  
Findings – It is suggested that financial environments where access to credit is relatively uncon-
strained will complement forward integration through cooperatives. 
Research limitations/implications – This challenges existing approaches to explaining organiza-
tional change in agriculture based on transaction cost economics (TCE) which focuses more nar-
rowly on technological drivers of asset specificity. It is suggested that TCE approaches may omit 
important interaction effects between the asset specificity of technological developments and the 
financial environment. 
Practical implications – The financial environment in Denmark is changing in the post GFC world 
which may be putting the existing organizational form under pressure and may lead to adaptive 
changes.  
 
Keywords: Finance, Organization, Complementarity, Institutional change, Technological change. 
 
Article Classification: Research paper   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
8 Presented for a group of industry stakeholders at a seminar at the Knowledge Centre for Agriculture, September 24th 2012.  
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3.1 Introduction 
This paper argues that the financial system plays a potentially important role in determining organi-
zational forms. The asset specificity attributes of production technology are traditionally seen as a 
major determinant for organizational form in transaction cost economic (TCE) explanations of or-
ganization of agricultural marketing Significant changes in the structure and organization of the 
U.S. agricultural sector have been explained with transaction cost arguments where changes in asset 
specificity, uncertainty and/or frequency of exchange, driven by technological change, lead to 
changing organizational forms. The U.S. hog sector has shifted from being dominated by the spot 
market, to a situation in which production and marketing contracts and full backward vertical inte-
gration are the dominant governance structures. (MacDonald and Banker, 2004; MacDonald and 
McBride, 2009; MacDonald et al., 2004; Martinez and Zering, 2004; Martinez, 1999, 2002). In the 
meantime, the dominant governance structure in the Danish hog sector has been marketing coopera-
tives.  
 
The role of the institutional environment with regard to finance has largely been ignored in the ex-
isting agricultural literature. This may be a serious caveat, as the financial environment may interact 
with technological developments in determining the distinct organizational form. Williamson 
(1991a, 1991b), being a major proponent of the TCE approach, also recognizes a systems approach 
where the different levels of social analysis interact or moderate each other, Aoki (2001, 2007) is 
another major proponent of this approach when high levels of endogeneity is accepted.  
 
A large body of work has explained the organizational transformation of U.S. livestock agriculture 
based on TCE arguments (MacDonald et al., 2004; Martinez and Zering, 2004; Martinez, 1999, 
2002) James et al. (2011) critiques these approaches in that they may omit the cumulative or inter-
active effects of different exogenous determinants of the organizational form and emphasize finance 
as one such determinant. This paper supports the critique raised by James et al. (2011) specifically 
the possibility of interaction effects in the form of complementarities between finance and organiza-
tion in the process of adaption to technological change. However they do not necessarily have to be 
exogenous factors.  
 
The paper poses the question: If the TCE arguments sufficiently explain organizational transfor-
mations as seen in the U.S., why has no organizational transformation taken place in Denmark, 
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which, from a technological view point, have seen a similar increase in the TCE drivers asset speci-
ficity, uncertainty and frequency of exchange? 
 
Williamson (1991a, 1991b) explains, Japanese corporate organization with the complementary rela-
tion and the distinctive institutional supports of employment, subcontracting and banking. In a simi-
lar way, this paper will, argue that the distinctive institutional environment with regard to finance 
can help explain the differences in the evolution of organization in the agricultural value chains in 
the U.S. and Denmark. The analysis balances what Aoki (2001) calls the synchronic and the dia-
chronic problem, on the one hand trying to understand the complexity and diversity of governance 
structure as an instance of multiple equilibriums, on the other hand trying to understand the process 
of institutional evolution and change in a framework consistent with an equilibrium view of institu-
tions (Aoki, 2001).     
 
This is a focus that puts the paper within New Institutional Economics where the primary research 
focus deals with level two and three of social analysis; the institutional environment level and the 
governance level respectively (Williamson, 2000). With a focus on the effects of differences in the 
institutional environment with regard to finance on the governance structure, the paper examines the 
interaction between the institutional environment level and the governance level, specifically the 
interaction between finance and organization, and the possible complementary effects between fi-
nance and some organizational forms. This is done with comparative institutional analysis based on 
induction from an inter-temporal cross-country comparison, the papers finds that interaction in the 
form of complementary effect between the financial environment and the organizational structure in 
agricultural value chains may exist in the process of adapting to technological change.  
 
The historical comparison compares two cases. The U.S. case, in which organizational change oc-
curs, is compared with the Danish case where no organizational change occurs, but which is in all 
other respects the same as the U.S. case. In doing so, the paper takes up the challenge posed by Mé-
nard and Klein (2004) to apply a comparative approach to the study of organizational arrangements 
their innovation and their institutional environment. Based on stylized facts and with a special em-
phasis on the finance and risk management implications of different organizational arrangements, 
the study compares hog marketing arrangements in the U.S. and Denmark in the light of different 
institutional frameworks with regard to finance.  
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic claim of the paper; that while technological change may induce in-
vestments in co-specific assets, the degree to which this will lead to organizational adaptation is 
moderated by the institutional environment. Here, the institutional environment with regard to fi-
nance and risk management is emphasized. However, this does not necessarily mean that other di-
mensions of the institutional environment are less important, nor does it mean that the factors nec-
essarily are exogenous, endogeneity and feedback loops will be discussed later.     
 
 
Figure 3.1: Asset specificity and institutional environment codetermine organizational form   
 
While this paper can be seen as a building block which supports the systems approach, integrating 
the institutional environment level and the governance level of analysis as advocated by Williamson 
(1991a, 1991b) and Aoki (2001,  2007), the paper challenges the TCE view on debt and equity con-
siderations, where debt and equity are seen as two different governance structures, one based on 
rules and another on discretion, and where the redeployability of the underlying asset is the deter-
mining factor (Williamson, 1988). 
 
While the redeployability of the underlying assets is an important factor with regard to the use of 
debt, this paper argues that there is more to it than that. The use of debt plays a number of roles, 
including an important role with regard to risk management. The diverse roles of debt are important 
reasons why the institutional environment with regard to finance is argued to be an important mod-
erating factor in the process of organizational adaptation.    
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The theoretical background for this claim is grounded in a holistic approach to a number of different 
theories of debt, TCE theories of technological drivers of asset specificity inducing organizational 
change and theories of cooperative organization. 
 
3.2 Theoretical background 
3.2.1 THE DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS OF DEBT 
Different economic schools of thought emphasize different aspects of the phenomenon, debt. Wil-
liamson recognizes that the different perspectives of agency theory and TCE theory are “mainly 
complementary” (Williamson, 1988, p. 568). This section tries to bridge these perspectives with 
insights from corporate and agricultural finance literature, as the approach to debt in the literature is 
far from holistic. A more unified approach to debt, which acknowledges multiple aspects, is applied 
to the question of organizational form in agricultural value chains and the financial structure of sole 
proprietorships, the family farm being the archetypal sole proprietorship. A short introduction to 
these different aspects is warranted. 
 
Classic financial theory is based on the separation theorem, where a combination of the efficient 
portfolio and the risk-free asset constructs dominant sets and separates the choice of where to be on 
the efficient portfolio frontier from the decision maker’s risk preferences. In this line of theory, the 
role of debt is to extend the capital market line beyond the tangency point on the efficient portfolio. 
That is borrowing at the risk-free rate and leveraging the efficient portfolio instead of holding com-
binations of the risk-free asset and the efficient portfolio tangency point (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 
1964; Tobin, 1958) 
 
Agency theory, pioneered by Jensen and Meckling (1976), sees debt as a financial instrument that 
adjusts risk and return through the leverage effect, much like the classic financial theory. Authors in 
this field do, however, implement the interrelated risk distorting effects of debt. The first is the in-
centive effect associated with a highly leveraged firm. If leverage is high, the lender will carry the 
downside of risky decisions (if the risky activity results in a financial loss, this will by a loss to the 
lender) while the owner (borrower) will get the upside of risky endeavors (the lender will only re-
ceive interest, if the activity turns out to be very profitable the gain will go to the borrower), this 
will induce the lender to risk adjust the cost of borrowing. Second, the incentive effect will induce 
the lender to incur monitoring costs, and adjust the cost of borrowing accordingly. Third is the cost 
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of bankruptcy and reorganization in cases where monitoring and pricing do not prevent default situ-
ations. Anticipating all these costs, the lender incorporates the costs into the price offered to the 
borrower, meaning that the borrower will carry the full wealth effect of agency costs associated 
with the use of debt.    
 
“The existence and size of the agency costs [of debt and outside equity] depend on the nature of the 
monitoring [and bonding] costs, the tastes of managers for non-pecuniary benefits [the ability to 
signal this to lenders] and the supply of potential managers who are capable of financing the entire 
venture out of their personal wealth [as these agent will have competitive advantages, eliminating 
competition carrying agency costs, within the limits of their wealth]” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
p. 330). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) base their model on an, initially, equity-financed entrepreneur who 
given an investment opportunity has to choose the right combination of debt and outside equity to 
finance the investment. Williamson calls the agency theory approach based on entrepreneurs “rather 
special” (Williamson, 1988, p. 578). Given the share of economic activity governed by SMEs com-
pared to large corporations, one could however reverse this argument9. In relation to corporate fi-
nance, Williamson’s critique is understandable, but in relation to agriculture, the focus of this paper, 
where farms are usually sole proprietorships or family partnerships, Jensen and Meckling’s ap-
proach is the natural reference point.  
 
Most literature relies on the price mechanism to convey the transaction cost and / or the agency cost 
of using debt. However, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that credit rationing, which is a non-price 
mechanism, represents agency and transaction costs of imperfect information. Instead of debt be-
coming “available on progressively worse terms” (Williamson, 1988, p. 578), debt may simply not 
be available.    
 
On the plus side of using debt, Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) formalized the tax incentives of 
debt instead of equity. Important as it is, it cannot explain all aspects of debt. Debt also enables 
agents to exercise profitable investment opportunities, which are beyond the limits of their personal 
                                                 
9 ”The [U.S.] small business share of private nonfarm GDP held relatively steady from 1998 through 2004 at 50 percent of the total” 
(Kobe, 2007, p. 26). 
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wealth, which is rational as long as the marginal returns from investment are above the marginal 
cost of debt including the agency costs of debt and as long as these costs are below the marginal 
costs of outside equity including the associated agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
Jensen´s (1986) free cash flow concept showed how debt could reduce the agency cost of free cash 
flows by aligning the incentives of principals and agents. The theory is developed in the environ-
ment of two principals, the lender and the outside equity provider, and one agent, the manager and 
inside equity provider. In an agricultural context, there typically is no outside equity provider, but 
debt may still shift the farmer’s focus from non-pecuniary goals to pecuniary goals as there are pe-
cuniary obligations to meet. This can induce a higher level of effort by the owner-operator (Barry 
and Robison, 2001).  
 
Agricultural finance literature following Baker (1968), and corporate finance literature following 
Donaldson (1961) have recognized the risk mitigating effect of unused credit reserves, which re-
duce the need to hold cash or other liquidity reserves. If debt is available, it can serve as a liquidity 
reserve. Keynes (1936) also realized the importance of liquidity and the role of debt and he de-
scribed the precautionary motive for holding cash as dependent “on the cheapness and the reliability 
of methods of obtaining cash, when it is required, by some form of temporary borrowing, in particu-
lar by overdraft or its equivalent. For there is no necessity to hold idle cash to bridge over intervals 
if it can be obtained without difficulty at the moment when it is actually required” (Keynes, 1936, p. 
196). Note that Keynes states that price as well as non-price mechanisms affect the use of borrow-
ing, “cheapness” and “reliability”, this is congruent with Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981) emphasis on 
non-price mechanisms, which generally do not receive the attention they deserve. Even Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) recognize the importance of credit reserves in addition to their focus on bank-
ruptcy costs and tax advantages of using debt, stating that: “These additional considerations, which 
are typically grouped under the rubric of "the need for preserving flexibility," will normally imply 
the maintenance by the corporation of a substantial reserve of untapped borrowing power. The tax 
advantage of debt may well tend to lower the optimal size of that reserve, but it is hard to believe 
that advantages of the size contemplated under our model could justify any substantial reduction, let 
alone their complete elimination” (Modigliani and Miller, 1963, p. 442). 
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TCE sees debt as a governance structure based on rules rather than discretion (Williamson, 1988). 
Having the modern corporation in mind, the focus is turned to project finance which yields im-
portant insights, as the importance of the redeployability characteristics of the investment assets are 
highlighted. In the case of default, assets will be liquidated and lenders will recover their claims to 
the extent that the assets in question are redeployable. The more specific the assets, the less the val-
ue of a pre-emptive claim and the less attractive the terms of debt that will be offered eventually 
leaving the investment opportunity to be equity financed or not exercised at all.        
 
The link between project finance and corporate capital structure is, however, unclear, as the compo-
sition of the portfolio of assets in the firm is not explained. Thus the possibility of interaction ef-
fects on the financing and risk management side of different investment projects is ignored. Don-
aldson (1961, p. 143) puts it like this: “within a single corporate entity the risk of cash insolvency 
must be considered on a company-wide basis.”  
 
While the redeployability of an asset, which Williamson (1988) emphasizes, affects the potential 
loss a lender will expect given default, Williamson (1988) ignores the probability of default which 
may be affected by the interaction in the portfolio of assets which the legal borrowing entity holds. 
Furthermore, the TCE approach to debt ignores that fact that a loan which is based on a single in-
vestment project will be part of a portfolio of loans, from the lenders point of view, and as such, 
portfolio considerations will apply on both sides of the transaction; “one person’s liability, is anoth-
er person’s asset” (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012, p. 1471). 
 
In this paper all of the above mentioned aspects of using debts are integrated. Summing up they are:  
1) The redeployability characteristics of the investment assets matter (collateral) 
2) Unused credit capacity serves as a flexible liquidity reserve 
3) Use of debt is restricted by both price and quantity constraints 
4) Debt affects the risk / return structure of investments through the leverage effect 
5) There are tax advantages to the use of debt 
6) Debt shifts the management focus from non-pecuniary to pecuniary gains 
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3.2.2 OUTSIDE EQUITY 
The TCE account of the cost of using outside equity in agriculture, following Allen and Lueck 
(1998), is based on uncertainty and (in)frequency and not the predominant TCE factor, asset speci-
ficity. The cost of outside equity stems from the opportunity for opportunistic behavior based on 
asymmetric information about the effects of random shocks of nature (uncertainty) as well as labor 
effort levels and the relatively high cost related to monitoring the labor effort in short and seasonal 
(infrequent) production stages involving few distinct tasks. This corroborates agency theory’s ex-
planation of the cost of using outside equity, as it stems from incentive dilution due to increased 
incentive for on-the-job consumption by the management and the monitoring costs involved in cur-
tailing this incentive. Jensen and Meckling (1976) stress that reduced effort can be seen as a form of 
on-the-job consumption10. 
 
3.2.3 THE PECKING ORDER THEORY OF FINANCE AND TCE 
The pecking-order theory of finance is attributed to Donaldson (1961). Briefly summarized it states 
that firms prefer retained earnings over debt and debt over the issuing of outside equity. Williamson 
(1988) identifies the following caveats in the pecking-order theory; 1) a lack of reference to the 
characteristics of the assets in pecking-order theory, and; 2) a lack of TCE justification for prefer-
ring retained earnings over debt.  
 
Williamson compares equity to intra firm coordination and debt to markets in a parallelization of 
Coase’s (1937) central question, firm or market, with the question of equity or debt; “parallels be-
tween corporate finance and vertical integration are especially striking” (Williamson, 1988, p. 576). 
If, however, one not only looks at the characteristics of the assets which Williamson stresses, but 
also looks at the characteristics of the financial side, one will find different types of debt and the 
central tenet of agency theory, different types of equity. The simplification of the asset side, of 
which agency theory may be guilty, is mirrored by the simplification of the liabilities and equity 
                                                 
10 “We shall continue to characterize the agency conflict between the owner-manager and outside shareholders as deriving from the 
manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his own consumption. However, we do not mean to 
leave the impression that this is the only or even the most important source of conflict. Indeed, it is likely that the most important 
conflict arises from the fact that as the manager’s ownership claim falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities 
such as searching out new profitable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such ventures simply because it requires too much trouble 
or effort on his part to manage or to learn about new technologies. Avoidance of these personal costs and the anxieties that go with 
them also represent a source of on-the-job utility to him and  can result in the value of the firm being substantially lower than it oth-
erwise could be” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 313). 
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side of the balance sheet, of which TCE is guilty. Describing both sides in more detail is relatively 
straight forward and bridges the two approaches to finance.  
 
A TCE justification for preferring retained earnings over debt and outside equity emerges when the 
distinction between market acquisition and the internal production of capital as merely debt and 
equity is refined. More appropriately, retained earnings could parallel internal production and both 
debt and outside equity could parallel the market acquisition of products. Simply put, there is such a 
thing as an (outside) equity market and a debt market. Transactions in both these markets are asso-
ciated with transaction costs. A TCE justification for preferring retained earnings over debt in cor-
porate-type firms could be that the joint action of the payment of dividends and obtaining debt 
could be associated with more costs than simply retaining the earnings for the simple reason that it 
generates a lot of transactions. Tax issues are ignored by Williamson, but they most likely play a 
major role in reality. Agency arguments for the pecking order theory, such as asymmetric infor-
mation, adverse selection, moral hazard and signaling still apply.  
 
In the case of the sole proprietorship, preferring retained earnings over debt when financing invest-
ment opportunities is essentially a question of the choice between consumption and savings. For the 
sole proprietor, residual earnings that are not consumed are saved, and savings in any form are an 
investment. Under the assumption of a stabile consumption behavior such as predicted by the per-
manent income hypothesis, windfall earnings will by definition be preferred to debt in financing 
investments, including bank deposits. As long as outside equity is not introduced, private savings 
and equity financed investments will be identical.        
 
3.2.4 TCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Transaction cost economics generally explains organizational form on the basis of three factors; 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Asset specificity is the 
main explanatory factor, as the specificity of assets has a major effect on the risk of post contractual 
opportunistic behavior. 
 
If the value of an asset is related to the relationship between contracting parties, the risk of oppor-
tunistic behavior may exist as one party may try to appropriate quasi-rents (Klein et al., 1978) from 
relationship specific investments made by the other party. Realizing this risk, decision makers will 
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be reluctant to make such investments based on inter-firm relationships. However, relation specific 
assets will stimulate integration to the extent that internalizing the relationship will mitigate the cost 
of opportunistic behavior.  
 
Asset specificity takes six different forms: 1) Site specificity; 2) Physical asset specificity; 3) Hu-
man-asset specificity; 4) Brand-name capital; 5) Dedicated asset, and; 6) Temporal specificity 
(Williamson, 1991). 
 
The increasing specialization of agricultural production, especially livestock, is driven by develop-
ments in production technology, which can only be reaped through increasing scale (Key and 
McBride, 2003, 2007; MacDonald and McBride, 2009). This is also the case in the processing stage 
of the agricultural value chain. Reacting to special consumer demands may also lead to the need for 
investment at both the production (farm) level and the processing level. These investments are rela-
tionship-specific, and therefore difficult to motivate without organizational forms that reduce the 
risk of opportunistic behavior because bilateral dependency poses added contracting hazards. 
 
In agriculture, the existence of cooperatives has long been explained by their role in the mitigation 
of the hold-up problem11 (Ménard, 2004; Sexton, 1990). Processing and marketing cooperatives are 
a form of forward integration, where farmers (cooperatively) own processing facilities and market 
their products. This organizational form has been instrumental in the swift adoption of technological 
developments. An alternative to the cooperative forward integration is backward integration, where 
firms originating in the processing stage of the agricultural value chain, integrate primary produc-
tion stages with their processing activities. This can be through inter-firm contracts (quasi-
integration) or by vertical integration.  
 
A central premise in TCE and agency theory is, however, that contracts “can never specify exactly 
what actions are to be taken and what payments are to be made in all possible future contingencies” 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, p. 61) and must therefore be incomplete. This leads to the second fac-
tor which explains organizational form, uncertainty, which is the primary reason for the impossibil-
ity of complete contracts. Greater uncertainty leads to greater costs of doing business, because rigid 
contracts, on the one hand, are less likely to determine efficient outcomes, while flexible contracts, 
                                                 
11 The hold-up problem being the agency theory label for post contractual opportunistic behaviour (Klein et al., 1978; Staatz, 1987) 
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on the other hand, are open to interpretation and thus to costly renegotiation (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990). 
 
The complexity of the contractual arrangements, which determine the organizational form, is related 
to the frequency of transactions. As the cost of complex arrangements is sunk, they are more likely 
to be made where frequent transactions are expected.  
 
Co-specialized assets, that is cases where both sides of the transaction have made specific invest-
ments, are more likely to be co-owned (Klein et al., 1978). In cases where assets are non-
transferable, such as human capital, the degree of co-specialization determines the organizational 
structure (Grossman and Hart, 1986).     
        
Allen and Lueck’s (1998) explanation for agricultural organization is along these lines. Based on 
the observation that agriculture is both seasonal and random, they conclude that these two factors 
lead to potential moral hazard problems and limitations regarding the gains from specialization. 
This makes the family farm an efficient organizational form as the moral hazard problem is elimi-
nated or reduced without sacrificing significant gains from specialization. If seasonality and ran-
domness can be mitigated, the family farm becomes a less obvious organizational form as alterna-
tives become more competitive.   
 
The limitations to the gains from specialization are related to the relatively low level of asset speci-
ficity of agricultural assets, as many farmers usually use somewhat similar production technologies. 
Land is by definition spatially specific, but it can be used for the production of a variety of alterna-
tives, often with relatively little difference in the return to land. Most agricultural machinery (trac-
tors, etc.) is also fairly general purpose and mobile. The seasonal nature of production means that 
the specialization of human and physical capital is limited. For example, a combine harvester is 
only productive for a couple of months a year, which is why specializing regarding the use of this 
machine has it limits.  
 
Given the exposure to the natural environment, production results are prone to uncertainty. This 
entails a moral hazard problem as monitoring the effort of hired management is costly and the effort 
level of management cannot be determined by observing results (a good result may be due to signif-
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icant effort or good luck, while a bad result may be due to minimal effort or bad luck). This results 
in the family farm organization being the dominant organizational form as management and signifi-
cant parts of other labor inputs are supplied by the owner along with equity capital with no associat-
ed monitoring costs. There is no separation of ownership and control in the Berle and Means (1932) 
sense. 
  
The degree to which the ability to control the natural environment is harnessed by technological 
change, for example through modern livestock confinement systems, decreases the degree to which 
the family farm is the obvious organizational form. Reducing the effects of seasonality and uncer-
tainty is usually contingent on large location-specific investments involving high degrees of special-
ization. The production environment becomes controlled or controllable, which is why production 
failures are linked to failures of management, which in turn reduces the moral hazard problem asso-
ciated with asymmetric information.  
 
Technological changes which open the possibility of exploiting economics of scale in livestock ag-
riculture almost always involve specific investment (Key and McBride, 2003, 2007; MacDonald 
and McBride, 2009). These investments have to be finances, following the pecking order theory, by 
inside equity, debt or outside equity in preferred order. Limits to the access to credit, due to prohibi-
tive prices or rationing, may lead to specialization. Focusing available capital on fewer more spe-
cialized activities enables production at a larger scale, but focused on more narrow stages of pro-
duction. If the perceived benefits of investment are high enough, increased use of outside capital 
may be justified as long as the marginal cost of capital (including agency costs) is below the mar-
ginal return of the investment. Likewise, if the perceived marginal cost of capital (including agency 
costs) is declining, more investment opportunities may become attractive, and the use of outside 
capital may increase.  
 
The value of many agricultural commodities is dependent on timing, as they are perishable, non-
storable and/or will decline in value with sub-optimal market timing. This leads to a special kind of 
asset specificity called temporal specificity (Masten, 2000). Milk will spoil quickly if it is not 
stored, transported and processed in a proper and timely fashion. In a similar manner, hogs may 
only be within their target weight class for a short period of time. Because of temporal specificity, 
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the marketing of livestock commodities has to be coordinated to avoid a loss of production and rent-
seeking behavior.       
 
When spot markets have failed in the coordination of production, processing and the marketing of 
perishable livestock commodities such as milk or meat, cooperatives have historically been orga-
nized to deal with the coordination problem, and more recently coordination has been accomplished 
through contracting. These organizational forms maintain the incentive structure of the family farm, 
avoiding moral hazard and eliminating (or reducing) monitoring costs, while mitigating the transac-
tion costs associated with asset specificity due to specialization and product characteristics. While 
full-scale backward integration also mitigates the transaction costs, it introduces the moral hazard 
problem with hired management and thus monitoring costs, to the extent that seasonality and/or the 
uncertainty (randomness) of nature are not fully controlled.  
 
3.2.5 COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION IN THE AGRICULTURAL VALUE CHAIN 
Cooperatives are hybrid organizational forms between market and hierarchies (Ménard, 2004) that 
reduce some of the transaction cost associated with asset specificity. The fact that many agricultural 
commodities have temporal and spatially specific characteristics means that transportation is an 
important but costly factor (Masten, 2000). Combined with relatively few processing facilities, due 
to economics of scale at the processing stage, markets for agricultural raw commodities tend to have 
oligopsonistic characteristics. Sexton (1990) shows how the existence of cooperatives, in markets 
like this, have a procompetitive effect on non-cooperative rivals, as cooperatives reduce the possi-
bility of (tacit) collusion among the non-cooperative processors. In this way, cooperatives reduce 
transaction costs by working as a completive yardstick (Sexton, 1990) that reduces the risk of post-
contractual opportunistic behavior.  
 
Technological changes are the underlying driver of development in agriculture, where other organi-
zational forms may lead to hold-up problems and thereby reduce investment and hamper technolog-
ical adoption; cooperatives establish farmers as residual claimants and reduce the hold-up problem 
(Fulton, 1995). The major weakness of cooperatives is the vaguely defined property rights (Cook, 
1995). This weakness leads to a number of problems including the horizon, portfolio, control, free-
rider and influence cost problem that may reduce incentives to invest in the cooperative (Royer, 
1999), although some problems may lead to overinvestment (Olesen, 2007). Another problem is the 
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quantity control problem in which the individual member does not carry all the costs of quantity 
changes, as the marginal effect associated with the cooperative revenue and processing cost func-
tions are shared between all members proportionately (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2000; Fulton, 1995; 
Hansen, 2011). These problems may, however, be overcome or mitigated by organizational innova-
tions such as the New Generation Cooperative (Burress et al., 2008). 
 
3.2.6 THE RISK MANAGEMENT ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS - EFFECT OF POLICY, 
TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCE   
Increased specialization and the increased use of outside capital in the form of debt will increase the 
risk exposure of the firm (farm) in two ways. The market risk exposure to competitive prices will 
increase as production is specialized and increased. Specialization will also increase the risk of 
hold-up dependent on TCE characteristics, asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency.  
 
The ability to manage both these types of risk cost efficiently differs across organizational arrange-
ments. Typically, the organizational literature focuses on the risk of hold-up and other TCE related 
risks. The ability to manage the more simple market risks is, however, also affected by the organi-
zational form. The extent to which organizational form copes with these issues depends on alterna-
tive arrangements which cope with risks. The OECD (2011) explains how agricultural policy may 
crowd out other risk management arrangements. The financial environment may have a similar ef-
fect in cases where the perceived access to credit leads decision makers to believe that they have 
large credit reserves.     
 
Under institutional environmental conditions where market risks are low due to market stabilizing 
agricultural policy, and the existing market risk is managed by perceived credit reserves, it is only 
natural to expect that organizational development will have reduced focus on these types of risks, 
while maintaining the ability to cope with hold-up related risks.    
 
Under institutional environmental conditions where production technology does not lead to a high 
risk of hold-up, i.e. under conditions of low asset specificity, low uncertainty and low frequency of 
transactions, but where the production is exposed to pure market related price risk, it is only natural 
to expect the organizational development will have less focus on hold-up related risks, and an in-
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creased relative focus on market risks, for example through combined use of institutions such as 
spot and futures markets. 
 
In institutional environments where the need to cope with both hold-up related risks and with mar-
ket related risk it is natural to expect the organizational development to focus on both these issues 
through organizational or quasi-organizational arrangements such as integration or contract produc-
tion. The dual aim of contract production to cope with both market and hold-up risk is recognized 
by MacDonald and Korb (2011) who analyze the development in agricultural contracting in the 
U.S. 
 
Policy, technology and finance are important frames for the organizational form, because they af-
fect the role the organization will have to play with regard to risk management. Some organizational 
forms may need to adapt in the event of changes in the institutional environment. Processing and 
marketing cooperatives, as seen in the Danish livestock sector, have evolved to cope with hold-up 
risks in environments where the need for a focus on market risks was reduced, initially due to diver-
sified production on the farms, and later due to agricultural policy and a financial environment 
which provided the farmer with a perception of relatively large credit reserves (Paper I). Farms spe-
cialized due to technological developments, which may have been adopted quicker due to price sta-
bilizing agricultural policies. Later, market risk increased due to changing agricultural policy, while 
more recently, the risk coping mechanism of credit reserves has been reduced due to the global fi-
nancial crisis. An institutional vacuum may be appearing, in which Danish farmers are exposed to 
risk for which there are no longer any available coping mechanisms.      
 
Market-based hedging mechanisms, such as futures markets, may not fill the gap, because farmers 
may be exposed to different price fluctuations in the physical market than in the futures market. 
This basis risk may be especially strong for cooperative members as their exposure on the physical 
market, while strongly related to market risk, is also related to the cooperative specific business risk 
associated with the cooperative’s operations, market and strategic risks. Furthermore, there may be 
a lack of natural counterparts in these types of commodity futures markets, which is why they are 
difficult to establish.   
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Price risk management in the form of hedging is widely seen as a way to improve, or a prerequisite 
for, access to credit. A major rationale for commodity price hedging is improved access to credit, 
both in the general financial literature (Froot et al., 1993) and in the specific agricultural finance 
literature (Heifner, 1972) where “lenders in some instances are willing to provide more credit to 
farmers who hedge” (Turvey, 1989, p. 634). “Several of these studies have focused on hedging […] 
and its relationship to a producer’s use of leverage. These studies generally conclude that hedging 
tends to increase as the farm’s debt level rises” (Harwood et al., 1999, p. 39). These conclusions are 
in apparent contrast to the observation that price risk management activity (hedging) is higher and 
leverage is lower in the U.S. compared to Denmark where risk management activity is low and lev-
erage is high. The line of research mentioned above tends to ignore the reverse argument, that am-
ple access to credit or liquidity may crowd out the rationale for business risk management. Baker 
(1968), Barry and Baker (1971), Gabriel and Baker (1980), Keynes (1936) and Modigliani and Mil-
ler (1963), are examples of a recognition of this credit reserves argument.  
 
The financial institutional environment may affect the perceived access to credit and thus the per-
ceived credit reserves. This may have a major effect on investment behavior as well as risk man-
agement behavior. A major theme in the finance literature is credit constraints and investment cash 
flow sensitivities. This literature, however, focuses narrowly on external credit rationing which 
draws attention away from the more interesting “self-imposed limitations on credit use” (Barry and 
Baker, 1971, p. 222). Liquidity reserves have a small explicit effect on income or cash flow risk, 
“most of its influence is implicit in that it affects the production organization as well as the financial 
organization of the farm” (Gabriel and Baker, 1980, p. 562). Extending this line of reasoning, the 
perceived level of credit reserves will also affect the organization of marketing, e.g. spot market, 
cooperative marketing, contracting or vertical integration by the processor.  
 
The question is what determines whether the coordination, technology adaptation or market risk 
management problems will be mitigated through market, quasi-forward or backward integration, 
other hybrid forms or a hierarchy? We suggest that the financial system plays a pivotal role in an-
swering this question.  
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In the following, a cross country comparison of the development in the U.S. and Danish hog mar-
keting arrangements is made in an effort to illustrate and exemplify the moderating role of the fi-
nancial system in organizational adaptation to technological change.   
 
3.3 Cross Country Comparison of Development in Hog Marketing  
3.3.1 METHOD  
John Stuart Mill is widely considered to be the father of the modern comparative method. This sec-
tion follows the “Method of Difference” which is a comparative method that can be described as 
follows: “By comparing instances in which the phenomenon does occur, with instances in other 
respects similar in which it does not”  (Mill, 1882, pp. 478-479).  
 
In the empirical TCE literature, one of three general methods are applied: qualitative case studies, 
quantitative case studies, and cross-sectional econometric analysis (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). 
With regard to the role of the financial system and risk management, Williamson’s (1991b) work on 
the Japanese corporation can be seen as a related qualitative case study. Woolverton and Sykuta 
(2009) apply a comparative institutional analysis to the question of farmers’ hedging decisions and 
this paper can be considered as a related quantitative case study. Finally, Acemoglu et al. (2009) is 
an example of a related cross-sectional econometric analysis. Acemoglu et al. (2009) find interac-
tion effects of financial development and contracting costs in a large multi-country, multi-industry 
analysis of vertical integration, linking TCE literature (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and property rights 
theories (PRT) (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) with the body of work which 
emphasizes the importance of the institutional environment which governs the relationship between 
firms and financial intermediaries, i.e. the institutional environment with regard to finance 
(Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Kumar et al., 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
 
The aforementioned existing research on agricultural organization does not include the interaction 
effect of the institutional environment level and the governance level emphasized by Williamson 
(1991a, 1991b), Acemoglu et al. (2009) and James et al. (2011). Financial development and vertical 
integration are not unambiguous concepts, however. Instead of more or less developed financial 
systems (Acemoglu et al.  2009), more subtle differences in the financial institutions may affect 
organization. Likewise, the degree of vertical integration may also be refined with respect to direc-
tion, e.g. what determines whether vertical integration developments will be of forward or backward 
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integrating nature, in line with PRT? What determines other quasi-integrated hybrid organizational 
forms? These questions are not addressed by Acemoglu et al. (2009). 
 
The cross-country comparison presented in the following is best described as an explorative com-
parative case study. Empirically, the cross-country comparison finds that complementary effects of 
the Danish financial system and the dominating cooperative form of processing and marketing live-
stock commodities may explain why technological change has been adopted in Denmark without 
organizational changes such as those seen in the U.S. This supports the proposition that financial 
institutions matter with regard to organizational adaptation to technological change.       
 
3.3.2 THE DANISH AND U.S. HOG SECTORS 
The Danish and U.S. pork industries are major export-oriented industries. Both have undergone 
substantial and somewhat similar structural changes over the past decades, driven largely by techno-
logical development. However, the development in the U.S. has been characterized by significant 
increase in vertical integration and the use of production and marketing contracts, whereas the Dan-
ish hog marketing procedures have been relatively stable, relying on traditional processing and 
marketing cooperatives.   
 
Denmark is a major pork producing country with approximately 2 % of world production and a 
large share of world trade. The U.S. is an even larger producer with approximately 10 % of world 
production12 (Foreign Agricultural Service / USDA, 2011). However, relative to its population, 
Danish production is much higher than in the U.S. with approximately nine times the per capita 
production of the USA. The U.S. production is, however, concentrated in two major clusters, one in 
southern Minnesota and Iowa which accounts for approximately 40 % of national production, and 
one in North Carolina which accounts for approximately 15 % of national production. Furthermore, 
approximately 30 % is located in the other “Heartland” states which neighbor the Minnesota / Iowa 
cluster and the Great Lakes. The per capita production of pork in the state of Iowa is approximately 
three times that of Denmark while the absolute production is roughly 170 % that of Denmark. Den-
sity measured per hectare is higher in Denmark as the total arable farmland in Iowa is more than 
four times that of Denmark (Danmarks Statistik, 2011; Economic Research Service / USDA, 2012). 
                                                 
12 China is the largest pork producing and consuming country in the world with approximately 50% of world production and con-
sumption (Foreign Agricultural Service / USDA, 2011). 
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Large scale structural changes have been followed by increasing size and specialization in both the 
U.S. and Danish hog operations during recent decades. From 1992 to 2004, the number of hog 
farms decreased by 70 % in the US and by roughly 63 % in Denmark, while the average size of 
operations increased by 492 % in the U.S. and by 347 % in Denmark. 
 
Concentration of production in the U.S. hog sector has changed rapidly. In 1990, 58 % of the U.S. 
hog inventory belonged to farms with less than 1,000 head. In 2000, 51 % of production belonged 
to 156 operations with more than 50,000 head, while in 2010, only 130 operations (0.215 % of all 
operations) with more than 50,000 head controlled 57 % of the total inventory.   
 
Figure 3.2a Figure 3.2c 
Figure 3.2b Figure 3.2d 
Source: Danish Agriculture & Food Council 
(2011)  
Source:   Hog and Pigs NASS USDA (1991), 
Lawrence and Grimes (2001),  
Land in Farms NASS USDA (2012) 
 
Figures 3.2a and 3.2d illustrate the structural development in Denmark and the U.S. As can be seen, 
there is a similar trend in development towards fewer, larger and more specialized farms, although 
the super large farms that have emerged in the U.S. have not emerged in Denmark. There are legal 
reasons for this as the acreage size of farms has been restricted in Denmark and farmers have been 
legally required to own a progressively larger share of land needed for the disposal of manure. The 
combination of these two pieces of legislation has effectively capped the size of Danish hog opera-
tions. Whether other factors, such as financial constraints, would have restricted the development in 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
< 1000 1000 - 2000 2000 - 5000 5000 - 10000 > 10000 > 20000 Total
Number of Hog and Pig Operations in Denmark by 
Year and Size Group
1990 2000 2010
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
< 1000 1000 - 2000 2000 - 5000 5000 - 10000 10000 - 50000 > 50000 Total
Number of Hog and Pig Operations in USA by       
Year and Size Group
1990 2000 2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
< 1000 1000 - 2000 2000 - 5000 5000 - 10000 > 10000
Market Share of Danish Hog and Pig Operations by 
Year and Size Group 
1990 2000 2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
< 1000 (>1K)1000 - 2000 2000 - 5000 5000 - 10000 10000 - 50000 > 50000
Market Share of U.S. Hog and Pig Operations by 
Year and Size Group
1990 2000 2010
  
93 
 
the absence of legal restrictions based on structural and environmental policy is a hypothetical ques-
tion which is very hard to answer, although the possibility cannot be ruled out. 
 
Key and McBride state that large scale U.S. “operations that specialize in a single phase of produc-
tion [...] have replaced farrow-to-finish operations that traditionally performed all phases of produc-
tion” (2007, p. 1). This trend toward specialization in single stages of production is a form of verti-
cal disintegration, which is in contrast to another trend; the increasing backward vertical integration, 
which is shown below. Key and McBride (2007) further report that the share of total output, from 
specialized finishing operations, increased from 22 % to 77 % in the period from 1992 to 2004, 
while integrated “Farrow-to-finish” production fell from 65 % to 18 %. A somewhat similar picture 
can be discerned regarding the structural change in Denmark, although the degree of specialization 
may be lower while the development has also been slower. Definitions of farm types may play a 
role. Some Farrow-to-feeder operations are hybrid farm types that are partly specialized and partly 
integrated. These farms may show up as Farrow-to-finish farms in statistics even though they would 
characterize themselves as Farrow-to-feeder operations.  
 
Table 3.1 shows the development in the share of hog operations within the different production or-
ganizations. The table shows the share of farms within the different categories, and does not present 
the development in output mentioned above due to size distribution.  
 
Table 3.1:  Share of Hog farms within different groups related to specialization 
Country Denmark USA 
Year 1990 2000 2010 1992 1998 2004 
Farrow-to-finish (Integrated) 49 % 49 % 43 % 54 % 49 % 31 % 
Feeder-to-finish (Specialized) 28 % 39 % 46 % 19 % 31 % 40 % 
Other* specialized producers 23 % 13 % 10 % 27 % 20 % 29 % 
Source: (Danish Agriculture & Food Council, 2011; Key and McBride, 2007) 
 
3.3.3 ORGANIZATION OF HOG PRODUCTION  
The shift from the intra-firm (farm) coordination of production to the market coordination of pro-
duction is affected by the transaction cost of market coordination relative to the costs of intra-firm 
coordination in a Coasian perspective. A reduction in transaction costs relative to the cost of the 
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intra-firm coordination of hogs is not the only possible explanation. Technological process innova-
tion in production, which yields potential economies of scale within specialized production phases, 
combined with budget constraints (due to transaction costs in the financial system or reservation 
value of credit use), or combined with environmental restrictions on size, may have led to the in-
creased specialization as the potential gains from economies of scale would have been traded off 
against the transaction costs of market coordination within size constraints due to financial or legal 
restrictions, or a combination of these.    
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Organization of hog production, Source: Adapted from MacDonald and McBride 
(2009) 
 
 
From a transaction costs point of view, the hybrid farms mentioned above are interesting as the rea-
son for partly integrating may be due to information asymmetries and / or problems with keeping or 
observing quality standards. A farrow-to-feeder producer with a partly integrated feeder-to-finish 
operation may select the best quality feeder pigs for his own feeder operation, and sell lower quality 
pigs to separate feeder operations in a Lemon type market (Akerlof, 1970). Sellers may adversely 
select low quality feeder pigs for sale and keep high quality feeder pigs for finishing. However, 
since planning and relationships play an important role for continual supply and demand relation-
ships between farrow-to-feeder and feeder-to-finish operations, farrow-to-feeder operations may 
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actually keep low quality pigs and only deliver high quality animals to customers. This may occur if 
it is hard or costly to observe the value of low quality feeder pigs, and so, the buyer may demand 
significant price cuts. To avoid this potential asymmetry of expected value, favorable selection may 
occur, and the farrow-to-feeder farmer may select the low quality feeder pigs for his integrated 
feeder-to-finish operations. Breeding stock will also play a role.  
 
The decision to partly integrate may be influenced by other circumstances. Initial endowment of 
production facilities or bundling of assets in the purchase of neighboring farms may leave the 
farmer with some production-specific assets on hand dedicated to one phase of production while 
trying to specialize in another phase of production. Utilizing these assets in a manner such as the 
one described above may be the best alternative, as the assets are not costlessly redeployable.     
 
As shown in Table 3.1, the organization of hog production is somewhat similar across countries but 
is heterogeneous within countries. Figure 3.3 above illustrates the different organizational structures 
of production and the picture is similar in Denmark and the USA. The degree of integration be-
tween crop production and animal production differs widely both within and across countries. In the 
U.S., the per cent share of home-grown grain fed has been declining, especially for specialized 
Feeder-to-finish operations (Key and McBride, 2007). This trend has not been so clear in Denmark 
which is partly due to the legal linkage of land ownership and animal production.     
 
3.3.4 DANISH DEVELOPMENT 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the development in specialization in hog production in Denmark relative to the 
general structural development in Danish agriculture. The increase in the total number of farms in 
2005 was due to the redefinition of farms. Figure 3.5 shows the development in the number of pigs 
slaughtered in Denmark and the number of pigs exported live. Since 1993, the number of slaugh-
tered pigs in Denmark has been relatively stable at around 20 million head a year. The export of live 
pigs has however increased gradually. This is mainly the export of feeder pigs for finishing in Ger-
many, but also finished pigs for processing. In 1997, substantial live exports of, primarily, feeder 
pigs began from Denmark. This export accelerated in 2005 and in 2011, 0.40 live pigs were export-
ed for every pig slaughtered in Denmark. 
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The trend towards increased live export may be explained by a number of coevolving factors; 
a) Slaughterhouse labor cost differentials between Denmark and Germany. 
b) The Danish lead in know-how regarding the Farrow-to-feeder part of the value chain. 
c) Investment in the Farrow-to-feeder part operations driven by animal welfare legislation. 
d) A financial system with greater access to credit in Denmark.  
e) A legal requirement that the ownership of land in Denmark is in conjunction with livestock 
operations.13  
f) Higher land ownership requirement in e) for Feeder-to-finish than for Farrow-to-feeder rela-
tive to value added. 
g) High land price inflation which is probably influenced by d) and e), and increasing the rela-
tive effect of f).  
h) A lower level of competition in the producer-processor interface (Hobbs, 2001) than the 
feeder-finish interface. 
 
Figure 3.4: Structural development in Danish 
agriculture 
Figure 3.5: Slaughter and live export from 
Denmark 
Source: (Danmarks Statistik, 2012a) Source: (Danmarks Statistik, 2012b) 
 
3.3.5 DEVELOPMENT IN THE USA 
As shown, the production of pork has undergone great change during recent decades. Size structure 
has developed rapidly like in most other agricultural subsectors. The structural shifts have been ac-
companied by regional shifts in production. Natural and technology-related economic conditions 
have been affected by policy. An example of this is the development in livestock production in Io-
                                                 
13 It was legally required that farms with large livestock operations had to be “harmonious” in the sense that they had to own a large 
part (60%) of the land, needed to recycle nutrients from animal manure. 
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wa, where early dominance in animal feeding evolved because of the naturally abundant supply of 
grain, which made it more profitable to raise livestock and transport meat, than to transport grain 
and raise the livestock near the consumer. These natural favorable conditions for livestock produc-
tion, reflected in the price differentials to other states, were reduced by technological development 
in transport and were further skewed by the loan rates (Hayes et al., 1996) given by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation as part of U.S. agricultural policy. “Because this loan rate was the same in all 
regions, it effectively removed the grain price differential that had given Iowa's livestock feeders 
their initial advantage” (Hayes et al., 1996, p. 2). The Iowa hog industry stagnated contrary to North 
Carolina where the hog industry thrived up to 1997 when the state enacted a moratorium on the 
construction of medium and large scale hog operations due to environmental concerns (Key and 
McBride, 2007).  
 
The trade policy of foreign governments effectively encouraged U.S. grain exports at the expense of 
U.S. livestock exports up to the GATT and NAFTA agreements. The European Community subsi-
dized value-added exports so that pork and food-importing countries placed import restrictions on 
livestock products in an attempt to capture the value-added in livestock industries. These interna-
tional policies led the U.S. to export more feed grains and consequentially reduce Iowa's livestock 
production (Hayes et al., 1996).  
 
The liberalization of world trade opened world meat markets, and because it became more efficient 
to export meat than to export feed grains, U.S. meat export surged. Domestic agricultural policy 
changes reduced the skewing effect of the loan rates, and along with technological and regulatory 
changes in the logistics of pork, the comparative advantage of Iowa’s hog industry was restored 
(Hayes et al., 1996). 
 
Hayes et al. (1996) argue that the geographical development in the structure of U.S. pork produc-
tion was due to the removal of institutional barriers with the GATT and NAFTA agreements and a 
call for the leaders in Iowa to solve the differences “regarding discussions on perceived negative 
environmental, economic and social aspects”  (Hayes et al., 1996, p. 15). Key and McBride (2007), 
however, regard the North Carolina moratorium on the construction of new and expanded hog oper-
ations with 250 or more hogs to be the reason for the rapid growth in Iowa and other regions; “Re-
stricted growth in North Carolina may explain the particularly rapid growth of the industry in West-
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ern States. Open space and a relatively low population density in these states provide greater flexi-
bility in managing animal waste” (Key and McBride, 2007, p. 10). 
 
3.3.6 MARKETING ARRANGEMENT FOR HOGS 
The transition from family firm to large corporations is a salient characteristic of industrial devel-
opment, although agriculture has largely resisted this development (Allen and Lueck, 1998). In the 
case of U.S. hog production, the development toward large scale industrialized corporations has 
been significant compared to many other subsectors and regions of the world. The U.S. hog produc-
tion sector still has distinct features from agrarian tradition but combined with modern industrial 
organization it forms a number of diverse organizational structures. 
 
Production technology has driven development toward investments in dedicated production assets 
which are specific for hog production as well as specific investments in human capital dedicated to 
hog production. Production technological development has, however, been dependent on the availa-
bility of finance for the realization of technological innovations. Technological development and 
the financing required for its implementation go hand in hand in the explanation of structural devel-
opment.   
 
Technological progress in hog production has been an important driver for structural change and 
specialization both in the U.S. and in Denmark. Technological change in the processing and market-
ing of pork has driven market concentration in the processing link of the supply chain both in the 
U.S. and Denmark. There are, however, significant differences in the structure and development of 
marketing arrangements in the two countries. In Denmark, cooperative meat processing dominates 
the marketing channel for hogs, while in the U.S. there has been a shift from the spot market pricing 
of hogs to contract production and backward integration.  
 
3.3.7 DEVELOPMENT IN U.S. HOG MARKETING 
Contracting is usually explained in part by risk shifting motives and coordination motives, where 
spot market prices have failed to signal consumer demands for specialized products and shifts in 
consumer tastes (MacDonald et al., 2004). Contract production can reduce farmers’ business risk, 
typically price risk and in some cases also yield risk, but in reducing business risk the farmer may 
increase exposure to strategic risks related to specific investments (MacDonald and Banker, 2004). 
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The risk that increased possibility to exert market power on the buyer side of the market, by proces-
sors in monopsony positions, has been of concern. The increasing concentration of processing in the 
U.S., dominated by IOFs, has led to concerns about hold-up risk. Contracts can be used to mitigate 
the risk of hold-up as well as to exert market power (MacDonald et al., 2004). 
 
A number of surveys have examined producer behavior related to the choice of marketing arrange-
ment in the U.S. hog sector (Davis and Gillespie, 2007; Key and McBride, 2003; Zheng et al., 
2008) from a risk reduction or transaction costs perspective. Franken et al. (2009) analyses Illinois 
hog farmers and finds empirical support for both transaction costs and risk preference explanations 
individually and in a unified framework.  
    
U.S. hog marketing has changed radically in the recent decades, with a significant shift from the 
spot marketing of hogs to contract production and backward vertical integration. Figure 3.6 shows 
the development in relative importance of the spot market. In 1994 it was the dominant coordinating 
vehicle with 62 % of hogs marketed through the spot market, but by 2010, only one tenth of the 
relative market size remained, with 6.2 % of hogs marketed through the spot market (Plain, 2011). 
 
Figure 3.6:  Per cent of barrows and gilts sold on the spot market live or carcass weight basis. 
Source: (Plain, 2011) 
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The development has been followed by Glenn Grimes and Ronald L. Plain (Grimes and Plain, 
2009; Plain, 2011) based initially on surveys and later on data from mandatory price reporting 
(MPR). The MPR data is separated into six categories: 
 
 Negotiated: Non-packer raised hogs sold on spot market on a carcass weight basis 
 Market Formula: Non-packer raised hogs sold on contracts based on publicly reported prices 
 Other Market Formula: Non-packer raised hogs sold on futures price based contract   
 Other Purchase Agreement: Non-packer raised hogs priced in a different way than the above  
 Packer Sold: Hogs raised by one packer and slaughtered by another packer (processor) 
 Packer Owned: Hogs raised and slaughtered by the same packer (processor) 
 
Table 3.2 shows the development in pricing method for hogs in the U.S. from 1994 to 2010. From 
1994 to 2002, the data are survey-based from the U.S. Hog Marketing Contract Study (Grimes and 
Plain, 2009), while from 2002 to 2010, the data are based on MPR data. Surveys report pricing of 
hogs in January whereas MPR data are year averages. There is some discrepancy in the data, but the 
general trend is clear. Packers (processors) have integrated vertically into production of hogs and 
raise more than 31% of production via ownership, another 59 % of production is contracted in some 
way.  
 
Table 3.2: Hog marketing structure in the U.S., Percent Hogs Slaughter by Pricing Method 
 
Source: (Grimes and Plain, 2009; Plain, 2011) 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mandatory Price Reporting
carcass weight priced
Negotiated 62 43.4 35.8 25.7 17.3 16.7 13.8 12.6 10.4 10.4 9.0 8.2 8.1 6.5 4.9
Market Formula 44.2 47.2 54.0 44.5 40.8 37.1 38.2 38.6 35.4 35.7 35.6 41.4 36.5
Other Market Pormula 3.4 8.5 5.7 11.8 8.7 7.2 8.6 8.4 8.1 8.1 9.4 6.5 10.1
Other Purchase Agreement 14.4 16.9 22.8 8.6 12.2 18.0 17.0 15.5 14.8 13.8 12.6 11.2 12.4
Packer Sold 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.3 5.9 6.1 5.9 5.5 5.3
Packer Owned 16.4 16.4 17.8 18.1 19.4 20.7 22.3 23.1 24.0 25.2
Total 62 43 98 98 100 100 94 95 94 95 94 94 95 95 94
Mandatory Price Reporting
live weight priced 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.5 0.9 1.3
Non-Mandatory Price Reporting 4.2 3.9 4.4 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pricing Method Used for Market Hog Purchases in January Market Hog Sales by Pricing Method
USDA / AMS Market News ReportsGlenn Grimes Packer Surveys
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3.3.8 PRODUCTION CONTRACTS AND MARKETING CONTRACTS 
There are two general types of contracts in use in the U.S. hog industry, production contracts and 
marketing contracts. Both are intermediate forms of governance between the extremes; spot market 
and (backward) vertical integration (MacDonald et al., 2004).  
 
In the spot market, the farmer controls assets and production decisions on the farm and receives 
prices for farm output, negotiated at the time of sale. In this governing structure the market mecha-
nism governs the allocation of resources, subject to any market imperfections and transaction costs. 
With marketing contracts the farmer still controls assets and production decisions on the farm, but 
the contract may specify the quantity and timing of the output. The farmer receives prices negotiat-
ed prior to, or during, production. Marketing contracts shift some price risk from the producer to the 
processor and increase the processor’s ability to schedule production and control input costs. Pro-
duction contracts shift control over some production decisions to the contractor (the processor) 
and/or ownership over some of the traditional farm assets. Contractors will often provide feed, vet-
erinary and logistical services as well as providing the feeder pigs, of which they retain ownership. 
Farmers provide labor, equipment and housing and are paid a fee for a service. Vertical integration 
shifts all control to a single firm and the farmer / manager of the hog production stage is compen-
sated according to skill and time (MacDonald et al., 2004). 
 
3.3.9 DEVELOPMENT IN HOG PROCESSING IN DENMARK 
The cooperative structure in Denmark has reduced the risk of hold-up situations, as the risk that 
cooperatives will exploit their members is considered to be less likely than the risk that IOFs in the 
processing link of the supply chain will exploit asset specificity on the producer side of the market.   
 
There is a 125-year history of cooperative slaughterhouses in Denmark, with the first cooperative 
slaughterhouse being established in 1887 (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004). In the 1870s, Danish 
agriculture was transformed from being a mainly grain exporting sector to a mainly livestock prod-
uct exporting sector. Open market trade policy and technological developments were key elements 
of the institutional environment which shaped this development. The growing livestock product 
export spurred investment in processing facilities which were often organized as cooperatives.  
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Figure 3.7: Slaughterhouses in Denmark from 1860 to 2000.  
Source:  Pedersen and Strandskov (2011) 
 
The number of cooperative slaughterhouses (Figure 3.7) peaked in the period from the 1930s to the 
1960s and declined rapidly in the 1970s with a wave of mergers (Pedersen and Strandskov, 2011). 
The consolidation of the sector continued during the 1980s and 1990s and reached a significant 
landmark in 1998 with the merger of the two cooperatives Danish Crown and Vestjyske Slagterier 
creating the (at the time) third largest slaughtering company in the world and the largest in Europe 
(Hobbs, 2001). In 1970 there were 50 cooperative and four IOF meat processing companies in the 
association Danish Slaughterhouses (DS), known as the Danish Meat and Bacon Council, but by 
2010 only two cooperatives were left (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3: Hog processing firms in Denmark  
Members of DS Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
 Cooperatives  50 18 5 - 2 
 IOF  4 2 1 - 0 
Nonmembers with > 10.000 hd. processed / year - - 7 - 8 
Source: (Danish Agriculture & Food Council, 2011) 
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While the structure of production and the structure of processing have developed tremendously in 
the Danish hog sector during the past forty years, the marketing of hogs has not changed much. Up 
to the merger of Danish Crown and Vestjyske Slagterier in 1998, the industry good organization 
Danish Slaughterhouses quoted an industry-wide weekly base price for hogs determined by a com-
mittee of representatives of all of the members. The EU Commission approved the merger subject 
to a number of conditions, including the abandonment of the base price committee. Prior to the 
merger, the competition between cooperatives in the Danish Pork sector was on the size of the end 
of year patronage payment, as the base price was the same. This changed very little in the post-
merger setting, as Danish Crown effectively became the price leader and the competition continued 
to be based on the patronage payment. The quality payment and logistical cost differentials have 
been adjusted on an on-going basis without major changes.  
 
The role of marketing cooperatives in hog marketing is very important in Denmark, as they are by 
far the dominant organizational form (Pedersen and Strandskov, 2011). The long history of this or-
ganizational form has very likely affected the belief system of hog farmers and the sector’s techno-
structure14. Discussions of a transition of cooperatives toward corporate ownership or a new type of 
cooperative structure have however been held from the early days in the 1890s (Heyman, 1890 cf. 
De samvirkende danske Andelsslagterier, 1972) and up to the present-day (Andreasen, 2011; 
Hansen, 2011; Krogshede, 2011a, 2011b). A conflict of interest between cooperative management 
and members is another important issue that may hamper organizational adaptation. Classic agency 
problems between owners and hired management have been studied intensively for IOFs and while 
similar problems exist for cooperatives, the research has been limited to date (Hueth and Marcoul, 
2009). 
 
3.3.10 DIFFERENCES IN THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
According to the World Economic Forum’s  Financial Development index (WFE) (2011), Denmark 
is ranked 15 out of 60 countries with a score of 4.3 on a 1-7 scale, while the U.S. is ranked 2 with a 
score of 5.1. Acemoglu et al. (2009) use a financial development index comparable with the WEF 
index. While indices like these capture many aspects of very complex systems, they cannot capture 
the subtle differences in financial systems.  
 
                                                 
14 Techno-structure refers to cooperative management and leaders in sector organizations.   
  
104 
 
For the questions posed in this paper, the relevant issue is not so much greater or less financial de-
velopment, but is rather related to the subtle differences in the financial systems. The aim of the 
section is to demonstrate that there are important differences in the financial environment in the 
U.S. and Danish agricultural value chains. A detailed analysis and explanation of these differences 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is a relevant subject for further research.    
 
Danish agriculture in general and specifically the Danish hog sector has a very high debt to asset 
ratio compared to the U.S. which indicates that access to credit has been relatively easy in Denmark 
compared to the U.S15. Figure 3.8 illustrates the development in debt to asset ratios over the past two 
decades. The farm sector debt to net cash flow is another way of illustrating the differences in the 
financial systems of the U.S. and Denmark. Figure 3.9 shows the development of Danish and U.S. 
debt to net cash flow on the sector level.  
 
Anecdotally, lending in the U.S. is said to be cash flow based, while lending in Denmark is said to 
be collateral-based. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 support this idea. Danish agriculture is much more indebted 
than the agricultural sector in the U.S., both with respect to the value of assets and with respect to 
net cash flow. This difference in indebtedness is an indication of subtle underlying differences in 
the financial systems, which can affect the organization of the value chain.  
 
Here the difference in indebtedness will be taken as an indication of easier access to credit for farm-
ers in Denmark than in the U.S. following the reasoning that farmers in a sector with a high level of 
debt in general must be willing and able to obtain credit, thus preserving relative easy access to 
credit for investment finance and as a financial buffer in the form of credit reserves.   
 
An alternative interpretation of the difference is that the Danish farmers have exhausted their credit 
reserves and their ability to debt finance investments, compared to U.S. farmers. Pedersen and Ol-
sen (forthcoming) (Paper I) shows that this is not the case that Danish farmers exhausted their credit 
reserves, at least not prior to the GFC. Nevertheless, some difference in the institutional environ-
ment of agricultural finance in Denmark and the U.S. is indicated.   
                                                 
15 The Danish data are biased as they are based on public valuation of assets, which is lagged. The public valuation system is based 
on average market prices for real estate every second year. This means that the book value of assets will be lower than the market 
value in an increasing market and vice versa. 
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Figure 3.8: Debt to Asset ratios in U.S. and Danish agriculture 
Source: ARMS ERS/USDA for U.S. data and Danmarks Statistik / Statistikbanken for Danish data. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: U.S. and Danish farm sector debt to net cash flow.  
Source: Harris et al. (2009) for U.S. data and FADN for Danish data  
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3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 PLACING FINDINGS IN A LITERATURE CONTEXT  
The tendency, in parts of the agricultural economic literature, to omit the complementary effects of 
finance and organization as criticized by James et al. (2011) may be a serious caveat as the charac-
teristics of the financial environments may be very different and may have an important impact on 
the organizational development.  
 
The diffusion of technological innovations will most often necessitate investments in specific as-
sets; in the case of the U.S. hog industry this was no different. As producers (farmers) were initially 
largely unable and/or unwilling to finance these specific investments, processors took on more fi-
nancing and more risk which enabled farmers to finance the residual investments needs. This is 
manifested via vertical integration or production contracts whereby the processor owns the animals 
and the farmers are paid a fee for a service so that some of the financing and risk is shifted away 
from the farmer. Alternatively, the shift is manifested via marketing contracts where only the risk is 
shifted (MacDonald et al., 2004).  
 
“Growth in hog contracting was driven in part by production differentiation. Processors wanted 
more control over the characteristics of the hogs they acquired, which helped them provide a con-
sistent quality of meat to consumers” (Hoppe and Banker, 2010, p. 38). This kind of control over 
product characteristics and adaptation to consumer preferences has to a large extent been done by 
the cooperatives in Denmark. Greater willingness to make on-farm product specific investments by 
members may be related to greater trust in cooperatives than IOFs as found in the sugar beet indus-
try (Balbach, 1998), more relevant elements of contract design are linked to organizational structure 
by Sykyta and Cook (2001). 
 
Specific investments driven by technological development have changed the organization of U.S. 
hog marketing, but what would have happened if farmers had been able to finance the specific in-
vestments themselves? In Denmark investment has, largely, been debt financed both in the vertical-
ly integrated cooperative processing facilities and at the individual farm level. The fact that this has 
been achieved means that access to credit has been available. The availability of ample access to 
credit indicates that the credit reserves have appeared large, leading to a reduced demand for risk 
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management via hedging, which may have crowding out futures market-based risk management as 
well as contract production and (backward) vertical integration.  
Cooperative marketing reduces transaction costs related to price discovery by producers and reduc-
es the business risks related to post contractual opportunistic behavior, the hold-up problem. Danish 
farmers have “marketing security” in the sense that the cooperative guarantees to market their hogs. 
Important as this is, it should not be confused with price guarantees. The cooperative will pay the 
farmer the same price as other members, for the same quality delivered at the same time. This is risk 
reduction via pooling, which is different to forward contracting (Hardaker et al., 2004). The “mar-
keting security” has however been appreciated by lenders to Danish agriculture and the organization 
of marketing has affected access to credit and risk management.  
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Figure 3.10: Adapted from Williamson (1991b) illustrating organizational adaptation 
 
The positive effect of marketing security via cooperative marketing on access to credit for Danish 
farmers is widely accepted, although it is anecdotal in nature16. The relative security of supply is 
recognized as a positive effect on the cooperatives’ access to credit by Hansen (2011). The argu-
ment, stressed in this paper, that an institutional environment providing relatively unconstrained 
access to credit has a positive effect on cooperative marketing is not generally recognized, but may 
be an important factor.   
 
Figure 3.10 illustrates the U.S. and Danish development in an adaptation of a Figure 3 in William-
son (1991b). In the U.S. case, increased asset specificity driven largely by the technological devel-
opment, leads to organizational adaptations toward marketing contracts, production contracts and 
full backward vertical integration. Because the Danish hog sector operated in a financial institution-
al environment where access to credit yielded a perception of large credit reserves, Danish farmers 
operated at a lower (perceived) level of risk exposure, net of the effect of the institutional environ-
ment. Although the Danish hog sector has witnessed increased levels of asset specificity, similar to 
the U.S. sector, this has not led to organizational adaptation, because of the moderating effect of the 
financial institutional environment.         
 
We belief that the financial framework is an important and relatively neglected institutional frame, 
in explanations of organizational adaptions to change. However, this is not to say that a host of oth-
er factors are not playing important roles. The paper is intended to highlight what we belief to be 
the fact that financial institutions also matter. Therefore an alternative variation of the title of the 
paper could have been: Financial Institutions also Matter.  
 
The question that follows, if one accepts the claim that financial institutions also matter, is how 
much do they matter? To answer this question, a much better control for other intuitional factors 
must implemented, than is the case in the present paper. This paper cannot say how big an impact 
the financial environment has due to omitted factor bias, but the claim that there is some effect is 
maintained.  
                                                 
16 To my knowledge, no research has documented this effect. Hansen (2011) addresses the farmers’ interest in marketing security, but 
does not link this interest to the access to credit. 
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Consequently, if the claim is accepted, other research omitting to control for the financial environ-
ment also suffers from omitted factor bias. The scope for further research is substantial.     
 
3.4.2 GENERALIZATION OF FINDINGS   
Imagine a sector consisting of producers and processors, where investment in technological devel-
opments will give the firms a competitive edge. These investments are, however, co-specific, mean-
ing that their payoff is subject to specific investments of the contractual constituency and that they 
expose the firms to ex post opportunistic behavior from the contractual constituency. Vertical inte-
gration may mitigate this risk and increase the incentive to invest. Vertical integration does, howev-
er, mean that the firm will not only invest in its primary technological development, but also in the 
up/down stream producers/processors’ assets including the co-specific investments. This increases 
the pressure on finance as all of these investments have to be financed by combinations of retained 
earnings, debt and outside equity. 
 
Following the pecking order theory, retained earnings are initially preferred to debt, and debt is ini-
tially preferred to outside equity. Assume that the retained earnings are depleted. The state of the 
financial environment is now a key determining factor. If the access to credit is relatively unrestrict-
ed, investment will be debt financed, whereas if access to credit is relatively restricted, the decision 
maker will turn to outside equity to supplement debt.   
 
Suppose that access to credit is relatively unrestricted. The relative agency cost of debt (monitoring, 
bonding, etc.) for the producer compared to the processor, will determine whether integration will 
be forward or backward. If the (agency) cost of debt is relatively low for producers compared to 
processors, producers will integrate forward into processing, whereas if cost of debt is relatively 
high for producers, processors will integrate backward into production. If access to credit is rela-
tively restricted, outside equity is more likely to be the cheapest finance alternative on the margin. 
The relative (agency) cost of outside equity (monitoring) for the producer compared to the proces-
sor, will determine whether integration will be forward or backward. If monitoring is relatively low 
for producers compared to processors, producers will integrate forward into processing and vice 
versa. Figure 3.11 illustrates the effect of the financial institutional environment on organizational 
form.  
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Figure 3.11: The effect of the financial institutional environment on organizational form 
 
At first glance it may seem odd that monitoring costs differ with the direction of integration, and in 
the case of full-scale integration most likely there would be no difference. But considering agricul-
ture where the cooperative is a common organizational form, the case of processing and marketing 
cooperatives enables farmers in the production stage to forward integrate into the processing of ag-
ricultural commodities to avoid potential hold-up problems and ensuring sufficient coordination. 
The cost of monitoring cooperative management for cooperative members is likely to be much low-
er than if the management of the processing firm had to monitor the management of backward inte-
grated production units.    
 
The cooperative organizational form is, however, based on relatively easy access to credit for the 
producers. This factor is determined by the financial institutions, which is why financial institutions 
matter in the understanding of why specific organizational forms emerge, evolve and/or persist.  
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The other integration extreme seen in agriculture is the backward vertical integration of processors, 
which enables the coordination and increasing willingness to make specific investments as the risk 
of hold-ups is reduced. Backward integration in livestock value chains is seen in the U.S., among 
other places, where intermediate levels of vertical integration or quasi-integration are seen in the 
form of contract production. Backward vertical integration is a likely consequence of relatively re-
stricted access to credit, and lower relative costs of monitoring the processor than the producer, 
from the equity investor’s point of view.     
 
The central tenet in this theory is that financial institutions matter, paraphrasing Vernon Smith’ 
statement that “institutions matter because incentives and information matter” (Smith, 1994, p. 
116), the proposition of this theory could be formulated as follows:  
 
Financial institutions matter with respect to organization and risk management because financial 
institutions determine the access to credit, which crowd outs outside equity in the organizational 
structure of the firm and hedging in the risk management of the firm.   
 
This proposition does not imply that other institutional factors are unimportant, the intention is ra-
ther to stress that financial institutions may not get the attention they deserve in research related to 
New Institutional Economics and to explain, in more detailed, why and how financial institutions 
matter with respect to organizational form.  
  
With the term financial institutions, the whole financial system is addressed, at all levels, ranging 
from the informal institutional level based on traditions, customs, norms and religion, to formal 
institutions such as policy, legislature, bureaucracy and to governance structures of financial organ-
izations and marginal price/quantity considerations (Williamson, 2000). All these levels of the fi-
nancial system may affect the cost of using debt. The cost of debt being different than the price, e.g. 
the interest, charged by the lender. As discussed in section 3.2.1, debt has multiple characteristics 
all of which affect the cost of using debt, but which are not necessarily built into the price mecha-
nism.  
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Figure 3.12a): Governance structure: Leveraged sole proprietorship 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12b): Governance structure: Leveraged joint stock company  
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Synthesizing all these factors in the concept of the marginal cost of debt, and comparing these with 
the marginal cost of outside equity and the marginal return on investment can illustrate the effect of 
financial institutions on organizational form. Figure 3.12a) illustrates an organization, the size of 
which is determined by the marginal return on investment (MRI) and the marginal cost of capital 
(MCC) represented by the substitutes marginal cost of debt (MCD) and marginal cost of outside 
equity (MCE)17. The optimal scale of the organization is where the MRI = MCC which is 
Min(MCD, MCE). The case represented in Figure 3.12 a) is a case where the MRI = MCD < MCE, 
meaning that the optimal scale is reached where the marginal cost of debt is below the marginal cost 
of outside equity. Notice that the MCD dominates MCE within the scale of the organization. This 
determines that the organizational form be a leveraged sole proprietorship. Figure 3.12b) illustrates 
a case, otherwise similar to a), but where the financial institutions make access to credit harder and 
therefore the marginal cost of debt higher. In this case the MRI = MCC where MCE < MCD and the 
organizational form is a leveraged joint stock company.   
   
The inner loop of figure 3.13 illustrates the narrow TCE explanation of organizational change criti-
cized by James et al. (2011) for omitting the financial environment. In contrast, the proposition of 
this paper is illustrated in the outer loop of Figure 3.13. The brief TCE story is that new technologi-
cal developments lead to investments in specific assets, and that this affects the organizational form.  
 
The longer story proposed here begins the same way, but realizes that investments need to be fi-
nanced. The choice of financial structure depends on the financial institutions determining the ac-
cess to credit and will affect the balancing of business risk and financial risk. This may affect the 
use of other risk management alternatives such as hedging, and will affect the organizational form. 
The organizational form may affect the diffusion of new technologies and the circle is complete. 
This illustration suggests important interaction between organization, finance and risk management, 
as well as production technology. Exogenous changes in one factor are likely to increase the proba-
bility of adaptive change in the other factors.     
 
                                                 
17 MCD and MCE being functions of the optimal use of the other substitute. 
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Figure 3.13: The financial environment moderates organizational adaptation to technological 
change 
 
In this paper we stress the effect of the financial system on hog marketing arrangements in the U.S. 
and Denmark and link the cooperative marketing in Denmark to the Danish financial system. It 
must, however, be recognized that cooperatives play an important role in some agricultural sectors 
in the U.S., which are presumably faced with the same financial environment as the U.S. hog sector. 
The estimated share of farm marketing through cooperatives in the U.S. in 2001 was 28%, ranging 
from 12% for the category “all other” to 13% for livestock/wool/mohair and 83% for dairy 
(Kreanzle and Eversull, 2003). 
 
The hog sector is part of the livestock category where cooperative marketing plays a minor role. In 
the U.S. dairy sector, however, cooperatives play a major role. This illustrates that the financial en-
vironment is not the whole story. One major difference between the hog sector and the dairy sector 
in the U.S. is the agricultural policy, which may affect the risk exposure of farmers and the ability 
of cooperatives to affect the farmer’s ability to cope with risk exposure. Comparisons of the reasons 
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behind the cooperative organization of dairy marketing in the U.S. and the IOF organization of pro-
cessing in the hog sector is beyond the scope of this paper, but it would be an interesting avenue for 
further research.    
 
Legal systems affect organization in agriculture in a number of ways. They affect the way property 
rights are allocated and transferred, the degree to which specialization can be developed and the 
contracts that connect the links in the food supply chain, which means that a study of the agri-food 
industry has to be a combined law, economics and organizations undertaking (Ménard and 
Valceschini, 2005; Williamson, 1991). A “fundamental lesson of the new institutional approach to 
the organization of agriculture activities is that costs of alternative arrangements of transactions at 
the micro level as well as costs imposed on transactions by alternative policies at the macro level 
must be assessed in order to understand how specific solutions are selected and why some work 
better than others” (Ménard and Valceschini, 2005, p. 426). 
 
Total costs cannot be seen as the sum of production costs and transaction costs. Instead they must 
be considered together and “efficient organization is not simply a matter of minimizing transaction 
costs” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, p. 57). Market conditions on factor markets, including financial 
markets, and transaction and agency costs should be analyzed simultaneously. The interaction effect 
between the financial environment and the contacting costs, determined by best available produc-
tion technology, is a key determining factor of organizational form.  
  
Changes in institutions exogenous to Danish agriculture are unfolding, notably changes in the fi-
nancial institutions following the GFC, the Basel III being a prominent example. A central question 
posed by this paper is how to adapt to these changes. This should not be seen as an attempt to im-
prove economic performance by changing one institution, but a recognition of the possible need to 
adapt institutions and governance structures in a response to exogenous changes in other parts of the 
institutional matrix. North (2005, p. 157) puts it like this: “The artifactual structure that defines the 
performance of an economy comprises interdependent institutions; changing just one institution in 
an attempt to get the desired performance is always an incomplete and sometimes a counter-
productive activity.” Learning by observing practices in other institutional environments can be 
valuable, although exact replication of practices will be suboptimal if institutional linkages are im-
portant (Williamson, 1991). This is the light in which the comparative analysis should be seen.   
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Organizational conventions can be hard to change as structural inertia build up against competitive 
pressure from a changing institutional environment. Organizational entrepreneurship, either through 
experimentation or imitation of successful organizational practices elsewhere, “are likely to result in 
"modification”, or a "ramification" of conventional organizational architecture that may significant-
ly alter some characteristics of the existing conventions, yet retain other basic features” (Aoki, 
2001, p. 129). This seems to suggest that the cooperative marketing of hogs in Denmark could and 
should be retained with some modifications to adapt to new institutional settings unfolding after the 
GFC, the cooperatives’ role in relation to the individual farmer’s ability to manage risk exposure 
being one such possible area for modification.  
 
Technology, organization, finance and risk management are intertwined and all areas may be af-
fected by exogenous shocks to the other. This is likely to be a general result, deviations from which 
are exceptions to the rule.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The tendency in parts of the literature to express causal explanations directly from technology in-
duced specific investments to organizational change may omit many insights and complementary 
factors from the corporate finance, agricultural finance and risk management literature. It is well 
recognized that institutions matter. The specific finding and emphasis of this paper is that financial 
institutions matter regarding organizational development.  
 
Three of the world’s significant hog production clusters are located in USA and Denmark. In the 
U.S., the number one hog production cluster is located in Iowa while another significant cluster is 
located in North Carolina. Trends in U.S. and Danish pork industries have been somewhat similar, 
the direction has almost been the same, but the origin and the speed travelled have been different. 
However, there is one important non-event in the Danish pork industry compared to the U.S. indus-
try; the absence of change in the marketing arrangements. This may be “the dog that didn’t bark” 
with reference to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s detective Sherlock Holmes18.  
 
                                                 
18 In the short story Silver Blaze, by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, the famous detective Sherlock Holmes solves the crime of a kidnapping 
of a race horse, by the fact that the guard dog didn’t bark, leading Sherlock Holmes to conclude that perpetrator was someone the dog 
knew. This is an iconic example of the importance of looking for clues outside the scope of the obvious and tangible.  
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While the general development in the U.S. hog industry has been driven by technological develop-
ment which has induced investments in specific assets, the development in the organizational design 
and the marketing arrangements may be conditioned on the financial environment. In the U.S., the 
adoption of new technologies and gains from increasing scale has been financed by capital inflow 
from the investor-owned processing level and risk shifting from the producer to the processor level 
(Martinez, 1999). In contrast, the Danish hog industry has adopted technological developments and 
gains from economies scale, within the limits of the environmental regulation, largely by debt fi-
nancing both at the cooperatively owned processing level and at the individual farm level. This re-
flects the fact that Danish hog farmers are highly leveraged compared to U.S. hog farmers, as is the 
case with Danish agriculture compared to U.S. agriculture in general, indicating that access to credit 
and the willingness to utilize debt capacity is generally higher in Denmark than in the U.S.  
 
Reduced price risk is stated as one reason for contract production by U.S. producers. Whereas there 
seem to be other important factors in the explanation, it may well be that U.S. hog farmers have 
been more aware of price risk management than Danish hog farmers. Conversely, Danish hog farm-
ers seem to have been relying more on the risk mitigating effect of credit reserves (Baker, 1968; 
Barry and Baker, 1971; Gabriel and Baker, 1980) than their U.S. counterparts who have been rely-
ing on price risk management through the use of contracting and other risk management possibili-
ties.  
 
The fact that debt financing of the development has been possible is likely to have influenced the 
organizational development. The ability to debt finance the development is probably linked to the 
characteristic Danish mortgage bond system. This system is under pressure from the international 
alignment of financial institutions. Changes in the Danish financial system may elicit change in the 
marketing arrangements in the Danish hog industry. Enhancing marketing options to include price 
risk transfer through cooperatives will allow greater control over financial returns for the coopera-
tive members with highest willingness to pay for price risk reduction (presumably the most risk 
averse) and thus insulate some producers from market risk.  
 
The financial crisis has left Danish agriculture in a situation where the heavy reliance on borrowing 
facilities may no longer be viable. Other risk management strategies are needed, but the institutional 
framework is not present. Price risk management is not practiced as the cooperatives are shifting 
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market risk uniformly to all members delivering identical products. There may be some risk sharing 
between different products within the same cooperative (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004), but this is not 
a clear mechanism and there is no shift of market risk within the same product. This does not have 
to be the case, as it is possible to reallocate risk among members according to their cost of carrying 
risk (Paper III). This governance structure is however not yet in use.  
 
The question is whether the financial crisis is “the beginning of the end of the cooperative structure 
itself?” (Ménard and Klein, 2004, p. 754) or to paraphrase Winston Churchill, whether it is “per-
haps, the end of the beginning” of the cooperatively organized marketing of agricultural products,  
indicating that we are on the verge of a new era  in which new roles for processing cooperatives are 
about to emerge. 2012 was the UN International Year of Cooperatives.  
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Chapter 4 
Paper III 
 
Reallocation of Price Risk among Cooperative Members19  
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the theoretical possibility of reallocation of price 
risk among members of processing cooperatives in the Danish hog and dairy sectors.   
Design/methodology/approach – Based on the observation that no effective price risk manage-
ment institutions exist for Danish hog and dairy farmers, possible explanations for this are discussed 
and the possibility of cooperatives to reallocate risk among members is analyzed.  
Findings – Use of futures to hedge individual farmer price risk is absent, which may be due to pro-
hibitively high basis risk. The reason for this basis risk is that cooperative prices, while they are 
influenced by market fluctuations reflected in futures markets, are also influenced by cooperative 
positions via contracting on the output-side, as well as general business specific risk. Farmers are 
exposed to the cooperative price as residual claimants of the cooperative. Endowing members with 
proportional forward contracts and organizing the exchange of these contracts via a double auction 
mechanism will reallocate risk, realizing gains depending on member heterogeneity and transaction 
costs. 
Research limitations/implications – The paper opens a number of research questions related to the 
model, such as the optimal level of endowment of forward contracts.  
Practice implications – Credit reserves are probably diminishing in Danish agriculture post the 
financial crisis. Introducing institutions that increase the ability to manage price risk may be of great 
value in a situation where the ability to cope with risk via credit reserves has been reduced. 
Originality/value – Most research on risk transfer focuses on vertical reallocations of risk in the 
value chain, whereas this paper is original in the sense that it explores the possibility of horizontal 
risk transfer. 
 
Keywords: futures, hedging, reallocation gains, risk management, cooperatives, mechanism design, 
auctions 
 
JEL classification: G13, G32, Q13, D61, D8  
                                                 
19 Presented at the 123rd EAAE Seminar, Price Volatility & Farm Income Stabilisation in Dublin, Ireland, Feb. 23rd and 24th, 2012 
and the 19th International Farm Management Congress in Warsaw, Poland, July 21st to 26th, 2013.  
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4.1 Introduction  
The main livestock sectors in Denmark, the hog and the dairy sectors, are characterized by asym-
metry in the contracting behavior. On the input side, forward contracting and substantial self-
sufficiency rates of grain or feed from the arable side of the farm are traditionally dominant. On the 
output side, there is tradition for the spot-price marketing of milk and meat delivered to cooperative 
dairies and slaughterhouses. This behavior is counter intuitive as the expected behavior of risk ad-
verse farmers with weak positive correlation between input and output would be to hedge symmet-
rically or not to hedge at all (Pennings and Wansink, 2004). The asymmetric behavior may however 
be explained by interactions with related institutional domains such as agricultural policy, finance 
and organization. Recent changes in these domains suggest the need for adaptive changes in risk 
management institutions. However, this response may be very challenging and not automatic (Aoki, 
2001). 
 
According to Bogetoft and Olsen (2004), risk sharing between producers and processors in producer 
cooperatives is limited to risk sharing between producer product groups and risks the absorption of 
the equity buffer. This paper challenges this statement by suggesting the grouping of members ac-
cording to their cost of carrying risk20 rather that their product attributes. By introducing mecha-
nisms that reallocate risk from the individuals faced with a high cost of risk to individuals with a 
low cost of risk, the aggregate cost of risk can be reduced (Chavas, 2011). 
 
Most research on hedging explores the vertical reallocation of risk in the value chain, the use of 
forward contracting, commodity futures and options being the main vehicles for the reallocation 
(Garcia and Leuthold, 2004). This paper explores the possibility of horizontal risk transfer among 
cooperative members. Endowing members with a forward contracted share of delivery, and organiz-
ing the transfer of this share via an auction mechanism at a market price will potentially lead to the 
reallocation gains.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 gives some background on hedging and why it may 
not have been widespread in Denmark. Section 4.3 provides an introduction to the characteristics of 
the marketing of Danish livestock products via the dominant marketing cooperatives. Section 4.4 
                                                 
20 Following Chavas (2011) the term cost of risk is used to represent Arrow-Pratt risk premium, This is done to distinguish the cost  
of risk from the price  paid for reduction of risk, labelled the risk premium in this paper. The cost of risk refers to both capacity 
to bear risk and the attitude towards risk, which is the willingness and ability to carry risk.     
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argues for the potential heterogeneity of cooperative members in their attitude towards risk man-
agement, and discusses the potential gain from the reallocation of risk. Section 4.5 discusses why 
this reallocation may not be handled via futures markets. Section 4.6 represents the main body of 
the work and extends a model by Collins (1997) to illustrate the potential for reallocating risk via 
the transfer of forward contracted delivery among cooperative members. The section also discusses 
the assumptions of the model. Section 4.7 provides some concluding remarks.  
 
4.2 Background on risk management in Danish agriculture 
In the 1970s, Danish agriculture was still characterized by fairly diversified farms and low leverage. 
During the 1980s, increasing specialization and leverage in the sector could be related to the price 
support regime in the EU’s common agricultural policy. This can be interpreted as a meso-level 
effect of the balancing of business and financial risk (Gabriel and Baker, 1980). In the 1990s and 
2000s, price support was substituted by income support, thereby reintroducing the potential for in-
creased price risk. The reintroduction of price risk coincided with the build-up of the credit bubble 
which imploded in 2008 leading to the global financial crisis (GFC).  
 
It is widely recognized that agricultural policy may have a crowding out effect on market-based risk 
management institutions (OECD, 2009; Turvey and Baker, 1989, 1990). However, it is less well 
recognized that ease of access to credit, which may occur in the case of a credit bubble, may also 
crowd out market-based risk management.  
 
The connection between hedging and financial structure is, however, recognized by part of the liter-
ature (Collins, 1997; Garcia and Leuthold, 2004; Pennings and Garcia, 2004; Pennings and 
Leuthold, 2000; Turvey and Baker, 1989, 1990), who see the motivation for hedging and risk man-
agement as a desire to avoid financial failure which is related to, but different from, a desire to re-
duce income variability. The literature suggests heterogeneity in willingness to pay for hedging. 
While this literature focuses on the financial aspects of hedging behavior, only Turvey and Baker 
(1990) stress and distinguish between liquidity aspects and capital structure aspects. A focus on the 
possible impact of macro-economic fluctuations of the business cycles on finance and its implica-
tions for hedging and risk management is generally absent. The importance of credit reserves, ex-
plicitly described in Gabriel and Baker (1980), is not emphasized. In a leverage cycle framework 
(Geanakoplos, 2010), the credit reserves may, however, not be constant even though debt and assets 
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are and thus the debt-to-asset ratio may not fully reflect the credit reserves. An increase in the ac-
cess to credit for Danish agriculture in the late 1990s and 2000s is demonstrated by Pedersen and 
Olsen (Paper I). The crowding out effect of easy access to credit on risk management institutions 
may have been substantial in this period. Post GFC changes in the financial environment and agri-
cultural policy reform may lead to a situation of institutional vacuum, where the institutions that 
crowded out the need for market-based risk management institutions disappear, although market-
based risk management institutions may not appear instantly. The potential lack of risk management 
institutions may have significant social costs.   
 
4.3 The marketing of milk and meat in Denmark 
Danish agriculture is dominated by two major processing and marketing cooperatives; Arla Foods 
in the dairy sector and Danish Crown in the pork (and beef) sector. These firms are in the top ten of 
Danish firms with regard to turnover and the top fifteen with regard to the number of employees.  
 
These two cooperatives have near monopsony power in the Danish markets for milk and meat. As 
pointed out by Hobbs (2001, p. 27), this leads to “the unusual situation where, despite the fact that 
the processing and downstream supply-chain activities are performed by farmer-owned organiza-
tions, there remain concerns over the effects of concentration in the industry.” The mergers which 
led to the formation of the current cooperatives were subject to a number of conditions, including 
that they partially relinquished their exclusive supply requirement for members and that the notice 
for leaving the cooperative was shortened.  
 
Within both cooperatives there are base price schemes with quoted prices for current spot deliveries 
to the cooperatives and end-of-year patronage payments based on a split of the residual claims 
among patronage payments, retained earnings on personal member accounts and retained earnings 
for collective equity build up in the cooperative. In addition to the base price schemes, there are 
general quality schemes and market-specific contracts.  
 
The farm-gate price of milk is based on fat and protein content, quality, logistics and especially con-
tracted credence attributes such as organic or grass-milk. Similarly, the farm-gate price of hogs is 
based on weight and quality parameters and especially contracted credence attributes such as UK 
special pigs, free-range pigs, etc. 
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The Arla Foods payment scheme is based on a basic commodity value which is a linear function of 
the fat and protein content of the milk delivered and a constant term. This is the stated price that 
Arla Food changes on a regular basis according to current market and business conditions. Quality 
bonuses or penalties are added / subtracted as a percentage of the basic commodity value for somat-
ic cell count, bacterial count and spore count. On top of this a fixed payment for willingness to ac-
cept independent determination of when Arla Foods collects the milk from the farm and a quantity 
payment based on the yearly delivery from the farm is paid as an adjustment of the difference in the 
costs of colleting the milk due to quantity and logistical flexibility. For organic producers a fixed 
premium is paid per kg. A minor fixed membership fee is paid by the farmer. On top of this the 
farmer receives a supplementary payment based on resolution of the board of representatives in 
proportion to the amount of business conducted with the cooperative (Arla Foods, 2013). 
 
The Danish Crown payment scheme is based on a basic price per kg slaughtered weight in the 
weight class from 70.0 to 89.9 kg with a meat percent of 61%. More lean hog get premiums while 
more fat hogs get penalties. For hogs in other weight class’s alternate prices apply. Danish Crown 
has a number of different logistical models adapted to the different production modes of the mem-
bers. For different credence attributes a number of special payments apply, the different models are; 
‘Antonius’, ‘UK-pigs’, ‘EU-heavy pigs’, ‘Male pigs’, ‘Bornholm pigs’, ‘Free range pigs’ and ‘Or-
ganic pigs’. Like Arla Foods the farmer receives a supplementary payment based on resolution of 
the board of representatives in proportion to the amount of business conducted with the cooperative 
(Danish Crown, 2013). 
   
There are clear price differentiation schemes on the physical attributes of the products and supple-
ment payments for special contracted products, such as organic production, that often involve 
changes in on-farm production processes and specific investments. Although criticized for reducing 
competition (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2007), Danish cooperatives have shown that they can manage 
price differentiation among members on a number of product attributes. One thing they are not dif-
ferentiated on, however, is the acceptable volatility of the base price. Danish hog and dairy farmers 
have no effective way of adjusting their hog or milk price risk exposure. 
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The substantial price risk that Danish farmers are exposed to is illustrated in Figure 4.1, note the 
change in milk price characteristic in 2007. Before 2007 milk price was declining but fairly stable, 
after 2007 more price variation is seen.    
 
 
Figure 4.1: Monthly milk and hog price from Sep-2003 to May-2013. Source: FarmtalOnline 
(2013) 
 
4.4 Member heterogeneity in risk exposure, appetite and management needs 
Recent work by Chavas (2011) stresses the interaction between uncertainty and externalities in effi-
ciency analysis of the agricultural sector. Using a certainty equivalent approach, the Coasian effi-
ciency evaluation is extended to include risk allocation. It is stated that “an efficient allocation 
should try to reduce the aggregate cost of risk” (Chavas, 2011, pp. 398) and three ways of doing this 
are mentioned. First, risk exposure can be reduced. Second, when exposure involves externalities, it 
can be managed by coordination schemes using contracts or policy. Third, “the aggregate cost of 
risk […] can be reduced through risk-transfer mechanisms. By redistributing the risk away from the 
individuals who face a high cost of risk […], such mechanisms can reduce the aggregate cost of 
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risk” (Chavas, 2011, pp. 398-399). Chavas (2011) implicitly stresses the importance of heterogenei-
ty and explicitly stresses the potential for reallocating risk.   
 
Pennings and Leuthold (2000) and Pennings and Garcia (2004) explicitly stress the heterogeneity in 
hedging behavior using structural equation modeling to analyze the behavioral characteristics of 
Dutch hog farmers. The Dutch hog sector is very similar to the Danish hog sector, although the 
marketing traditions and the use of hog futures are important differences. Pennings and Leuthold 
(2000) analyze the following characteristics; perceived performance of futures as effective hedging 
tools, entrepreneurial freedom, perceived risk exposure, risk attitude, market orientation and the 
level of understanding of futures as a financial instrument. To test for heterogeneity, the sample was 
segmented in two. Across the two segments all characteristics except the level of understanding 
were significant drivers for hedging activity. There were, however, differences between characteris-
tics leading the use of futures across the two segments. The study shows heterogeneity in the drivers 
for the use of futures in a sector very similar to the Danish hog sector. In the USA, the use of price 
risk management is widespread in both the dairy and hog sectors and in Ireland the cooperative 
dairy Glanbia has forward contracted part of its production with members, linking member supply-
side forward contracts to specific business partner contracts on the demand side (Keane, 2012). This 
illustrates demand for price risk management instruments in the dairy sector. Assuming heterogene-
ity in the attitude towards risk management instruments among Danish hog and dairy farmers seems 
fair.   
 
Collins (1997) presents a model where heterogeneity in cost structure, profitability and financial 
structure affect the likelihood of financial failure and motivate different levels of hedging via fu-
tures contracts. 
 
4.5 The problem with futures markets – Basis risk 
Futures markets could potentially solve the problem of commodity price risk adjustment for the 
individual cooperative member. There may, however, be liquidity problems in existing futures mar-
kets (Berg and Kramer, 2008) for milk and pork, and hedging in these markets are subject to con-
siderable basis risk (Meuwissen, van Asseldonk and Huirne, 2008). A fundamental problem is the 
substantial basis risk that emerges from the fact that even if futures markets could transfer market 
price risk effectively, farmers, as cooperative members, are exposed to business risk in the dairy or 
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meat processing and marketing business. This is a broad definition of the basis risk concept, but a 
useful one. A narrow definition of basis risk is the difference between the spot cash price and the 
futures price (Hull, 2002).  
 
In the case of the hedging of farm-gate milk or hog prices, derived prices of semi-processed prod-
ucts, trade on futures exchanges, for example skim milk powder (SMP) and butter, can be used. 
Combining futures in these two products could hedge milk price, but errors in relative weights 
could add to a broadly defined basis risk.  
 
“Theory predicts that as maturity approaches, cash and futures prices must converge and the basis 
approaches zero, except for delivery costs” (Garcia and Leuthold, 2004, p. 242). The semi-
processing of livestock commodities, transforming non-storable commodities to storable commodi-
ties, is an extension of the delivery cost line of reasoning. Even for non-storables “[p]rices are still 
expected to converge at maturity, and the futures price for non-storables is considered a market-
expected cash price for a future time” (Garcia and Leuthold, 2004, pp. 242-243). The “delivery” 
costs may, however, include considerable transformation costs from non-storable to storable.   
 
The Danish marketing cooperatives are going much further in adding value to commodities, which 
adds to the basis risk from the farmer/cooperative member’s point of view if commodity prices are 
hedged via semi-processed commodities futures, and physical delivery is to cooperatives that add 
substantially more value to the average product via processing and marketing. The cooperatives 
down-stream contracting and risk management behavior may also have an impact on the broad def-
inition of basis risk. If cooperatives have significant contract production down-stream, their earn-
ings will not necessarily be fully reflected in the commodity market price, unless their down-stream 
contracting was hedged via an effective futures market.  
 
The distinction between the market price risk and business risk is important, but not necessarily 
obvious. The “market price” for milk or pork in Denmark is greatly affected by the success or fail-
ure of the processing and marketing activities of the respective marketing cooperative. A potential 
global or European futures market price for milk or pork would be, if not independent, then very 
weakly dependent on the success or failure of the processing and marketing activities of the domi-
nant marketing cooperative on the Danish market.  
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Global or European market price risk is what could potentially be transferred via a futures ex-
change. However, the relevant risk of concern to the Danish dairy or hog farmer is the aggregate of 
business and market risk of the respective market and marketing cooperative. A futures market for 
the transfer of commodity price risk on milk or pork would realistically be based on the physical 
delivery to local processing facilities. As Arla Foods and Danish Crown have near monopsony in 
Denmark, it is very hard to avoid exposure to processing and marketing business risk for Danish 
dairy and hog farmers. As explained above, the close connection between cooperative business risk 
and market risk means that market risk is very hard to avoid or adjust for Danish livestock farmers.  
 
The difference between futures market risk and the aggregate of cooperative business and market 
risk is a key element of the basis risk involved in synthetic futures based hedging. Information 
asymmetries about processing costs and marketing contract and risk management status between 
cooperatives and members makes an effective hedge of, e.g. milk via synthetic combination of SMP 
and butter futures very difficult, if not impossible. The marketing cooperative may, however, not be 
very willing to disclose this information for strategic competition related reasons.    
Example of risk, unrelated to market risk: The case of Arla Foods in the cartoon controversy 
One example of specific business risk, which would not have been hedged in the case of use of fu-
tures market contracts and the physical delivery of milk to Arla Foods, is the case of the controversy 
following the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten’s publishing of cartoons of the Islamic prophet 
Muhammad in 2005. The controversy affected Danish exports to the Middle East, notably the sig-
nificant export of dairy products. The estimated loss for Arla Foods was 460 million DKK 
(Pedersen, 2010) equivalent to a price fall for the residual claimants of 0,075 DKK / kg member 
delivered milk in 2006 (Arla Foods, 2007) or more than a 3 % price cut in the farm-gate price in 
2006. Business risk like this are not transferable on a futures market, but may possibly be trans-
ferred among cooperative members.   
 
The pricing behavior of cooperatives may be affected by investment and finance considerations. 
The members are the residual claimants, but residual earnings may be retained in the cooperative 
for investment purposes or for reduction of debt. Thus strategic considerations concerning finance 
and possible credit constraints, as well as variation in investment opportunities for the cooperative, 
will affect the aggregate of the cooperative spot cash price and the end of year patronage payment. 
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This may affect the difference between the cooperative price and the futures price, as well as the 
predictability of this difference, which will increase the difficulty of use of commodity futures for 
the hedging of cooperative members’ price risk. Possible agency problems may exist, arising from a 
conflict of interest between owners and the management of the cooperative. These problems are 
beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
A number of potential problems with the use of futures hedging to reduce the cost of risk are identi-
fied. It should be noted, however, that even early literature on the topic by Working (1953) realized 
that, much the same as in insurance, the chief risk management function of hedging is to protect 
“against serious, crippling, loss. Carrying insurance against small losses that occur frequently is 
ordinarily poor business” (Working, 1953, p. 339). The cost of hedging must be weighed against the 
benefit of hedging. A lower quality hedge, with high basis risk, may be attractive if it comes at a 
discount compared to a high quality hedge, although a high quality hedge at an attractive price will 
be preferred if it is possible.   
 
4.6 Potential for reallocation of price risk among cooperative members 
4.6.1 THE MODEL  
Marketing cooperatives may have some unutilized potential for differentiation of price risk expo-
sure between cooperative members. By forward contracting different percentages of commodity 
turnover with cooperative members, the aggregate price risk of the cooperative can be redistributed 
among cooperative members.  
 
Elaborating on the Collins (1997) model framework shows that cooperative member heterogeneity, 
in the usual factors which motivate hedging, yields potential gains from trade, thereby redistributing 
risk from members with a high cost of risk to members with a low cost of risk, as suggested more 
generally by Chavas (2011). One usual explanation for hedging is the reallocation of risk vertically 
in the supply chain. The idea suggested here is to utilize the potential gain from reallocation of risk 
horizontally in the supply chain, that is, reallocation among cooperative members with heterogene-
ous cost of risk. 
 
As stated in Collins (1997, pp. 494-495), the “realistic objective of a single-period model is to max-
imize the expected effect of this period’s operations on the firm’s terminal equity […] subject to the 
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constraint that the chance that terminal equity is less than some disaster level () is less than ” 
which is the individual’s acceptable probability of financial failure. Following Collins (1997), the 
model of terminal equity of the individual farmer is: 
 
 = ! + ["#$ + "%&(1 − $)]' − *' − ,- − . (19) 
 
Where  is the terminal equity, ! is the initial equity, "# is the forward price of hedged output, $ 
is the hedge ratio, "%& is the stochastic cash price of the unhedged output, ' is output, * is variable 
costs, , is the interest rate paid on debt, - is debt and  . is fixed costs. Given stochastic cash price 
of output, terminal equity is a stochastic function of not only realized cash price and the quantity 
hedged, but also the financial leverage of the firm. For simplicity the possibility of capital gains and 
losses are ignored.  
 
Let () be the probability density function for terminal equity. The objective function is: 
max  =   ()
/
0/
 
s. t.   () ≤ 
3
0/
 
(20) 
Where  is the acceptable risk of terminal equity below the individual disaster level, reflecting the 
individual cost of risk. Expected terminal equity is: 
 
 = ! + ["#$ + "̅&(1 − $)]' − *' − ,- − . (21) 
and  
$ =  ("# −  "̅&)' 
 
(22) 
 
 
The relevant situations are where, "̅&, the expected spot cash price is above the forward price of 
hedged output ("̅& > "#) or an equivalent situation where there is a trade-off between expected 
terminal equity and a reduction in the risk of financial failure.    
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Following Collins (1997), suppose for simplicity that the price "%& is uniformly distributed between 
the worst possible price () and the best possible price (). The uniform density function is defined 
as:  
("&) =  1 −  ,  ≤ "& ≤ ; 0 @ℎ,E 
 
(23) 
 
Further, following Collins (1997), given ("&), the probability density function for terminal equity 
() is uniformly distributed with  representing the terminal equity under realization of () and 
 representing the terminal equity under realization of (). The probability that a terminal equity 
level will be less than the disaster level is: 
 
 () =  −   −  
3
0/
,   <  <  (24) 
Now suppose this model reflects the Danish situation for the marketing of milk and hogs. Because 
of near monopsony and prohibitive basis risk for futures markets, there are no effective hedging 
tools and $ = 0. All cooperative members receive the same stochastic price "%& for a given output, 
which reflects the residual claims in the cooperative.  
 
If the goal of the marketing cooperative is to maximize the individual member’s terminal equity 
subject to the constraint that the probability of terminal equity is less than some disaster level, 
which is less than the acceptable risk of financial failure, the ability to redistribute price risk among 
heterogeneous members will increase utility assuming zero transaction cost. The commonly stated 
goal of cooperatives is to maximize the commodity price received by their members. An example of 
this is in Jeppesen and Jørgensen (2012), this may differ from the assumed goal above. Whether the 
stated goal of maximum price is due to communicational convenience (as maximizing integrated 
profit may be a difficult concept to communicate) or otherwise, goals that maximize integrated 
profit and thus take the on-farm costs into account seem more relevant (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2000). 
Following Chavas (2011), the on-farm costs ought to include the cost of risk.  
 
Suppose the marketing cooperative has three member segments, one with a low cost of risk, one 
with a medium cost of risk and one with a high cost of risk. Total quantity marketed through the 
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cooperative is '& =  ' + '3S + '#S# where the subscripts low, medium and high repre-
sent the three member segments.  
 
The residual claims in the cooperative are: 
 
["#$ + "%&(1 − $)]'& (25) 
 
where $ = 0, by tradition. That is, the cooperative payment to the member is proportional to the 
amount of business the member has with the cooperative. As a member the farmer is an owner of 
the cooperative and entitled to the residual claims, that is a proportion of what is left after all prior 
claims are satisfied (costs of running the cooperative).     
 
But suppose members were endowed with an equal and positive forward price and an equally posi-
tive and proportional forward priced quantity,  $. Equation (21) could be extended to: 
 
                               Q"#$ ''& + "%&(1 − $)
''&T + Q"#$
'3S'& + "%&(1 − $)
'3S'& T
+ Q"#$ '#S#'& + "%&(1 − $)
'#S#'&T = ["#$ + "%&(1 − $)]'& 
 
(26) 
 
This endowment is equivalent of a pre-commitment to increase the aggregate prior claims and re-
duce the residual claims, as well as reducing the quantity of which the residual claims will be pro-
portionally divided. Notice that the average price and the variation in average price are unchanged 
for all segments. However, marginal price ("%&) volatility (&) is increased.  
 
Assume for convenience that the forward price is equal to the expected spot cash price, "# = "̅&. As 
stated above the relevant situation is where ("̅& > "#) or an equivalent situation where there is a 
trade-off between expected terminal equity and a reduction in the risk of financial failure.  
 
Now suppose cooperative members were allowed to exchange $'& among each other at a market 
price . Cooperative members with a high cost of risk would presumably be willing to pay 
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ℎ$  ¡¢£¡¡¤ for an increase in the forward contracted quantity by ℎ$  ¡¢£¡¡¤. Similarly, cooperative 
members with a low cost of risk would presumably be willing to reduce the forward contracted 
quantity by ℎ$  ¡¢£¡¡¤ in return for pecuniary compensation ℎ$  ¡¢£¡¡¤, where ℎ is the share of the 
endowed fixed price quantity that the low cost of risk members will be willing to sell at the price .  
 
This is such an equivalent situation and a trade-off between expected terminal equity and a reduc-
tion in the risk of financial failure is created. High cost of risk members can be in a financial posi-
tion where they don’t have the capacity to bear risk or they can have high cost of risk because of a 
high level of risk aversion. Likewise, the low cost of risk members can be in a strong financial posi-
tion with moderate risk aversion, or they may be in a weaker financial position but have a low level 
of risk aversion, in both cases they have to be both willing and able to take on increased risk expo-
sure in return for adequate compensation. 
 
The cooperative members with a medium cost of risk would be unwilling to pay  for a marginal 
increase in the forward contracted quantity, and unwilling to receive  for a marginal reduction in 
the forward contracted quantity. They would be unaffected at the average price volatility level, but 
would be affected by an increase in variation at the marginal price ("%&) level.  
 
Equation (22) could be extended to: 
 
                                Q"#$ ''& − "#ℎ$
''& + "%&(1 − $)
''& + "%&ℎ$
''& + ℎ$
''&T
+ Q"#$ '3S'& + "%&(1 − $)
'3S'& T
+ Q"#$ '#S#'& + "#ℎ$
''& + "%&(1 − $)
'#S#'& − "%&ℎ$
''& − ℎ$
''&T
= ["#$ + "%&(1 − $)]'& 
 
(27) 
 
 
The expected terminal equity for cooperative members with a low, medium and high cost of risk, 
respectively, is 
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¥ = ¦ + Q"#$ ''& − "#ℎ$
''& + "%&(1 − $)
''& + "%&ℎ$
''& + ℎ$
''&T 
−*' − ,- − . 
(28 a) 
3S¥ = 3S¦ + Q"#$ '3S'& + "%&(1 − $)
'3S'& T 
−*'3S − ,-3S − .3S 
(28 b) 
#S#¥ = #S#¦ + Q"#$ '#S#'& + "#ℎ$
''& + "%&(1 − $)
'#S#'& − "%&ℎ$
''& − ℎ$
''&T 
−*'#S# − ,-#S# − .#S# 
(28 c) 
 
As pointed out above, the heterogeneity in factors which affect hedging behavior can take many 
forms (Pennings and Garcia, 2004; Pennings and Leuthold, 2000). Assume these factors are con-
densed in the cost of risk (Chavas, 2011) and assume, without loss of generality, that the cost of risk 
is inversely reflected in the level of acceptable probability of financial failure   >  3S >
#S# holding the disaster level equal for all members at the point of financial failure where  is 
zero,   =  3S = #S# = 0.  
 
The objective function of the three segments could be stated as:  
max S_ =   S_	S_
S_
/
0/
 
s. t.   	S_
S_ ≤ S
3
0/
, ℎ , ∈ {, ¨,F, ℎ,ℎ} 
 
(29) 
 
 
This means that members with a low cost of risk ceteris paribus will accept a higher probability of 
financial failure than members with a high cost of risk, against compensation of ℎ$  ¡¢£¡¡¤. Mem-
bers with a high cost of risk will accept a lower expected terminal equity, #S#_, in return for a 
lower probability of financial failure.    
    
Assume that 	_
 = 	3S_
 = 	#S#_
 ex ante, before endowment of  $ and trans-
fer of risk. The only thing separating the three segments is  >  3S > #S#.  
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Figure 4.2 a): Cumulative distribution function of terminal equity, ex ante 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 b): Cumulative distribution function of terminal equity, ex post 
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As illustrated in Figure 4.2 a, the condition for equation (25) is not satisfied for the high cost of risk 
segment, since the probability of financial failure is above  #S#, the acceptable level of financial 
failure. Given the endowment of $ it is possible to transfer risk among members in exchange for 
pecuniary compensation and obtain an ex post situation (Figure 4.2 b) in which risk is adjusted to 
the level where the probability of financial failure is equal to the acceptable level, for each segment. 
Expected terminal equity will shift from _ = 3S_ = #S#_ in the ex ante situation to 
_ > 3S_ > #S#_ in the ex post situation. ©(S_) denotes the cumulative distribution 
function of terminal equity of segment ,.  
 
Assuming that 
ª 
ª«£ = 0, that ℎ > 0 and zero transaction costs, a change in the traditional endow-
ment of $ = 0 to $ > 0 will increase the aggregate utility without anyone being worse off. This 
constitutes a Pareto improvement. This claim builds on the following reasoning; endowing mem-
bers with a non-zero but low positive $ changes nothing, neither the expected terminal equity nor 
the variation in terminal equity. Nobody is worse off. Now if ℎ > 0  this means that someone made 
a voluntary market transaction, and this means that someone is better off, making it a Pareto im-
provement. These assumptions, however, need further discussion.  
 
4.6.2 TRANSACTION COSTS 
An actual endowment of $ > 0 and the subsequent exchange of forward contracting rights will 
incur some direct transaction costs. The cost structure of direct transaction costs will presumably 
have some fixed element related to setup costs, etc. If these are assumed to be negligible or covered 
more than fully by direct transaction fees paid by participating segments, there could still be room 
for Pareto improvement. In this case, non-participating members will no longer be unaffected but 
will receive part of the redistribution gains, that is the transaction fees paid by participating mem-
bers less the part of direct transaction costs covered by the cooperative multiplied by  ¬­®¯°¬£¡¡¤ . 
Modern electronic market platforms have relatively low direct transaction costs, which is why as-
suming variable transaction costs, although a simplification of reality seems fair.  
 
The model could be extended to cover variable transaction costs ± in the following way: 
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         Q"#$ ''& − "#ℎ$
''& + "%&(1 − $)
''& + "%&ℎ$
''& + ℎ$
''& −
±
2 ℎ$
''&T 
    + ²"#$ ¬­®¯°¬£¡¡¤ + "%&(1 − $) ¬­®¯°¬£¡¡¤ ³ 
     + Q"#$ '#S#'& + "#ℎ$
''& + "%&(1 − $)
'#S#'& − "%&ℎ$
''& − ℎ$
''& −
±
2 ℎ$
''&T 
     = ["#$ + "%&(1 − $) − @ℎ]'& 
(30) 
 
 
  
Expected terminal equity for cooperative members with a low, medium and high cost of risk, re-
spectively, would be: 
 
¥ = 
¦ + Q"#$ ''& − "#ℎ$
''& + "%&(1 − $)
''& + "%&ℎ$
''& + ℎ$
''& −
±
2 ℎ$
''&T 
                              −*' − ,- − . 
 
(31 a) 
3S¥ = 
3S¦ + Q"#$ '3S'& + "%&(1 − $)
'3S'& T 
                                −*'3S − ,-3S − .3S 
 
(31 b) 
#S#¥ = 
#S#¦ + Q"#$ '#S#'& + "#ℎ$
''& + "%&(1 − $)
'#S#'& − "%&ℎ$
''& − ℎ$
''& −
±
2 ℎ$
''&T 
                                −*'#S# − ,-#S# − .#S# 
(31 c) 
 
If transaction costs are sufficiently low, there will still be potential for Pareto improvements by ena-
bling the reallocation of price risk.   
 
Assuming zero setup costs means zero costs if ℎ =  0, this is of course a simplifying assumption. 
But given the turnover of the cooperatives in question, assuming the fixed setup costs of a price risk 
reallocation scheme to be negligible seems a fair simplifying assumption.  
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In reality, the cost structure of a risk reallocation mechanism is likely to involve relatively high 
fixed cost (setup costs) compared to negligible variable costs. The setup costs will, however, most 
likely be relatively low compared to the reallocation gain. Experiences from the introduction of a 
sugar beet contract exchange in Denmark in 2008 among farmers are good and the cost of running 
an exchange like this is negligible compared to the economic size of the cooperatives in question. 
The sugar beet contract exchange not only facilitated the efficient reallocation of contracts, it did so 
whilst keeping bid and ask information confidential through use of secure multiparty computation 
(SMC) technology (Bogetoft and Nielsen, 2012). 
 
In principal the reallocation of risk suggested above could be done by cooperative members betting 
on the cooperative pay-out bilaterally. However, as Danisco and the Danish Sugar Beet Growers 
Association realized when they implemented their contract exchange, bilateral bargaining involves 
considerable searching and matching costs and is associated with strategic behavior. Mechanism 
design and implementation are pivotal in order to obtain the reallocation gains (Bogetoft and 
Nielsen, 2012). Organization of a forward contract exchange by cooperatives may significantly in-
crease the gains derived from the reallocation of price risk. Not only will searching and matching 
costs be reduced, counterparty risk, involved in a bilateral betting scenario, will also be reduced by 
having the cooperative act as a clearing house, thereby shifting counterparty risk from a member to 
member issue, to a member to cooperative issue. Reduced counterparty risk is a feature of ex-
change-traded derivatives such as futures and options as opposed to negotiated contracts. In this 
way the concept of futures (standardized contracts) and forwards (negotiated contracts) converge, as 
the forward contracts exchanged are standardized, but cooperative specific, with exchange being 
restricted to cooperative members.  
 
4.6.3 QUANTITY EFFECT OF INCREASED VOLATILITY OF MARGINAL PRICE  
In the analysis above it was assumed that change in the volatility of price has no effect on output, 
ª
ª«£ = 0. This assumption may be strong which is why the effect of relaxation is discussed as it may 
influence the model outcome. As Turvey (1989) points out, production and marketing issues are 
often treated independently, although they are inherently integrated parts of one decision problem.   
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As classical theory dictates, the short run production will be maintained as long as marginal revenue 
is greater than or equal to marginal cost, "%&  ≥ *. In the long run all costs will have to be covered. 
The question is how long is the long run? How flexible is the cost structure at the individual farm 
level and on the cooperative wide level.  
 
The time horizon of the suggested endowment of forward contracts to cooperative members is a key 
variable. The contract horizon length is assumed to be positively related to the value of hedging. 
Very short contracts will approach a no contract situation, while longer contracts will improve cash 
flow predictability for members with an above average hedge ratio within the contract period. 
Members, having sold part of their forward contract endowment to other members, will have a be-
low average hedge ratio. The price of accepting increased price volatility, for members with below 
average hedge ratio, will increase with the length of the time horizon of forward contracts. The op-
timal length of such contracts is beyond the scope of this paper, although a pragmatic suggestion for 
the time horizon of the forward contract could be that the hedged price "# and quantity endowment 
$ are specified in advance for the cooperative’s fiscal year, stating "# as the expected average price 
and the individual member endowment $S to be based on the individual member’s preceding year’s 
delivery to the cooperative.  
 
Suppose forward contract is specified as above, then the short run will become the cooperative’s 
fiscal year. The volatility of the unhedged price "%& will increase and will affect the production quan-
tity in cases where "%& < * with * representing the within year flexible costs. In general, the cost 
structure of modern Danish livestock production is relatively fixed and cases where "%& < * will 
presumably be seldom. However, across the members of the cooperative, there will likely be a dis-
tribution of production technologies at work. Older production facilities that are near the end of 
their productive lifespan, may be shut down early in cases where "%& is low. Similarly, these facili-
ties may be kept in production for a while longer in cases where "%& is high. This sort of dynamic 
will most likely have some effect on the total production '& and ªª«£ ≠ 0 and thus have an impact 
["#$ + "%&(1 − $)]'& and an accelerating impact on &. The cooperative average price will be 
affected at some level and the above-mentioned impact on non-participating members will be un-
derstated. Pareto improvements will be less likely, as the possibility that non-participating members 
will not be automatically compensated will increase. There will, however, still be significant poten-
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tial for improvement of the weaker Kaldor-Hicks efficiency measure as a function of the risk reallo-
cation possibility (Gowdy, 2004).  
 
If delivery of '& declines as a consequence of low "%&, the cooperative may be able to mitigate 
this effect by sourcing input from outside the group of members. This may be a realistic strategy in 
cases where general market price downturn drives "%& to a low level. In cases where the lower "%& is 
related to business specific factors, this may not be possible. As mentioned earlier, mergers leading 
to the formation of the current cooperatives were subject to a number of conditions, including that 
they partially relinquished their exclusive supply requirement for members. Members are, however, 
still required to deliver a substantial part of their production to the cooperative within the year, and 
are only able to leave the cooperative, without penalty, with due notice effective at the end of the 
year. Side-trading is therefore limited if the length of forward contracting endowments is aligned 
with the possibility of leaving the cooperative. However, members who cease production, as men-
tioned above, will not be restricted.      
 
Because of the proportional payment schemes, cooperatives traditionally have inherent incentive 
problems in the sense that they signal average benefit to the member, and the member is incentiv-
ized to react to average benefit. This may not be equal to marginal benefit, and maximizing inte-
grated profit may be difficult because of difficulty in equating marginal cost and marginal benefit, 
which is called the quantity control problem. In New Generation Cooperatives (NGC), this problem 
is mitigated through contract production. NGCs are usually characterized by closed membership 
and transferrable delivery rights (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2000). In some sense the suggested endow-
ment and reallocation of forward contracted prices is similar to the operation of NGCs, although the 
model differs from NGCs in the sense that membership is not closed and the endowment of forward 
contracting is only short therm.  
 
As mentioned, the level of endowment of forward contracts, $, to cooperative members is zero by 
tradition. Increasing this level and reallocating the contracts among members via a double auction 
will most likely yield reallocation gains. Increasing the level of $ too much will, however, reintro-
duce risk in the form of counterparty risk. In case of a high level of $ the risk that the cooperative 
will be unable to pay "# for the contracted quantity may be introduced. A balance between the po-
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tential reallocation gains on the one hand, and the increase in counterparty risk on the other, will 
determine the optimal level of $. This analysis is beyond the scope of this study. A suggested level 
of $ around 20 % of '& seems to be low enough to avoid the risk of being unable to pay "#, driv-
ing the cooperative into bankruptcy, while yielding a significant potential for reallocation gains.    
 
Tying the individual endowment of $ to the preceding year’s delivery will introduce a second order 
effect on commodity price. Revenue from commodities delivered to the cooperative will not only be 
in the form of "# or  "%& but also in the form of, ·¸ 5$·¸ 5'·¸ ¹, the value of endow-
ment of forward contracting the following year. Assume for illustration that the risk premium  is 5 
% of the expected spot cash price and that the endowment of $ is 20% of the previous year’s deliv-
ery, the second order price effect will be a 1 % increase in the expected price.      
 
Bak-Pedersen and Neergaard-Petersen (2003) suggest a model with many similar aspects targeting 
new (young) entrants to the hog sector. They suggest a five year contract based on the average price 
of the previous five years. The main difference between the model presented in this paper and the 
Bak-Neergaard-model is that the suggested contracts here would be one year contracts based on 
expected price. Other important differences are:  a) all members have the same access to the con-
tract; b) the risk premium paid for reducing price risk via contract is determined by an auction 
mechanism and not by fiat; c) all members are endowed with a contract quantity in equal proportion 
to the previous delivery, which means that members who do not participate in the auction will expe-
rience minimal change in their risk exposure if they have stable production, and; d) the Bak-
Neergaard-model suggests that the cooperative should carry the liquidity burden associated with 
risk, while the liquidity burden is transferred to the residual claimants in the model presented here.    
 
The importance of the financial framework conditions are recognized by Bak-Pedersen and 
Neergaard-Petersen (2003) and they conclude that the value of their contract model is reduced by 
favorable access to credit at the time, but that future adverse developments in the financial markets 
may increase the relevance of the model. This is important insight and the actual development in the 
post financial crisis world may very well increase the potential value of risk reallocation among 
cooperative members.    
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Bogetoft and Olesen (2000, 2002, 2004, 2007) have performed rigorous analyses of contracting in 
Danish agriculture. Their main frame of analysis is producer / processor contracting and one of the 
main issues is the conflict between motivation of optimal effort and optimal risk sharing. Examples 
of risk related to effort can be quality aspects or animal health issues. Processors may be better able 
to carry the cost of risk associated with stochastic processes related to these issues, although the 
cost of risk may be significantly reduced by the producer’s optimal effort. In these cases, motiva-
tional problems may exist.  
 
Figure 4.3: Price risk exposure for farmers using forward contracts 
 
With regard to price risk and price risk transfer, the motivational problems that preoccupied Bo-
getoft and Olesen (2004) are not major problems if hedge ratios are moderate. Price risk transfer via 
hedging reduces the variation of average price received around the hedged price subject to the in-
creased variation of the price of unhedged production and the hedge ratio. Classical production the-
ory predicts that production quantity is motivated, not by the average price, but by the marginal 
price, which is the price of the unhedged production. Increasing production to the level where mar-
ginal costs are equal to marginal revenue is unaffected by hedging at moderate levels from the indi-
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vidual farmer’s point of view. Figure 4.3 illustrates differences in forward contracted price, average 
price and marginal (unhedged) price with the differences in the slope of the total revenue curve.   
      
Forward contracting part of production will to some extent mitigate the quantity control problem, in 
the sense that the cooperative via "%& sends a stronger signal of marginal benefit as opposed to aver-
age benefit. The above-mentioned effect on non-participating members may be positive as better 
price signals may increase integrated profit. Pareto improvement may, however, still be too strong 
an efficiency criterion, because the distribution of effects may potentially put some groups in a situ-
ation where they are worse off, ex post.  
 
Today cooperative management do not receive any signals on the acceptable risk taking in the pro-
cessing and marketing business except for the signals sent via the members’ democratic organiza-
tion. An internal market price for forward contracts may improve the ability to signal the farm-level 
cost of risk to cooperative management in a more efficient way. This may help coordinate collective 
risk management. Basis risk on futures markets may be lower from the cooperative’s point of view 
than from the farm’s point of view as asymmetry in information on cooperative exposure may be 
substantial. Garcia and Leuthold (2004, p. 261) pose the question “Will individual managers have to 
turn to locally based forward contracts offered by large processing firms who then have access to 
futures markets to manage their risk?” The question seems to suggest a fruitful line of reasoning.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The potential gain from the reallocation of risk among cooperative members will depend upon the 
distribution of cooperative member attitudes towards, and perceptions of, risk, their alternative risk 
mitigation possibilities and differences in financial structure and possibly the macroeconomic envi-
ronment, all reflected in the members individual cost of risk. Given sufficiently low transaction 
costs and sufficiently high heterogeneity of members, the potential gains would be positive. It is the 
author’s belief that the potential is great in the current post GFC environment, although it is not 
static, as alternative ways of mitigating risk evolve dynamically and the potential will be condi-
tioned on the present alternatives at any given time.  
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“Necessity is the mother of invention” (Ester Boserup cf. Rogers, Jalal, & Boyd, 2008, p. 20) the 
question is whether necessity is also the mother of institutional innovation with regard to risk man-
agement in agriculture?   
 
Until recently, institutions may have been in place that crowded out the need for transferring price 
risk away from some of the livestock producers in Denmark. These institutions may be changing 
drastically and the ability to transfer price risk may be becoming valuable. Traditionally, commodi-
ty futures are thought of as vehicles for the transfer of price risk vertically in the value chain. Here 
endowment and the transfer of forward contracts among cooperative members is suggested to ex-
tract the potential gains from the horizontal reallocation of risk.   
 
Research questions like; what is the optimal endowment of $? what is the optimal forward price 
"#? and what is the potential gain from the reallocation of risk? are still open questions. However, it 
seems likely that advances in electronic market platforms and market design could reduce transac-
tion costs to a sufficiently low level, where this type of reallocation could be a source of social gain. 
Price risk management tools could potentially alleviate some of the financial constraints that Danish 
agriculture is experiencing in the aftermath of the GFC. 
 
As noted, the potential (net) gain will depend on the heterogeneity of the cooperative members 
(gross gain potential) and the transaction costs involved in reaping the gross gain potential. The 
estimation of the gross gain potential, e.g. the cost of carrying risk, is an open research area. Zheng 
et al. (2008) analyze the potential welfare loss from reducing the choice of marketing arrangements 
for agents with a heterogeneous risk preference in the U.S. hog industry. This approach may pro-
vide a useful way of estimating the potential gain from increasing the choice of marketing arrange-
ments among agents with a heterogeneous risk preference.     
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
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5.1 Conclusion 
5.1.1 CHANGE IN THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK 
MANAGEMENT  
This chapter will summaries the central findings of the three papers and will relate these findings to 
the bigger picture. Some aspects of this bigger picture which are not, or are only very briefly dealt 
with in the papers will be discussed here.   
 
The first paper quantifies and substantiates the general notion that access to credit was quite easy 
for Danish farmers up to the GFC. While the papers’ core contribution is methodological, suggest-
ing a novel measure for credit capacity by estimating debt possibility frontiers using Data Envelop-
ment Analysis, the implications of the empirical results are important for the understanding of risk 
management practice in Danish agriculture up to the GFC.  
 
During the past 40 years, the risk exposure of Danish farmers has increased as a function of increas-
ing specialization and leverage. Looking at these two factors alone, this development is counterintu-
itive as you would expect to see some risk balancing, e.g. counterbalancing the increasing business 
risk, from increased specialization, with decreasing financial risk via a reduction in leverage. How-
ever, this has not been the case, most likely because the risk mitigating effect of diversification that 
was lost with specialization was replaced by price stabilizing agricultural policy. When the gradual 
policy focus shifted toward more market-oriented policy, price risk was reintroduced leaving farm-
ers highly specialized, highly leveraged and exposed to price risk. The general business cycle and 
the more subtle details of the institutional environment with regard to finance, did however offer the 
Danish farmers increasing access to credit.  
 
In an environment with increasing access to credit, perceived credit reserves will most likely in-
crease as well, which will in turn crowd out other risk coping strategies. OECD (2009, 2011) stress-
es the crowding out effect of agricultural policy on market-based risk management instruments, 
such as futures and insurance markets. Basically the argument is that if agricultural policy reduces 
farmers’ risk exposure, it will also reduce demand for market-based risk management instruments. 
Because of this, demand may not reach a critical mass, where market-based instruments will appear 
or flourish. While this effect is important, the interaction with the institutional environment with 
regard to finance is an important, but largely omitted, effect.   
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While OECD (2009, 2011) realizes that risk management will affect farmers’ access to credit and 
investment behavior, the realization of the reverse effect is much more unclear, i.e. the crowding 
out effect of access the credit on market-based risk management instruments. In order to achieve a 
thorough understanding of agricultural risk management practice necessitates a thorough under-
standing of the financial environment and not solely an understanding of the natural and policy en-
vironment within which farmers operate.         
 
The increasing access to credit, documented in the first paper, will most likely have had a major 
effect on the way risk was managed in Danish agriculture up to the GFC. The institutional subtleties 
of the financial system in Denmark, however, reach much further back in history. In an historical 
perspective, access to credit was probably relatively easy for Danish farmers compared to most of 
their international counterparts. The effect of the international business cycle boom up to the GFC, 
or maybe more appropriately the international credit cycle boom, was more significant in the Dan-
ish institutional environment than it was in other more restrictive financial environments, and simi-
larly, the effect of the bust and the following process of deleveraging has had more severe conse-
quences for the Danish institutional environment for agriculture, ceteris paribus.    
 
5.1.2 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT   
The subtleties of the financial system that affect the access to credit may also affect the way produc-
tion is organized. The second paper explores this notion. The paper develops a theory of organiza-
tion which emphasizes the interaction between technological development and the financial system, 
built on observations from agricultural value chains. The development in hog marketing arrange-
ments in the U.S. and Denmark is compared using the method of difference.    
 
There is substantial research on the driver for the significant change in livestock marketing ar-
rangements in the U.S. This research is based on TCE arguments and basically concludes that tech-
nological change drives organizational change because it induces investments in more specific as-
sets. While this is probably a correct assessment of the key drivers of the evolution of organization-
al arrangement in the U.S. livestock sector toward contract production and backward integration, 
there seems to be some elements missing in a more comprehensive understanding of organizational 
change.  
  
148 
 
The comparison of the development in hog marketing arrangements in the U.S. and Denmark shows 
that the technological change, which was supposed to drive the organizational change in the U.S., 
also occurred in Denmark, but without any resulting organizational change. This suggests that omit-
ted factors may bias the TCE explanation of organizational change. Interaction between a financial 
system, with relatively easy access to credit, and technological change may result in different organ-
izational outcomes than interaction between financial systems with relatively hard access to credit 
and technological change.   
 
The theoretical prediction developed in the paper is that in situations where technological develop-
ment drives investment in specific assets, the financial institutional environment, which determines 
the access to credit, will determine whether investments will be financed via debt markets and/or 
equity markets affecting organizational form.    
 
If access to credit is relatively easy, forward integration via the cooperative organization of pro-
cessing and marketing is a likely outcome as long as the monitoring costs are lower for farmers (co-
operative members) who are monitoring hired cooperative management, than the monitoring costs 
for farmers who are monitoring hired farm managers in a backward integrated privately held pro-
cessing firm.  
 
If access to credit is difficult, firms will turn to the stock market for access to credit. If investors on 
the stock market have lower costs of monitoring backward integrated or quasi-integrated processing 
firms than forward integrated farms, it is likely that investor owned backward integrated firms will 
become the organizational outcome of technological change.  
 
An understanding of the connection between the institutional environment of finance and the coop-
erative organization of processing and marketing is important. Recognizing the connection is a first 
step toward anticipating the impact of change in the one factor on the other.  
 
Organization may mitigate at least two important risk factors. The main focus in organizational re-
search is on the mitigation of hold-up risk or post contractual opportunistic behavior. The other im-
portant risk factor that organization may mitigate is market price risk; that is the volatility in prices 
that would be present in perfect markets without agency or transaction costs.  
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Backward integration and contract production seen in the U.S. mitigate both these risk factors, 
whereas the Danish cooperatives only mitigate the risk of hold-up. As the market risk has been rela-
tively low and access to credit has been relatively easy in Denmark, there has been no, or relatively 
little, reason for the Danish system to cope with market risk, as credit reserves have been a favored 
risk coping mechanism. In the post-GFC world, the ability to mitigate risk via credit reserves is no 
longer as viable. This constitutes a challenge for the Danish system. Change in market price vola-
tility and access to credit constitute change in parts of the institutional matrix, which will induce the 
need for adaptive changes in other parts of the institutional matrix, e.g. other risk management insti-
tutions.  
 
5.1.3 ADAPTING TO CHANGE – THE REALLOCATION OF RISK AMONG COOPERATIVE 
MEMBERS 
The third paper explores one possible role of the Danish processing and marketing cooperatives in 
relation to the emerging risk management challenges. Specifically it explores the possibility of real-
locating price risk among cooperative members as an alternative to the futures-based hedging of 
price risk.  
 
There is no, or only very limited use, of futures based price hedging on the output side by farmers in 
the two main livestock sectors in Denmark, the dairy and the hog sector. One reason for the low use 
of the futures-based hedging is that farmers market their produce through cooperatives. Marketing 
via cooperatives means that the price risk farmers are exposed to in the physical market is different 
to the price risk that they may potentially hedge via futures markets.  
 
If the futures market was a place where farmers could hedge the pure market risk associated with 
their produce, it may still not help the farmers enough, as they are exposed to the cooperative price 
in the physical market, which is a combination of the pure market risk and the cooperatives’ busi-
ness risk.  
 
If, however, the cooperative members are sufficiently heterogeneous regarding their cost of coping 
with risk and the transaction costs associated with the reallocation of the cooperative price risk 
among the members are low enough, there will be potential gains from a mechanism that enables 
cooperative members to reallocate risk among themselves.   
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The basic idea of the mechanism is that all members are endowed with a proportional forward con-
tract each year, say 20 % of last year’s delivery, to a fixed price close to the cooperatives expected 
price the coming year. Endowing members with a fixed price on a part of the quantity increases the 
volatility in price of the residual part of the quantity (80 %), as it is this (now reduced) part of the 
quantity that holds the residual claims to the cooperatives earnings. As long as all members receive 
a fixed price on 20 % and a stochastic price on 80 % of their delivery to the cooperative, the mem-
ber’s end of year expected average price and the variation in this average price will be the same as 
if the mechanism was not in place. However, endowing members with a forward contracted quanti-
ty, and enabling trade with these fixed price quantities, enables the reduction of cooperative price 
risk exposure for some members, by paying a risk premium to the members who are increase their 
risk exposure, by selling part of their fixed price contracted quantity. 
 
In a perfect world, this mechanism would not be efficient, as ultra-liquid futures markets could 
transfer risks much better. If, however, futures markets do not work, for some reason or another, the 
potential for reallocation of cooperative price risk among the member could yield substantial gains 
from trade. 
 
Of the three papers summarized above, the first two deal with the “why´s” and the third deals with  
a “how” in the sense that the two first papers deal with why risk have been managed the way it has, 
up to the GFC. In understanding the “why”, the understanding of possible consequences of changes 
in the historically determining factors is improved. Realizing that the changes in the institutional 
frames for agricultural risk management, including finance and organization, will induce change in 
the risk management practice, the third paper turns to a “how” in the sense that it explores one sug-
gestion of how agricultural risk management can adapted to change. This is not a stand-alone or 
even the most probable risk management adaptation, but it is a novel contribution to the (coming) 
debate of how to adapt to the new institutional framework, broadly labeled “the new normal.” The 
key message is that cooperative can and should play an active role in dealing with the new chal-
lenges that face their members. In the following, examples of other alternatives of how to adapt are 
discussed briefly; most adaptations could be seen in combination with the suggestion above or with 
each other.  
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5.1.4 ADAPTING TO CHANGE – ACCESSING CAPITAL THROUGH REITS  
The introduction of outside equity capital to the primary farm level from investors such as pension 
funds could be a way of transferring risk away from the fewer and fewer active farmers. Outside 
equity is a universal risk management tool, much like debt. Outside equity may have the advantage 
regarding risk carrying capacity compared to the inside equity of sole proprietorships, that investors 
can diversify (diversifiable) risk away in the portfolio. Sole proprietors often do not have a very 
diversified portfolio, as most of their capital is tied up in their firms.  
 
One way of reducing debt, while keeping the agency costs of outside equity at a minimum, is to 
establish real estate investment trusts (REITs) invested in farms or possibly only land, which could 
be labeled FREITs and LREITs (Painter, 2000, 2011). Establishing FREITs or LREITs that rent 
agricultural assets to producers (tenant famers) could be a way of shifting the capital structure of the 
agricultural sector so that it is better aligned with the new financial environment where access to 
credit is limited and where farmers need greater solvency to buffer against risks. Renting land 
would enable tenant farmers to reap almost the same economies of scale as in the case ownership, 
while reducing the strain on solvency.     
 
5.1.5 ADAPTING TO CHANGE – RETAINING CAPITAL THROUGH POSTPONED SUCCES-
SION  
A variation of LREITs that is already in place in Denmark is combinations of ownership and tenant 
farming. It is quite common for farmers to rent the land of retired farmers who continue to live on 
their farms. In a sense these are examples of very small LREITs where the retired farmer has his 
own pension fund invested in the farm. There may be tax and non-pecuniary advantages of this 
model. There is a current debate in Danish agriculture which focuses on sector-level succession 
problems, as young farmers have great difficulty in accessing finance for succession of older gener-
ations. The debate seems to lack the insight that if succession is postponed, and assets are leased 
instead of sold; the young generation can assume control without assuming ownership of the most 
capital-intensive assets (land). This will retain equity in the sector and preserve sector level solven-
cy.    
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5.1.6 ADAPTING TO CHANGE – BACKWARD INTEGRATION AND CONTRACT PRO-
DUCTION  
Converting processing and marketing cooperatives to joint stock companies and listing them on the 
stock exchange may be a way of accessing capital on the sector level. Combining this with produc-
tion or marketing contracts will yield a structure that is somewhat similar to the structure in the U.S. 
It is possible to mitigate both the market and the hold-up risks in this way. But the risk of hold-up 
will most likely increase from the present situation dominated by cooperatives. The sector may end 
up in a trade-off between the need to cope with market risk and the need to cope with hold-up risk 
(unless market risk is handled in the way suggested in the third paper). The irony of this situation is 
that the timing of a stock market listing of the cooperatives is likely to be suboptimal, in the sense 
that the time where cooperative members agree to sell the firm on the stock market is likely to be 
when they cannot access the credit they need. This would most likely be at a time when investors 
have a low risk appetite and are buying bonds instead of stocks, which will be reflected in the price 
of the issued stock.   
 
5.1.7 ADAPTING TO CHANGE – COLLECTIVE REDUCTION OF RISK 
Cooperatives may try to hedge their revenue, thereby reducing price volatility collectively. Global 
Dairy Trade is an auction platform for internationally traded commodity dairy products that was 
established in 2008. The dominant Danish dairy cooperative Arla Foods is a participating seller on 
the platform. The sale of commodities for future delivery is a way for Arla Foods to hedge future 
revenues, although participation is very low and the hedging activity is unlikely to have a signifi-
cant impact on the volatility of the price Arla Foods is able to pay its members.      
 
5.2 Final conclusion 
This thesis explores the implications of finance and organization on agricultural risk management 
from an institutional perceptive. It concludes that financial institutions matter and that they interact 
with organizational forms, thereby affecting the way risks are managed. Financial institutions are 
changing and will most likely affect risk management practice in Danish agriculture along with the 
increased volatility in commodity prices. This change will most likely be direct, via the effect of 
reduced credit reserves, and potentially indirect via the effect of changing financial institutions on 
organization.  
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Describing the risk transferring function of debt, Donaldson (1961, p. 86) captures an essential 
point with regard to risk management in the following quote: “Every private enterprise operating in 
a competitive dynamic economy has a degree of uncertainty associated with expected future in-
come. This risk is inescapable and it must be borne by someone. Of the several distinct groups rep-
resenting various interests in this future income, however, not all are equally willing to assume the 
risk. As a consequence and by means of negotiated legal contracts some groups are able to shift 
“their share” of the risk to another group, giving up something in the process – usually the chance 
of a larger share of the uncertain future income. Of course, in reality no group ever escapes risk 
entirely in an absolute sense but the risk is greatly reduced”. The mechanism described in Paper III 
is a possible supplementary risk transfer vehicle. In the event of the fundamentally reduced risk 
transfer capacity of credit reserves due to changes in the institutional environment, supplementary 
risk transfer vehicles may come in demand. It is, however, important to recognize that the risk man-
agement potential of the reallocation of risk among cooperative members as well as other hedging 
alternatives is short term. As such, the risk management potential for hedging is the modest aim of 
budget security rather than the elimination of risk exposure for the investment in question. In con-
trast to hedging, large liquidity reserves may be a long term safeguard against cash insolvency 
and/or bankruptcy. This tendency in agricultural risk management research to focus on the short 
term while the serious problems are long term problems is addressed by Just (2003).       
 
The need for institutional adaptation seems clear. Institutional adaptation is however not an auto-
matic process, the efficiency both with regard to new mechanisms and the appropriate timing of 
their introduction is a challenge to governance in the industry. This thesis finds that processing and 
marketing cooperatives in Denmark can play a major role in enabling the management of Danish 
farmers’ core risk factors. This is a new role for the cooperatives, which is emerging from the insti-
tutional vacuum created by the changing institutional framework regarding finance and increasing 
commodity price volatility. It is the hope that this thesis will help cooperatives realize the role they 
can play and motivate them to assume this new role.    
 
  
154 
 
References  
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Mitton, T. (2009), “Determinants of Vertical Integration : Financial 
Development and Contracting Costs,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. LXIV No. 3. 
Akerlof, G.A. (1970), “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84 No. 3, pp. 488–500. 
Allais, M. (1953), “Le Comportement de l ’ Homme Rationnel devant le Risque : Critique des 
Postulats et Axiomes de l  ' Ecole Americaine,” Econometrica, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 503–546. 
Allen, D.W. and Lueck, D. (1998), “The Nature of the Farm,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 
41 No. 2, pp. 343–386. 
Andersen, T.J. and Schrøder, P.W. (2010), Strategic Risk Management Practice, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Anderson, E. and Gatignon, H. (2005), “Firms and the Creation of New Markets,” inMénard,C. and 
Shirley,M.M. (Eds.),Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Springer, pp. 401–431. 
Anderson, J.R., Dillon, J.L. and Hardaker, J.B. (1977), Agricultural decision analysis, Iowa State 
University Press, p. 344. 
Andreasen, G. (2011,December16), “Kan stryke DC med 800 millioner kroner uden at skulle til 
lommerne,” Maskinbladet, p. 2. 
Aoki, M. (2001), Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
London, England, The MIT Press. 
Aoki, M. (2007), “Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional Changes,” Journal of Institutional 
Economics, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 1–31. 
Arla Foods. (2007), Annual Report 2007. 
Arla Foods. (2013), “www.arla.com.” 
Association of Danish Mortgage Banks. (2012), “The Danish Mortgage Legislation.” Retrieved 
March 2, 2012, from 
http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Danish_Mortgage_Model/Covered_Bond_Legislation/The_Da
nish_Mortgage_Legislation.aspx  
Baker, C.B. (1968), “Credit in the Production Organization of the Firm,” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50 No. 3, pp. 507–520.  
  
155 
 
Baker, C.B. and Hopkin, J.A. (1969), “Concepts of Finance Capital for a Capital-Using 
Agriculture,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 51 No. 5, pp. 1055–1064. 
Bak-Pedersen, T. and Neergaard-Petersen, H. (2003), Analyse af Afregningssystemer for 
Nyetablerede Svineproducenter, Den Kongelige Veterinær- og Landbohøjskole. 
Balbach, J.K. (1998), “The effect of ownership on contract structure, costs, and quality: the case of 
the U.S. beet sugar industry,” inRoyer,J.S. and Rogers,R.T. (Eds.),The industrialization of 
agriculture: vertical coordination in the US food system, Aldershot (United Kingdom), 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd., pp. 155–184. 
Banerjee, A. V and Newman, A.F. (1993), “Occupational Choice and the Process of Development,” 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101 No. 2, pp. 274–298. 
Barry, P.J. (1983), “Financing Growth and Adjustment of Farms Under Risk and Inflation,” 
inBaum,K.H. and Schertz,L.P. (Eds.),Modeling Farm Decisions for Policy Analysis, Boulder, 
Westview Press. 
Barry, P.J. and Baker, C.B. (1971), “Reservation Prices on Credit Use: A Measure of Response to 
Uncertainty,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53 No. 2, pp. 222–227. 
Barry, P.J., Baker, C.B. and Sanint, L.R. (1981), “Farmers’ Credit Risk and Liquidituy 
Management,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 63 No. 2, pp. 216–227. 
Barry, P.J., Bierlen, R.W. and Sotomayor, N.L. (2000), “Financial Structure of Farm Businesses 
Under Imperfect Capital Markets,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 82 No. 
4, pp. 920–933.  
Barry, P.J. and Robison, L.J. (1986), “Economic versus Accounting Rates of Return for Farm 
Land,” Land Economics, Vol. 62 No. 4, pp. 388–401.  
Barry, P.J. and Robison, L.J. (1987), “Portfolio Theory and Financial Structure : An Application of 
Equilibrium Analysis,” Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 142–151. 
Barry, P.J. and Robison, L.J. (2001), “Agricultural Finance: Credit, Credit Constraints, and 
Consequences,” Handbook of agricultural economics, Elsevier, Vol. 1, pp. 513–571.  
Benni, N. El, Finger, R. and Mann, S. (2012), “Effects of agricultural policy reforms and farm 
characteristics on income risk in Swiss agriculture,” Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 72 No. 
3, pp. 301–324.  
Berg, E. and Kramer, J. (2008), “Policy options for risk management,” in Meuwissen,M.P.M.,van 
Asseldonk, M.A.P.M. and Huirne, R.B.M. (Eds.), Income stabilisation in European 
agriculture Design and economic impact of risk management tools, Wageningen, Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, 1st ed., pp. 143–168. 
  
156 
 
Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Transaction 
Publisher. 
Bernoulli, D. (1738), “Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis,” inSommer,T. by L. 1954 
(Ed.),Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae, 5thed., pp. 175–192. 
Blancard, S., Boussemart, J.-P., Briec, W. and Kerstens, K. (2006), “Short- and Long-Run Credit 
Constraints in French Agriculture: A Directional Distance Function Framework Using 
Expenditure-Constrained Profit Functions,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 
88 No. 2, pp. 351–364.  
Bogetoft, P. and Nielsen, K. (2012), “Efficient and confidential reallocation of contracts,” 
Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Vol. 82 No. 2, pp. 165–180.  
Bogetoft, P. and Olesen, H.B. (2000), Afregning i Andelsselskaber, Frederiksberg C, DSR Forlag, 
1st ed. 
Bogetoft, P. and Olesen, H.B. (2002), “Ten rules of thumb in contract design: lessons from Danish 
agriculture,” European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 185–204. 
Bogetoft, P. and Olesen, H.B. (2004), Design of Production Contracts, Copenhagen, Copenhagen 
Business School Press. 
Bogetoft, P. and Olesen, H.B. (2007), “Sales Distortion in Heterogeneous Cooperatives,” in 
Karantininis, K. and Nilsson, J. (Eds.),Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies - The 
Role of Cooperatives in the Agri-Food Industry, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 213–224. 
Bogetoft, P. and Otto, L. (2010), Benchmarking with DEA, SFA, and R., Copenhagen, Springer. 
Bond, S. and Van Reenen, J. (2007), “Microeconometric Models of Investment and Employment,” 
Handbook of Econometrics, Elsevier B.V., Vol. 6, pp. 4418–4498.  
Bowles, S. (2004), Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution, New York, Princeton 
University Press. 
Briggeman, B.C., Towe, C. a. and Morehart, M.J. (2009), “Credit Constraints: Their Existence, 
Determinants, and Implications for U.S. Farm and Nonfarm Sole Proprietorships,” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 91 No. 1, pp. 275–289.  
Burress, M.J., Cook, M.L. and Klein, P.G. (2008), “The Clustering of Organizational Innovation: 
Developing Governance Models for Vertical Integration,” International Food and 
Agribusiness Management Review, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 127–154. 
Caves, D.W., Christensen, L.R. and Diewert, W.. E. (1982), “The Economic Theory of Index 
Numbers and the Measurement of Input , Output , and Productivity,” Econometrica, Vol. 50 
No. 6, pp. 1393–1414. 
  
157 
 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W.W. and Rhodes, E. (1978), “Measuring the efficiency of decision making 
units,” European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 2, pp. 429–444. 
Chavas, J.-P. (2011), “Agricultural policy in an uncertain world,” European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 38 No. 3, pp. 383–407.  
Chew, S.H. and Sagi, J.S. (2007), “Small worlds: Modeling attitudes toward sources of 
uncertainty,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 139 No. 1, pp. 1–24.  
Coase, R.H. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, Vol. 4 No. 16, pp. 386–405. 
Coble, K.H., Heifner, R.G. and Zuniga, M. (2000), “Implications of Crop Yield and Revenue 
Insurance for Producer Hedging,” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Vol. 25 
No. 2, pp. 432–452. 
Coble, K.H., Miller, J.C., Zuniga, M. and Heifner, R. (2004), “The joint effect of government crop 
insurance and loan programmes on the demand for futures hedging,” European Review of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 309–330. 
Coelli, T.J., Rao, D.S.P., O’Donnell, C.J. and Battese, G.E. (2005), An Introduction to Efficiency 
and Productivity Analysis, New York, Springer, 2nd ed. 
Collins, R.A. (1985), “Expected Utility, Debt-Equity Structure, and Risk Balancing,” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 67 No. 3, pp. 627–629. 
Collins, R.A. (1997), “Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Hedging,” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 79 No. 2, pp. 488–499.  
Cook, M.L. (1995), “The Future of US Agricultural Cooperatives A NeoInstitutional Approach,” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 77 No. 5, pp. 1153–1159. 
Danish Agriculture & Food Council. (2011), “Statistics 2010 Pigmeat: Insight - Growth - Balance,” 
Danish Agriculture & Food Council. 
Danish Crown. (2013), “www.danishcrown.dk.” 
Danmarks Statistik. (2011), “NYT fra Danmarks Statistik - Afgrøder i dansk Landbrug 2011,” 
Danmarks Statistik. 
Danmarks Statistik. (2012a), “Husdyrbestand efter areal, enhed og art,” Statistikbanken. Retrieved 
March 15, 2012, from http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1600 
Danmarks Statistik. (2012b), “Slagtninger og produktion af svin efter kategori og enhed,” 
Statistikbanken. Retrieved March 16, 2012, from 
 http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1600 
  
158 
 
Davis, C.G. and Gillespie, J.M. (2007), “Factors Affecting the Selection of Business Arrangements 
by U.S. Hog Farmers,” Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 331–348.  
Diagne, A., Zeller, M. and Sharma, M. (2000), “Empirical Measurements of Households’ Access to 
Credit and Credit Constraints in Developing Countries: Methodological Issues and Evidence,” 
Washington, D.C. 
Donaldson, G. (1961), Coporate Debt Capacity: A study of corporate debt policy and the 
determination of corporate debt capacity, Boston, Havard University, Devision of Research, 
Graduate School of Business Administration. 
Economic Research Service / USDA. (2012), “State Fact Sheets: Iowa,” Washington, D.C., 
Economic Research Service / USDA. 
Eggertsson, G.B. and Krugman, P. (2012), “Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-
Minsky-Koo Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1469–1513.  
Ellsberg, D. (1961), “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 75 No. 4, pp. 643–669. 
Ergin, H. and Gul, F. (2009), “A theory of subjective compound lotteries,” Journal of Economic 
Theory, Elsevier Inc., Vol. 144 No. 3, pp. 899–929.  
Escalante, C.L. and Barry, P.J. (2001), “Risk Balancing in an Integrated Farm Risk Management 
Plan,” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 413–429. 
FADN. (2012), “The Farm Accountancy Data Network - Public Database.” Retrieved January 27, 
2012, from http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/ 
FarmtalOnline. (2013), “farmtalonline.dlbr.dk.” 
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard, R.G. and Petersen, B.C. (1988), “Financing Constraints and Corporate 
Investment,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1988 No. 1, pp. 141–206. 
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard, R.G. and Petersen, B.C. (2000), “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are 
Useful : A Comment on Kaplan and Zingales,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115 
No. 2, pp. 695–705. 
Featherstone, A.M., Moss, C.B., Baker, T.G. and Preckel, P. V. (1988), “The Theoretical Effects of 
Farm Policies on Optimal Leverage and the Probability of Equity Losses,” American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 70 No. 3, pp. 572–579. 
Foreign Agricultural Service / USDA. (2011), “Pork At a Glance,” Washington, D.C., Foreign 
Agricultural Service / USDA. 
Fox, C.R. and Tversky, A. (1995), “Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110 No. 3, pp. 585–603. 
  
159 
 
Franken, J.R. V., Pennings, J.M.E. and Garcia, P. (2009), “Do Transaction Costs and Risk 
Preferences Influence Marketing Arrangements in the Illinois Hog Industry ?,” Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 297–315. 
Froot, K.A., Scharfstein, D.S. and Stein, J.C. (1993), “Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate 
Investment and Financing Policies,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48 No. 5, pp. 1629–1658. 
Fulton, M. (1995), “The Future of Canadian Agricultural Cooperatives: A Property Rights 
Approach,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 77 No. 5, pp. 1144–1152. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S. and Lee, H. (1990), “A Nonparametric Approach to Expenditure-
Constrained Profit Maximization,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 72 No. 
3, pp. 574–581. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Lindgren, B. and Roos, P. (1992), “Productivity Changes in Swedish 
Pharamacies 1980-1989 : A Non-Parametric Malmquist Approach,” The Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, Vol. 3, pp. 85–101. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Norris, M. and Zhang, Z. (1994), “Productivity Growth, Technical 
Progress, and Efficiency Change in Industrialized Countries,” American Economic Review, 
Vol. 84 No. 1, pp. 66–83. 
Fødevareøkonomisk Institut. (2001), Agricultural Price Statistics, Copenhagen, 
Fødevareøkonomisk Institut, 86th –94th ed. 
Gabriel, S.C. and Baker, C.B. (1980), “Concepts of Business and Financial Risk,” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 62 No. 3, pp. 560–564. 
Garcia, P. and Leuthold, R.M. (2004), “A selected review of agricultural commodity futures and 
options markets,” European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 235–272. 
Garrido, A. and Bielza, M. (2008), “Evaluating EU risk management instruments: policy lessons 
and prospects for the future,” in Meuwissen, M.P.M.,van Asseldonk, M.A.P.M. and Huirne, 
R.B.M. (Eds.),Income stabilisation in European agriculture Design and economic impact of 
risk management tools, Wageningen, Wageningen Academic Publishers, 1st ed., pp. 79–98. 
Geanakoplos, J. (2010), “The Leverage Cycle,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, New Haven, 
No. 1715R. 
Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D. (1987), “Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-unique Prior,” Journal 
of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 18 No. December, pp. 141–153. 
Gowdy, J.M. (2004), “The Revolution in Welfare Economics and Its Implications for 
Environmental Valuation and Policy,” Land Economics, Vol. 80 No. 2, pp. 239–257. 
  
160 
 
Gray, A.W., Boehlje, M.D., Gloy, B. a. and Slinsky, S.P. (2004), “How U.S. Farm Programs and 
Crop Revenue Insurance Affect Returns to Farm Land,” Review of Agricultural Economics, 
Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 238–253.  
Greif, A. (1998), “Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis,” The American economic 
review, Vol. 88 No. 2, pp. 80–84. 
Grimes, G. and Plain, R.L. (2009), “U . S . Hog Marketing Contract Study.” 
Grosen, A., Jessen, P. and Kokholm, T. (2012), “An Asset Protection Scheme for Banks Exposed to 
Troubled Loan Portfolios,” Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. Online Fir No. 17th May 
2012. 
Grossman, S.J. and Hart, O.D. (1986), “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership : A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94 No. 4, pp. 691–719. 
Hansen, H.O. (2010), “Strukturudviklingen i Dansk landbrug - Udviklingen frem til i dag,” 
Tidsskrift for Landøkonomi, No. 1. 
Hansen, H.O. (2011), Andelsbevægelsens evne til forandring og omstilling i landbrugets udvikling 
fra den lokale til ” den globale landsby ”, København, Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 1sted. 
Hardaker, J.B., Huirne, R.B.M., Anderson, J.R. and Lien, G. (2004), Coping with Risk in 
Agriculture, CAPI Publishing, 2.ed. 
Hardaker, J.B. and Lien, G. (2005), “Towards some principles of good practice for decision analysis 
in agriculture,” Oslo. 
Harris, J.M., Johnson, J., Dillard, J., Williams, R. and Dubman, R. (2009), The Debt Finance 
Landscape for U. S. Farming and Farm Businesses. 
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990), “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 98 No. 6, pp. 1119–1158. 
Harwood, J., Heifner, R., Coble, K., Perry, J. and Somwaru, A. (1999), “Managing Risk in 
Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis.” 
Hayek, F.A. (1945), “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 35 
No. 4, pp. 519–530. 
Hayes, D.J., Otto, D.M. and Lawrence, J.D. (1996), “Pork Production in Iowa: An Industry at a 
Crossroads,” Ames, Iowa, USA. 
Heifner, R.G. (1972), “Implications of hedging for the agricultural lender,” Agricultural Finance 
Reveiw, Vol. 33, pp. 8–14. 
  
161 
 
Heyman, P.W. (1890), De Danske Svineslagterier - En Forklaring af Situationen samt et Forslag, 
Kjøbenhavn, O.C.Olsen & Co. 
Hobbs, J.E. (2001), “Against All Odds - Explaining the Exporting Success of the Danish Pork Co-
operatives.” 
Hoppe, R.A. and Banker, D.E. (2010), “Structure and Finances of U.S. Farms Family Farm Report, 
2010 Edition.” 
Hubbard, R.G. and Kashyap, A.K. (1992), “Internal Net Worth and the Investment Process: An 
application to U.S. Agriculture,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100 No. 3, pp. 506–
534. 
Hueth, B. and Marcoul, P. (2009), “Incentive Pay for CEOs in Cooperative Firms,” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 91 No. 5, pp. 1218–1223.  
Huirne, R.B.M., Hardaker, J.B. and Dijkhuizen, A.A. (1997), Risk Management Strategies in 
Agriculture – State of the Art and Future Perspectives, Wageningen, Mansholt S. 
Hull, J.C. (2002), Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 
Pearson Education Inc, Fourth (In. 
Hurwicz, L. (1987), “Inventing New Institutions: The Design Perspective,” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 69 No. 2, pp. 395–402. 
Jakobsen, M. (2011), “Da priserne på landbrug mistede jordforbindelsen,” Finans/Invest, Vol. 3, pp. 
16–21. 
James Jr., H.S., Klein, P.G. and Sykuta, M.E. (2011), “The Adoption, Diffusion, and Evolution of 
Organizational Form: Insights from the Agrifood Sector,” Managerial and Decision 
Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 243–259.  
Jensen, M.C. (1986), “Agency Cost Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,” SSRN 
Electronic Journal, Vol. 76 No. 2, pp. 323–329.  
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managegial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305–360. 
Jeppesen, P. and Jørgensen, C.J. (2012), “Høje mælkepriser er ikke nok: Mælkeproducenter under 
pres,” LandbrugsAvisen, Økonomi, p. 1. 
Just, R.E. (2003), “Risk research in agricultural economics: opportunities and challenges for the 
next twenty-five years,” Agricultural Systems, Vol. 75 No. 2-3, pp. 123–159.  
Kahnemann, D. and Tversky, A. (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 
Econometrica1, Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 263–292. 
  
162 
 
Kaplan, S.N. and Zingales, L. (1997), “Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful 
Measures of Financing Constraints ?,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112 No. 1, 
pp. 169–215. 
Kaplan, S.N. and Zingales, L. (2000), “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are not Valid Measures 
of Financing Constraints,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115 No. 2, pp. 707–712. 
Keane, M.J. (2012), “Personal communication,” Dublin. 
Key, N. and McBride, W.D. (2003), “Production Contracts and Productivity in the U.U. Hog 
Sector,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 85 No. 1, pp. 121–133. 
Key, N. and McBride, W.D. (2007), “The Changing Economics of U.S. Hog Production.” 
Keynes, J.M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New York, Classic 
Books America. 
Klein, B., Crawford, R.G. and Alchian, A.A. (1978), “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and 
the Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 297–
326. 
Klein, J.D., Schmidt, S. and Yaisawarng, S. (1992), “Productivity changes in the U.S. electric 
power industry,” Studies in Industrial Organization, Vol. 16, pp. 207–235. 
Klein, P.G. (2000), “NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS,” in Bouckaert, B. and De Geest,G. 
(Eds.),Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, pp. 456–489. 
Klibanoff, P., Marinacci, M. and Mukerji, S. (2005), “A Smooth Model of Decision Making under 
Ambiguity,” Econometrica, Vol. 73 No. 6, pp. 1849–1892. 
Knight, F.H. (1921), Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Boston, New York, Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Kobe, K. (2007), “The Small Business Share of GDP, 1998-2004,” Small Business Research 
Summary, Vol. April No. 299. 
Kreanzle, C.A. and Eversull, E.E. (2003), “Co-ops increase share of farm marketings; share of farm 
supply sales dips slightly,” USDA / Rural Development, No. June, pp. 19–21. 
Krogshede, M.B. (2011a,December16), “- Hvad hjælper et strærkt slagteri uden 
svineproducenter?,” Maskinbladet, pp. 4–5. 
Krogshede, M.B. (2011b,December16), “Bredholt: Der er ikke kapital nok i værdikæden,” 
Maskinbladet, p. 5. 
Kumar, K.B., Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (1999), “What Determines Firm Size?,” NBER Working 
Paper, Cambrige. 
  
163 
 
Lawrence, J.D. and Grimes, G. (2001), “Production and Marketing Characteristics of U.S. Pork 
Producers, 2000.” 
Lien, G. and Hardaker, J.B. (2001), “Whole-farm planning under uncertainty : impacts of subsidy 
scheme and utility function on portfolio choice in Norwegian agriculture,” European Review of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 17–36. 
Luce, R.D. and Narens, L. (1985), “Classification of concatenation measurement structures 
according to scale type,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 1–72.  
MacDonald, J.M. and Banker, D.E. (2004), “Agriculture Use of Production and Marketing 
Contracts,” in Banker, D.E. and MacDonald, J.M. (Eds.), Structural and Financial 
Characteristics of U.S. Farms 2004 Family Farm Report, Washington, D.C., Economic 
Research Service / USDA, pp. 51–62. 
MacDonald, J.M. and Korb, P. (2011), Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts in 2008. 
MacDonald, J.M. and McBride, W.D. (2009), “The Transformation of U.S. Livestock Agriculture 
Scale, Efficiency, and Risks.” 
MacDonald, J.M., Perry, J., Ahearn, M.C., Banker, D., Chambers, W., Dimitri, C., Key, N., et al. 
(2004), “Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production and Use of Agricultural 
Commodities,” SSRN Electronic Journal.  
Markowitz, H. (1952), “Portfolio Selection,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 77–91. 
Martinez, S.W. (1999), “Vertical Coordination in the Pork and Broiler Industries: Implications for 
Pork and Chicken Products.” 
Martinez, S.W. (2002), “A Comparison of Vertical Coordination in the U.S. Poultry, Egg, and Pork 
Industries,” Agricultural Information Bulletin. 
Martinez, S.W. and Zering, K. (2004), “Pork Quality and the Role of Market Organization.” 
Masten, S.E. (2000), “Transaction-cost economics and the organization of agricultural 
trancactions,” in Baye, M.R. (Ed.), Industrial Organization (Advances in Applied 
Microeconomics, Volume 9), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 173–195. 
Menapace, L., Colson, G. and Raffaelli, R. (2012), “Risk Aversion, Subjective Beliefs, and Farmer 
Risk Management Strategies,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, No. advance 
online access, pp. 1–6.  
Ménard, C. (2004), “The Economics of Hybrid Organizations,” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, Vol. 160 No. 3, pp. 345–376. 
  
164 
 
Ménard, C. and Klein, P.G. (2004), “Organizational Issues in the Agrifood Sector: Toward a 
Comparative Approach,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86 No. 3, pp. 
750–755. 
Ménard, C. and Valceschini, E. (2005), “New institutions for governing the agri-food industry,” 
European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 32 No. 3, pp. 421–440.  
Meuwissen, M.P.M., van Asseldonk, M.A.P.M. and Huirne, R.B.M. (2008), “Inceme stabilisation 
in agriculture; reflections on an EU-project,” in Meuwissen, M.P.M.,van Asseldonk, M. A. P. 
M. and Huirne, R.B.M. (Eds.), Income stabilisation in European agriculture Design and 
economic impact of risk management tools, Wageningen Academic Publishers, 1st ed., pp. 17–
32. 
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1990), “Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of 
economic activity,” in Alt,J.E. and Shepsle,K.A. (Eds.),Perspectives on Positive Political 
Economy, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 57–89. 
Mill, J.S. (1882), A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, New York, Harper & Brothers, 
Publishers Franklin Square, Eighth. 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.H. (1958), “The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory of 
Invenstment,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 261–297. 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.H. (1963), “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital : A 
Correction,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 53 No. 3, pp. 433–443. 
Moschini, G. and Hennessy, D.A. (2001), “Uncertainty, risk aversion, and risk management for 
agricultural producers,” in Gardner, B. and Rausser,G. (Eds.), Handbook of Agricultural 
Economics, Volume 1, Elsevier Science B.V., Vol. 1, pp. 87–153. 
National Agricultural Statistics Service. (1991), “Hogs and Pigs,” Washington, D.C., United States 
Department of Agriculture. 
National Agricultural Statistics Service. (2012), “Farms, Land in Farms, and Livestock Operations 
2011 Summary,” Washington, D.C., United States Department of Agriculture. 
Nau, R.F. (2006), “Uncertainty Aversion with Second-Order Utilities and Probabilities,” 
Management Science, Vol. 52 No. 1, pp. 136–145. 
Nau, R.F. (2007), “Extensions of the Subjective Expected Utility Model,” in Edwards,W., Miles, 
R.F. and von Winterfeldt, D. (Eds.), Advances in Decision Analysis: From Foundations to 
Applications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1st ed., pp. 253 – 278. 
Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1947), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton 
University Press, 2nd ed. 
  
165 
 
North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge; 
New York, Cambridge University Press. 
North, D.C. (1991), “Institutions,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 97–
112. 
North, D.C. (2005), Understanding the process of economic change, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
O’Donoghue, E.J., Roberts, M.J. and Key, N. (2009), “Did the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act 
Alter Farm Enterprise Diversification?,” Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 60 No. 1, pp. 
80–104.  
OECD. (2009), Managing Risk In Agriculture - A Holistic Approach. 
OECD. (2011), Managing Risk in Agriculture - Policy Assessment and Design. 
Olesen, H.B. (2007), “The Horizon Problem Reconsidered,” inKarantininis,K. and Nilsson,J. 
(Eds.),Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies - The Role of Cooperatives in the Agri-
Food Industry, Springer, pp. 245–253. 
Painter, M.J. (2000), “Should Saskatchewan Farmland be Part of Your Investment Portfolio?,” 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d&apos;agroeconomie, Vol. 
48 No. 1, pp. 39–50.  
Painter, M.J. (2011), “Is Farmland As Good As Gold?,” Economics Research International, Vol. 
2011, pp. 1–8.  
Pedersen, A.K. (2010), “Arla er tilbage hos den mellemøstlige købmand,” Kristeligt Dagblad. 
Retrieved from http://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/artikel/358108:Udland--Arla-er-tilbage-hos-
den-mellemoestlige-koebmand?all=1 
Pedersen, K. and Strandskov, J. (2011), “Fusioner som konkurrancestrategi,” Erhvervshistorisk 
årbog, Vol. 60, pp. 83–104. 
Pedersen, M.F. and Olsen, J.V. (n.d.). “Measuring Credit Capacity on Danish Farms using DEA,” 
Agricultural Finance Review. 
Pennings, J.M.E. and Garcia, P. (2004), “Hedging behavior in small and medium-sized enterprises: 
The role of unobserved heterogeneity,” Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 28 No. 5, pp. 
951–978.  
Pennings, J.M.E. and Leuthold, R.M. (2000), “The Role of Farmers’ Behavioral Attitudes and 
Heterogeneity in Futures Contracts Usage,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 
82 No. 4, pp. 908–919. 
  
166 
 
Pennings, J.M.E. and Wansink, B. (2004), “Channel Contract Behavior: The Role of Risk Attitudes, 
Risk Perceptions, And Channel Members’ Market Structures,” Journal of Business, Vol. 77 
No. 4, pp. 697–723. 
Petrick, M. (2005), “Empirical measurement of credit rationing in agriculture: a methodological 
survey,” Agricultural Economics, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 191–203. 
Plain, R.L. (2011), “U.S. Market Hog Sales, 2002-2010.” 
La Porta, R., Lopes-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997), “Legal determinants of 
external finance,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 52 No. 3, pp. 1113–1155. 
Quiggin, J. (1982), “A Theory of Anticipated Utility,” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 323–343. 
Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (1998), “Financial Dependence and Growth,” The American economic 
review, Vol. 88 No. 3, pp. 559–586.  
Reynolds, M.P., Bhabra, G.S. and Boyle, G.W. (2009), “Cash Flow , Investment and Derivative 
Use: An Empirical Analysis of New Zealand Listed Companies,” International Research 
Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 32 No. 32. 
Rogers, P.P., Jalal, K.F. and Boyd, J.A. (2008), An Introduction to Sustainable Development, 
London, Earthscan. 
Royer, J.S. (1999), “Cooperative Organizational Strategies: A Neo-Institutional Digest,” Journal of 
Cooperatives, Vol. 14, pp. 44–67. 
Ryan, R. (2010), “Single farm payment ‘needs to be maintained at current levels’,” Irish Examiner. 
De samvirkende danske Andelsslagterier. (1972), De samvirkende danske Andelsslagterier 1897-
1972, København, De samvirkende danske Andelsslagterier. 
Savage, L.J. (1954), The Foundations of Statistics, New York, Wiley. 
Schmeidler, D. (1989), “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity,” 
Econometrica, Vol. 57 No. 3, pp. 571–587. 
Sexton, R.J. (1990), “Imperfect Competition in Agricultural Markets and the Role of Cooperatives: 
A Spatial Analysis,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 72 No. 3, pp. 709–
720. 
Sharpe, W.F. (1964), “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of 
Risk,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 425–442. 
  
167 
 
Shelanski, H.A. and Klein, P.G. (1995), “Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A 
Review and Assessment,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 
335–361. 
Simar, L. and Wilson, P.W. (1999), “Estimating and bootstrapping Malmquist indices,” European 
Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 115 No. 3, pp. 459–471.  
Simar, L. and Wilson, P.W. (2000), “A general methodology for bootstrapping in non-parametric 
frontier models,” Journal of Applied Statistics, Vol. 27 No. 6, pp. 779–802.  
Simar, L. and Wilson, P.W. (2011), “Two-stage DEA: caveat emptor,” Journal of Productivity 
Analysis, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 205–218.  
Smith, V.L. (1994), “Economics in the Laboratory,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8 
No. 1, pp. 113–131. 
Statens Jordbrugs- og Fiskeriøkonomiske Institut. (n.d.). Agricultural Price Statistics, Copenhagen, 
Statens Jordbrugs- og Fiskeriøkonomiske Institut, 79th –85th ed. 
Statistics Denmark. (2010), “Statistics Denmark.” Retrieved from statbank.dk 
Stiglitz, J.E. and Weiss, A. (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 71 No. 3, pp. 393–410. 
Staatz, J.M. (1987), “Farmer’s Incentive to take collective action via cooperatives: A transaction 
cost approach,” inRoyer,J.S. (Ed.),Cooperative theory: New approaches, Washington, D.C., 
United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Cooperative Service, ACS Servic., pp. 
87–107. 
Svendsen, G.L.H. and Svendsen, G.T. (2004), The Creation and Destruction of Social Capital: 
Entrepreneurship, Co-operative Movements and Institutions, Cheltenham, UK - Northampton, 
MA, USA, Edward Elgar. 
Sykuta, M.E. and Cook, M.L. (2001), “A New Institutional Economics Approach to Contracts and 
Cooperatives.” 
Sykuta, M.E. and Chaddad, F.R. (1999), “Putting Theories of the Firm in Their Place: A 
Supplemental Digest of the New Institutional Economics,” Journal of Comparatives, Vol. 14, 
pp. 68–76. 
The Institute of Risk Management. (2002), A Risk Management Standard, London. Retrievedfrom 
www.theirm.org 
Tobin, J. (1958), “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk,” The Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 65–86. 
  
168 
 
Turvey, C.G. (1989), “The Relationship between Hedging with Futures and the Financing Function 
of Farm Management,” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne 
d’agroeconomie, Vol. 37 No. 4, pp. 629–638.  
Turvey, C.G. and Baker, T.G. (1989), “Optimal Hedging under Alternative Capital Structures and 
Risk Aversion,” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne 
D’agroéconomie, Vol. 37 No. 1988, pp. 135–143. 
Turvey, C.G. and Baker, T.G. (1990), “A Farm-Level Financial Analysis of Farmers’ Use of 
Futures and Options Under Alternative Farm Programs,” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 72 No. 4, pp. 946–957. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1992), “Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of 
uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 297–323.  
United Nations. (2005), Housing Finance Systems for Countries in Transition Principles and 
Examples, Geneva. 
Wakker, P., Erev, I. and Weber, E.U. (1994), “Comonotonic Independence: The Critical Test 
between Classical and Rank-Dependent Utility Theories,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 195–230.  
Wheelock, D.C. and Wilson, P.W. (1999), “Technical Progress, Inefficiency, and Productivity 
Change in U . S . Banking, 1984-1993,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 31 No. 2, 
pp. 212–234. 
Williamson, O.E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York, 
Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1988), “Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance,” The Journal of 
fianceance, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 567–591. 
Williamson, O.E. (1991), “Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization,” Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 12 No. Fundamental Research Issues in Strategy and Economics, 
pp. 75–94. 
Williamson, O.E. (1991), “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 269–296. 
Williamson, O.E. (2000), “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVIII No. September, pp. 595–613. 
Wilson, P.W. (2008), “FEAR: A software package for frontier efficiency analysis with R,” Socio-
Economic Planning Sciences, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 247–254. 
  
169 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England, The MIT Press. 
Woolverton, A.E. and Sykuta, M.E. (2009), “Do Income Support Programs Impact Producer 
Hedging Decisions? Evidence from a Cross-country Comparative.” 
Working, H. (1953), “Futures Trading and Hedging,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 43 No. 
3, pp. 314–343.  
World Economic Forum. (2011), The Financial Development Report 2011. 
Yaari, M.E. (1987), “The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk,” Econometrica, Vol. 55 No. 1, pp. 
95–115. 
Zhao, J., Barry, P.J. and Katchova, A.L. (2008), “Signaling Credit Risk in Agriculture: Implications 
for Capital Structure Analysis,” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Vol. 40 No. 
3, pp. 805–820. 
Zheng, X., Vukina, T. and Shin, C. (2008), “The Role of Farmers ’ Risk aversion for Contract 
Choice in the US Hog Industry,” Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, Vol. 
6. 
 
 
 
 
TITLER I PH.D.SERIEN:
2004
1. Martin Grieger
 Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces
 and Supply Chain Management
2. Thomas Basbøll
 LIKENESS
 A Philosophical Investigation
3. Morten Knudsen
 Beslutningens vaklen
 En systemteoretisk analyse of mo-
derniseringen af et amtskommunalt 
sundhedsvæsen 1980-2000
4. Lars Bo Jeppesen
 Organizing Consumer Innovation
 A product development strategy that 
is based on online communities and 
allows some ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a 
distributed process of innovation by 
consumers
5. Barbara Dragsted
 SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION 
AND TRANSLATION MEMORY 
 SYSTEMS
 An empirical investigation of cognitive
 segmentation and effects of integra-
ting a TM system into the translation 
process
6. Jeanet Hardis
 Sociale partnerskaber
 Et socialkonstruktivistisk casestudie 
 af partnerskabsaktørers virkeligheds-
opfattelse mellem identitet og 
 legitimitet
7. Henriette Hallberg Thygesen
 System Dynamics in Action
8. Carsten Mejer Plath
 Strategisk Økonomistyring
9. Annemette Kjærgaard
 Knowledge Management as Internal 
 Corporate Venturing
 – a Field Study of the Rise and Fall of a
  Bottom-Up Process
10. Knut Arne Hovdal
 De profesjonelle i endring
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
11. Søren Jeppesen
 Environmental Practices and Greening 
 Strategies in Small Manufacturing 
 Enterprises in South Africa
 – A Critical Realist Approach
12. Lars Frode Frederiksen
 Industriel forskningsledelse
 – på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde 
i danske forskningsintensive virksom-
heder
13. Martin Jes Iversen
 The Governance of GN Great Nordic
 – in an age of strategic and structural
  transitions 1939-1988
14. Lars Pynt Andersen
 The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV 
 Advertising 
 A study of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years with 
 special emphasis on genre and irony
15. Jakob Rasmussen
 Business Perspectives on E-learning
16. Sof Thrane
 The Social and Economic Dynamics 
 of Networks 
 – a Weberian Analysis of Three 
 Formalised Horizontal Networks
17. Lene Nielsen
 Engaging Personas and Narrative 
 Scenarios – a study on how a user-
 centered approach inﬂuenced the 
 perception of the design process in 
the e-business group at AstraZeneca
18. S.J Valstad
 Organisationsidentitet
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen
 Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk 
in Energy Markets
20.  Sabine Madsen
 Emerging Methods – An Interpretive
  Study of ISD Methods in Practice
21. Evis Sinani
 The Impact of Foreign Direct Inve-
stment on Efﬁciency, Productivity 
Growth and Trade: An Empirical Inve-
stigation
22. Bent Meier Sørensen
 Making Events Work Or, 
 How to Multiply Your Crisis
23. Pernille Schnoor
 Brand Ethos
 Om troværdige brand- og 
 virksomhedsidentiteter i et retorisk og 
diskursteoretisk perspektiv 
24. Sidsel Fabech
 Von welchem Österreich ist hier die 
Rede?
 Diskursive forhandlinger og magt-
kampe mellem rivaliserende nationale 
identitetskonstruktioner i østrigske 
pressediskurser 
25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen
 Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i
  ﬂersprogede forbundsstater
 Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og 
 Canada
26. Dana B. Minbaeva
 Human Resource Practices and 
 Knowledge Transfer in Multinational 
 Corporations
27. Holger Højlund
 Markedets politiske fornuft
 Et studie af velfærdens organisering i 
 perioden 1990-2003
28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen
 A.s erfaring
 Om mellemværendets praktik i en 
transformation af mennesket og 
 subjektiviteten
29. Sine Nørholm Just
 The Constitution of Meaning
 – A Meaningful Constitution? 
 Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion 
in the debate on the future of Europe
2005
1. Claus J. Varnes
 Managing product innovation through 
 rules – The role of formal and structu-
red methods in product development
2. Helle Hedegaard Hein
 Mellem konﬂikt og konsensus
 – Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker
3. Axel Rosenø
 Customer Value Driven Product Inno-
vation – A Study of Market Learning in 
New Product Development
4. Søren Buhl Pedersen
 Making space
 An outline of place branding
5. Camilla Funck Ellehave
 Differences that Matter
 An analysis of practices of gender and 
 organizing in contemporary work-
places
6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond
 Styring af kommunale forvaltninger
7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen
 Supply Chain versus Supply Chain
 Benchmarking as a Means to 
 Managing Supply Chains
8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan
 From an idea to a standard
 The UN and the global governance of 
 accountants’ competence
9. Norsk ph.d. 
10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni
 An Experimental Field Study on the 
 Effectiveness of Grocer Media 
 Advertising 
 Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition, 
 Purchase Intentions and Short-Term 
Sales
11. Allan Mortensen
 Essays on the Pricing of Corporate 
Bonds and Credit Derivatives
12. Remo Stefano Chiari
 Figure che fanno conoscere
 Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo 
e espressivo della metafora e di altri 
tropi da Aristotele e da Vico ﬁno al 
cognitivismo contemporaneo
13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
 Strategic Planning and Corporate 
 Performance
 An integrative research review and a 
 meta-analysis of the strategic planning 
 and corporate performance literature 
 from 1956 to 2003
14. Jens Geersbro
 The TDF – PMI Case
 Making Sense of the Dynamics of 
 Business Relationships and Networks
15 Mette Andersen
 Corporate Social Responsibility in 
 Global Supply Chains
 Understanding the uniqueness of ﬁrm 
 behaviour
16.  Eva Boxenbaum
 Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic
 Foundations of Institutional Change
17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
 Capacity Development, Environmental 
 Justice NGOs, and Governance: The 
Case of South Africa
18. Signe Jarlov
 Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse
19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
 Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening 
 Comprehension in English as a Foreign 
 Language
 An empirical study employing data 
 elicited from Danish EFL learners
20. Christian Nielsen
 Essays on Business Reporting
 Production and consumption of  
strategic information in the market for 
information
21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
 Egos and Ethics of Management 
 Consultants
22. Annie Bekke Kjær
 Performance management i Proces-
 innovation 
 – belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk
 perspektiv
23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
 GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
 Om organisering af den kreative gøren 
i den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis
24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
 Revenue Management
 Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige & 
 organisatoriske konsekvenser
25. Thomas Riise Johansen
 Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
 The Danish Case of Accounting and 
 Accountability to Employees
26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
 The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’ 
 Adoption Decisions
27. Birgitte Rasmussen
 Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes 
 fornyende rolle
28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
 Remerger
 – skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og 
 opkøb
29. Carmine Gioia
 A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF 
 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
 Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot, 
 pædagog eller politiker?
 Et studie i arbejdslederes meningstil-
skrivninger i forbindelse med vellykket 
gennemførelse af ledelsesinitierede 
forandringsprojekter
31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
 Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynami-
ske 
 læringsnettverk i toppidretten
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
 Linking Healthcare
 An inquiry into the changing perfor-
 mances of web-based technology for 
 asthma monitoring
33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
 Virtuel Uddannelsespraksis
 Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie 
i hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering 
kan forbedre praksis i virtuelle lærings-
miljøer
34. Anika Liversage
 Finding a Path
 Labour Market Life Stories of 
 Immigrant Professionals
35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
 Studier i samspillet mellem stat og   
 erhvervsliv i Danmark under 
 1. verdenskrig
36. Finn Janning
 A DIFFERENT STORY
 Seduction, Conquest and Discovery
37. Patricia Ann Plackett
 Strategic Management of the Radical 
 Innovation Process
 Leveraging Social Capital for Market 
 Uncertainty Management
2006
1. Christian Vintergaard
 Early Phases of Corporate Venturing
2. Niels Rom-Poulsen
 Essays in Computational Finance
3. Tina Brandt Husman
 Organisational Capabilities, 
 Competitive Advantage & Project-
Based Organisations
 The Case of Advertising and Creative 
 Good Production
4. Mette Rosenkrands Johansen
 Practice at the top
 – how top managers mobilise and use
 non-ﬁnancial performance measures
5. Eva Parum
 Corporate governance som strategisk
 kommunikations- og ledelsesværktøj
6. Susan Aagaard Petersen
 Culture’s Inﬂuence on Performance 
 Management: The Case of a Danish 
 Company in China
7. Thomas Nicolai Pedersen
 The Discursive Constitution of Organi-
zational Governance – Between unity 
and differentiation
 The Case of the governance of 
 environmental risks by World Bank 
environmental staff
8. Cynthia Selin
 Volatile Visions: Transactons in 
 Anticipatory Knowledge
9. Jesper Banghøj
 Financial Accounting Information and  
 Compensation in Danish Companies
10. Mikkel Lucas Overby
 Strategic Alliances in Emerging High-
Tech Markets: What’s the Difference 
and does it Matter?
11. Tine Aage
 External Information Acquisition of 
 Industrial Districts and the Impact of 
 Different Knowledge Creation Dimen-
sions
 
 A case study of the Fashion and  
Design Branch of the Industrial District 
of Montebelluna, NE Italy
12. Mikkel Flyverbom
 Making the Global Information Society 
 Governable
 On the Governmentality of Multi- 
Stakeholder Networks
13. Anette Grønning
 Personen bag
 Tilstedevær i e-mail som inter-
aktionsform mellem kunde og med-
arbejder i dansk forsikringskontekst
14. Jørn Helder
 One Company – One Language?
 The NN-case
15. Lars Bjerregaard Mikkelsen
 Differing perceptions of customer 
value
 Development and application of a tool 
for mapping perceptions of customer 
value at both ends of customer-suppli-
er dyads in industrial markets
16. Lise Granerud
 Exploring Learning
 Technological learning within small 
 manufacturers in South Africa
17. Esben Rahbek Pedersen
 Between Hopes and Realities: 
 Reﬂections on the Promises and 
 Practices of Corporate Social 
 Responsibility (CSR)
18. Ramona Samson
 The Cultural Integration Model and 
 European Transformation.
 The Case of Romania
2007
1. Jakob Vestergaard
 Discipline in The Global Economy
 Panopticism and the Post-Washington 
 Consensus
2. Heidi Lund Hansen
 Spaces for learning and working
 A qualitative study of change of work, 
 management, vehicles of power and 
 social practices in open ofﬁces
3. Sudhanshu Rai
 Exploring the internal dynamics of 
software development teams during 
user analysis
 A tension enabled Institutionalization 
 Model; ”Where process becomes the 
 objective”
4. Norsk ph.d. 
 Ej til salg gennem Samfundslitteratur
5. Serden Ozcan
 EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN 
 ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND 
 OUTCOMES
 A Behavioural Perspective
6. Kim Sundtoft Hald
 Inter-organizational Performance 
 Measurement and Management in 
Action
 – An Ethnography on the Construction 
of Management, Identity and 
 Relationships
7. Tobias Lindeberg
 Evaluative Technologies
 Quality and the Multiplicity of 
 Performance
8. Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg
 Den globale soldat
 Identitetsdannelse og identitetsledelse 
i multinationale militære organisatio-
ner
9. Lars Frederiksen
 Open Innovation Business Models
 Innovation in ﬁrm-hosted online user 
 communities and inter-ﬁrm project 
 ventures in the music industry 
 – A collection of essays
10. Jonas Gabrielsen
 Retorisk toposlære – fra statisk ’sted’ 
til persuasiv aktivitet
11. Christian Moldt-Jørgensen
 Fra meningsløs til meningsfuld  
evaluering.
 Anvendelsen af studentertilfredsheds-
 målinger på de korte og mellemlange  
 videregående uddannelser set fra et 
 psykodynamisk systemperspektiv
12. Ping Gao
 Extending the application of 
 actor-network theory
 Cases of innovation in the tele-
 communications industry
13. Peter Mejlby
 Frihed og fængsel, en del af den 
samme drøm? 
 Et phronetisk baseret casestudie af 
 frigørelsens og kontrollens sam-
eksistens i værdibaseret ledelse! 
 
14. Kristina Birch
 Statistical Modelling in Marketing
15. Signe Poulsen
 Sense and sensibility: 
 The language of emotional appeals in 
insurance marketing
16. Anders Bjerre Trolle
 Essays on derivatives pricing and dyna-
mic asset allocation
17. Peter Feldhütter
 Empirical Studies of Bond and Credit 
Markets
18. Jens Henrik Eggert Christensen
 Default and Recovery Risk Modeling 
and Estimation
19. Maria Theresa Larsen
 Academic Enterprise: A New Mission 
for Universities or a Contradiction in 
Terms?
 Four papers on the long-term impli-
cations of increasing industry involve-
ment and commercialization in acade-
mia
20.  Morten Wellendorf
 Postimplementering af teknologi i den  
 offentlige forvaltning
 Analyser af en organisations konti-
nuerlige arbejde med informations-
teknologi
21.  Ekaterina Mhaanna
 Concept Relations for Terminological 
Process Analysis
22.  Stefan Ring Thorbjørnsen
 Forsvaret i forandring
 Et studie i ofﬁcerers kapabiliteter un-
der påvirkning af omverdenens foran-
dringspres mod øget styring og læring
23.  Christa Breum Amhøj
 Det selvskabte medlemskab om ma-
nagementstaten, dens styringstekno-
logier og indbyggere
24.  Karoline Bromose
 Between Technological Turbulence and 
Operational Stability
 – An empirical case study of corporate 
venturing in TDC
25.  Susanne Justesen
 Navigating the Paradoxes of Diversity 
in Innovation Practice
 – A Longitudinal study of six very 
 different innovation processes – in 
practice
26.  Luise Noring Henler
 Conceptualising successful supply 
chain partnerships
 – Viewing supply chain partnerships 
from an organisational culture per-
spective
27.  Mark Mau
 Kampen om telefonen
 Det danske telefonvæsen under den 
tyske besættelse 1940-45
28.  Jakob Halskov
 The semiautomatic expansion of 
existing terminological ontologies 
using knowledge patterns discovered 
on the WWW – an implementation 
and evaluation
29.  Gergana Koleva
 European Policy Instruments Beyond 
Networks and Structure: The Innova-
tive Medicines Initiative
30.  Christian Geisler Asmussen
 Global Strategy and International 
 Diversity: A Double-Edged Sword?
31.  Christina Holm-Petersen
 Stolthed og fordom
 Kultur- og identitetsarbejde ved ska-
belsen af en ny sengeafdeling gennem 
fusion
32.  Hans Peter Olsen
 Hybrid Governance of Standardized 
States
 Causes and Contours of the Global 
Regulation of Government Auditing
33.  Lars Bøge Sørensen
 Risk Management in the Supply Chain
34.  Peter Aagaard
 Det unikkes dynamikker
 De institutionelle mulighedsbetingel-
ser bag den individuelle udforskning i 
professionelt og frivilligt arbejde
35.  Yun Mi Antorini
 Brand Community Innovation
 An Intrinsic Case Study of the Adult 
Fans of LEGO Community
36.  Joachim Lynggaard Boll
 Labor Related Corporate Social Perfor-
mance in Denmark
 Organizational and Institutional Per-
spectives
2008
1. Frederik Christian Vinten
 Essays on Private Equity
2.  Jesper Clement
 Visual Inﬂuence of Packaging Design 
on In-Store Buying Decisions
3.  Marius Brostrøm Kousgaard
 Tid til kvalitetsmåling?
 – Studier af indrulleringsprocesser i 
forbindelse med introduktionen af 
kliniske kvalitetsdatabaser i speciallæ-
gepraksissektoren
4. Irene Skovgaard Smith
 Management Consulting in Action
 Value creation and ambiguity in 
 client-consultant relations
5.  Anders Rom
 Management accounting and inte-
grated information systems
 How to exploit the potential for ma-
nagement accounting of information 
technology
6.  Marina Candi
 Aesthetic Design as an Element of 
 Service Innovation in New Technology-
based Firms
7.  Morten Schnack
 Teknologi og tværfaglighed
 – en analyse af diskussionen omkring 
 indførelse af EPJ på en hospitalsafde-
ling
8. Helene Balslev Clausen
 Juntos pero no revueltos – un estudio 
sobre emigrantes norteamericanos en 
un pueblo mexicano
9. Lise Justesen
 Kunsten at skrive revisionsrapporter.
 En beretning om forvaltningsrevisio-
nens beretninger
10. Michael E. Hansen
 The politics of corporate responsibility:
 CSR and the governance of child labor 
and core labor rights in the 1990s
11. Anne Roepstorff
 Holdning for handling – en etnologisk 
undersøgelse af Virksomheders Sociale 
Ansvar/CSR
12. Claus Bajlum
 Essays on Credit Risk and 
 Credit Derivatives
13. Anders Bojesen
 The Performative Power of Competen-
ce  – an Inquiry into Subjectivity and 
Social Technologies at Work
14. Satu Reijonen
 Green and Fragile
 A Study on Markets and the Natural  
Environment
15. Ilduara Busta
 Corporate Governance in Banking
 A European Study
16. Kristian Anders Hvass
 A Boolean Analysis Predicting Industry 
Change: Innovation, Imitation & Busi-
ness Models
 The Winning Hybrid: A case study of 
isomorphism in the airline industry
17. Trine Paludan
 De uvidende og de udviklingsparate
 Identitet som mulighed og restriktion 
blandt fabriksarbejdere på det aftaylo-
riserede fabriksgulv
18. Kristian Jakobsen
 Foreign market entry in transition eco-
nomies: Entry timing and mode choice
19. Jakob Elming
 Syntactic reordering in statistical ma-
chine translation
20. Lars Brømsøe Termansen
 Regional Computable General Equili-
brium Models for Denmark
 Three papers laying the foundation for 
regional CGE models with agglomera-
tion characteristics
 
21. Mia Reinholt
 The Motivational Foundations of 
Knowledge Sharing
22.  Frederikke Krogh-Meibom
 The Co-Evolution of Institutions and 
Technology
 – A Neo-Institutional Understanding of 
Change Processes within the Business 
Press – the Case Study of Financial 
Times
23. Peter D. Ørberg Jensen
 OFFSHORING OF ADVANCED AND 
HIGH-VALUE TECHNICAL SERVICES: 
ANTECEDENTS, PROCESS DYNAMICS 
AND FIRMLEVEL IMPACTS
24. Pham Thi Song Hanh
 Functional Upgrading, Relational 
 Capability and Export Performance of 
Vietnamese Wood Furniture Producers
25. Mads Vangkilde
 Why wait?
 An Exploration of ﬁrst-mover advanta-
ges among Danish e-grocers through a 
resource perspective
26.  Hubert Buch-Hansen
 Rethinking the History of European 
Level Merger Control
 A Critical Political Economy Perspective
2009
1. Vivian Lindhardsen
 From Independent Ratings to Commu-
nal Ratings: A Study of CWA Raters’ 
Decision-Making Behaviours
2. Guðrið Weihe
 Public-Private Partnerships: Meaning 
and Practice
3. Chris Nøkkentved
 Enabling Supply Networks with Colla-
borative Information Infrastructures
 An Empirical Investigation of Business 
Model Innovation in Supplier Relation-
ship Management
4.  Sara Louise Muhr
 Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulner-
ability of Diversity Management
5. Christine Sestoft
 Forbrugeradfærd i et Stats- og Livs-
formsteoretisk perspektiv
6. Michael Pedersen
 Tune in, Breakdown, and Reboot: On 
the production of the stress-ﬁt self-
managing employee
7.  Salla Lutz
 Position and Reposition in Networks 
 – Exempliﬁed by the Transformation of 
the Danish Pine Furniture Manu-
 facturers
8. Jens Forssbæck
 Essays on market discipline in 
 commercial and central banking
9. Tine Murphy
 Sense from Silence – A Basis for Orga-
nised Action 
 How do Sensemaking Processes with 
Minimal Sharing Relate to the Repro-
duction of Organised Action?
10. Sara Malou Strandvad
 Inspirations for a new sociology of art: 
A sociomaterial study of development 
processes in the Danish ﬁlm industry
11. Nicolaas Mouton
 On the evolution of social scientiﬁc 
metaphors: 
 A cognitive-historical enquiry into the 
divergent trajectories of the idea that 
collective entities – states and societies, 
cities and corporations – are biological 
organisms.
12. Lars Andreas Knutsen
 Mobile Data Services:
 Shaping of user engagements
13. Nikolaos Theodoros Korﬁatis
 Information Exchange and Behavior
 A Multi-method Inquiry on Online 
Communities
14.  Jens Albæk
 Forestillinger om kvalitet og tværfaglig-
hed på sygehuse
 – skabelse af forestillinger i læge- og 
plejegrupperne angående relevans af 
nye idéer om kvalitetsudvikling gen-
nem tolkningsprocesser
15.  Maja Lotz
 The Business of Co-Creation – and the 
Co-Creation of Business
16. Gitte P. Jakobsen
 Narrative Construction of Leader Iden-
tity in a Leader Development Program 
Context
17. Dorte Hermansen
 ”Living the brand” som en brandorien-
teret dialogisk praxis:
 Om udvikling af medarbejdernes 
brandorienterede dømmekraft
18. Aseem Kinra
 Supply Chain (logistics) Environmental 
Complexity
19. Michael Nørager
 How to manage SMEs through the 
transformation from non innovative to 
innovative? 
20.  Kristin Wallevik
 Corporate Governance in Family Firms
 The Norwegian Maritime Sector
21. Bo Hansen Hansen
 Beyond the Process
 Enriching Software Process Improve-
ment with Knowledge Management
22. Annemette Skot-Hansen
 Franske adjektivisk aﬂedte adverbier, 
der tager præpositionssyntagmer ind-
ledt med præpositionen à som argu-
menter
 En valensgrammatisk undersøgelse
23. Line Gry Knudsen
 Collaborative R&D Capabilities
 In Search of Micro-Foundations
24. Christian Scheuer
 Employers meet employees
 Essays on sorting and globalization
25. Rasmus Johnsen
 The Great Health of Melancholy
 A Study of the Pathologies of Perfor-
mativity
26. Ha Thi Van Pham
 Internationalization, Competitiveness 
Enhancement and Export Performance 
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 Evidence from Vietnam
27. Henriette Balieu
 Kontrolbegrebets betydning for kausa-
tivalternationen i spansk
 En kognitiv-typologisk analyse
2010
1.  Yen Tran
 Organizing Innovationin Turbulent 
Fashion Market
 Four papers on how fashion ﬁrms crea-
te and appropriate innovation value
2. Anders Raastrup Kristensen
 Metaphysical Labour
 Flexibility, Performance and Commit-
ment in Work-Life Management
3. Margrét Sigrún Sigurdardottir
 Dependently independent
 Co-existence of institutional logics in 
the recorded music industry
4.  Ásta Dis Óladóttir
 Internationalization from a small do-
mestic base:
 An empirical analysis of Economics and 
Management
5.  Christine Secher
 E-deltagelse i praksis – politikernes og 
forvaltningens medkonstruktion og 
konsekvenserne heraf
6. Marianne Stang Våland
 What we talk about when we talk 
about space:
 
 End User Participation between Proces-
ses of Organizational and Architectural 
Design
7.  Rex Degnegaard
 Strategic Change Management
 Change Management Challenges in 
the Danish Police Reform
8. Ulrik Schultz Brix
 Værdi i rekruttering – den sikre beslut-
ning
 En pragmatisk analyse af perception 
og synliggørelse af værdi i rekrutte-
rings- og udvælgelsesarbejdet
9. Jan Ole Similä
 Kontraktsledelse
 Relasjonen mellom virksomhetsledelse 
og kontraktshåndtering, belyst via ﬁre 
norske virksomheter
10. Susanne Boch Waldorff
 Emerging Organizations: In between 
local translation, institutional logics 
and discourse
11. Brian Kane
 Performance Talk
 Next Generation Management of  
Organizational Performance
12. Lars Ohnemus
 Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and 
Shareholder Value
 An Empirical Reconciliation of two 
Critical Concepts
13.  Jesper Schlamovitz
 Håndtering af usikkerhed i ﬁlm- og 
byggeprojekter
14.  Tommy Moesby-Jensen
 Det faktiske livs forbindtlighed
 Førsokratisk informeret, ny-aristotelisk 
τηθος-tænkning hos Martin Heidegger
15. Christian Fich
 Two Nations Divided by Common 
 Values
 French National Habitus and the 
 Rejection of American Power
16. Peter Beyer
 Processer, sammenhængskraft  
og ﬂeksibilitet
 Et empirisk casestudie af omstillings-
forløb i ﬁre virksomheder
17. Adam Buchhorn
 Markets of Good Intentions
 Constructing and Organizing 
 Biogas Markets Amid Fragility  
and Controversy
18. Cecilie K. Moesby-Jensen
 Social læring og fælles praksis
 Et mixed method studie, der belyser 
læringskonsekvenser af et lederkursus 
for et praksisfællesskab af offentlige 
mellemledere
19. Heidi Boye
 Fødevarer og sundhed i sen- 
modernismen
 – En indsigt i hyggefænomenet og  
de relaterede fødevarepraksisser
20. Kristine Munkgård Pedersen
 Flygtige forbindelser og midlertidige 
mobiliseringer
 Om kulturel produktion på Roskilde 
Festival
21. Oliver Jacob Weber
 Causes of Intercompany Harmony in 
Business Markets – An Empirical Inve-
stigation from a Dyad Perspective
22. Susanne Ekman
 Authority and Autonomy
 Paradoxes of Modern Knowledge 
Work
23. Anette Frey Larsen
 Kvalitetsledelse på danske hospitaler
 – Ledelsernes indﬂydelse på introduk-
tion og vedligeholdelse af kvalitetsstra-
tegier i det danske sundhedsvæsen
24.  Toyoko Sato
 Performativity and Discourse: Japanese 
Advertisements on the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Desire
25. Kenneth Brinch Jensen
 Identifying the Last Planner System 
 Lean management in the construction 
industry
26.  Javier Busquets
 Orchestrating Network Behavior  
for Innovation
27. Luke Patey
 The Power of Resistance: India’s Na-
tional Oil Company and International 
Activism in Sudan
28. Mette Vedel
 Value Creation in Triadic Business Rela-
tionships. Interaction, Interconnection 
and Position
29.  Kristian Tørning
 Knowledge Management Systems in 
Practice – A Work Place Study
30. Qingxin Shi
 An Empirical Study of Thinking Aloud 
Usability Testing from a Cultural 
Perspective
31.  Tanja Juul Christiansen
 Corporate blogging: Medarbejderes 
kommunikative handlekraft
32.  Malgorzata Ciesielska
 Hybrid Organisations.
 A study of the Open Source – business 
setting
33. Jens Dick-Nielsen
 Three Essays on Corporate Bond  
Market Liquidity
34. Sabrina Speiermann
 Modstandens Politik
 Kampagnestyring i Velfærdsstaten. 
 En diskussion af traﬁkkampagners sty-
ringspotentiale
35. Julie Uldam
 Fickle Commitment. Fostering political 
engagement in 'the ﬂighty world of 
online activism’
36. Annegrete Juul Nielsen
 Traveling technologies and 
transformations in health care
37. Athur Mühlen-Schulte
 Organising Development
 Power and Organisational Reform in 
the United Nations Development 
 Programme
38. Louise Rygaard Jonas
 Branding på butiksgulvet
 Et case-studie af kultur- og identitets-
arbejdet i Kvickly
2011
1. Stefan Fraenkel
 Key Success Factors for Sales Force 
Readiness during New Product Launch
 A Study of Product Launches in the 
Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry
2. Christian Plesner Rossing
 International Transfer Pricing in Theory 
and Practice
3.  Tobias Dam Hede
 Samtalekunst og ledelsesdisciplin
 – en analyse af coachingsdiskursens 
genealogi og governmentality
4. Kim Pettersson
 Essays on Audit Quality, Auditor Choi-
ce, and Equity Valuation
5. Henrik Merkelsen
 The expert-lay controversy in risk 
research and management. Effects of 
institutional distances. Studies of risk 
deﬁnitions, perceptions, management 
and communication
6. Simon S. Torp
 Employee Stock Ownership: 
 Effect on Strategic Management and 
Performance
7. Mie Harder
 Internal Antecedents of Management 
Innovation
8. Ole Helby Petersen
 Public-Private Partnerships: Policy and 
Regulation – With Comparative and 
Multi-level Case Studies from Denmark 
and Ireland
9. Morten Krogh Petersen
 ’Good’ Outcomes. Handling Multipli-
city in Government Communication
10. Kristian Tangsgaard Hvelplund
 Allocation of cognitive resources in 
translation - an eye-tracking and key-
logging study
11. Moshe Yonatany
 The Internationalization Process of 
Digital Service Providers
12. Anne Vestergaard
 Distance and Suffering
 Humanitarian Discourse in the age of 
Mediatization
13. Thorsten Mikkelsen
 Personligsheds indﬂydelse på forret-
ningsrelationer
14. Jane Thostrup Jagd
 Hvorfor fortsætter fusionsbølgen ud-
over ”the tipping point”?
 – en empirisk analyse af information 
og kognitioner om fusioner
15. Gregory Gimpel
 Value-driven Adoption and Consump-
tion of Technology: Understanding 
Technology Decision Making
16. Thomas Stengade Sønderskov
 Den nye mulighed
 Social innovation i en forretningsmæs-
sig kontekst
17.  Jeppe Christoffersen
 Donor supported strategic alliances in 
developing countries
18. Vibeke Vad Baunsgaard
 Dominant Ideological Modes of  
Rationality: Cross functional 
 integration in the process of product
 innovation
19.  Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson
 Governance Failure and Icelands’s
 Financial Collapse
20.  Allan Sall Tang Andersen
 Essays on the modeling of risks in
 interest-rate and inﬂ ation markets
21.  Heidi Tscherning
 Mobile Devices in Social Contexts
22.  Birgitte Gorm Hansen
 Adapting in the Knowledge Economy
  Lateral Strategies for Scientists and 
Those Who Study Them
23.  Kristina Vaarst Andersen
 Optimal Levels of Embeddedness
  The Contingent Value of Networked 
Collaboration
24.  Justine Grønbæk Pors
 Noisy Management
  A History of Danish School Governing 
from 1970-2010
25.  Stefan Linder
  Micro-foundations of Strategic 
Entrepreneurship
  Essays on Autonomous Strategic Action
26.  Xin Li
  Toward an Integrative Framework of 
National Competitiveness
 An application to China
27.  Rune Thorbjørn Clausen
 Værdifuld arkitektur
  Et eksplorativt studie af bygningers 
rolle i virksomheders værdiskabelse
28.  Monica Viken
  Markedsundersøkelser som bevis i 
varemerke- og markedsføringsrett
29.  Christian Wymann
  Tattooing 
  The Economic and Artistic Constitution 
of a Social Phenomenon
30.  Sanne Frandsen
 Productive Incoherence 
  A Case Study of Branding and 
Identity Struggles in a Low-Prestige 
Organization
31.  Mads Stenbo Nielsen
 Essays on Correlation Modelling
32.  Ivan Häuser
 Følelse og sprog
  Etablering af en ekspressiv kategori, 
eksempliﬁ ceret på russisk
33.  Sebastian Schwenen
 Security of Supply in Electricity Markets
2012
1.  Peter Holm Andreasen
  The Dynamics of Procurement 
Management
 - A Complexity Approach
2.  Martin Haulrich
  Data-Driven Bitext Dependency 
 Parsing and Alignment
3.  Line Kirkegaard
  Konsulenten i den anden nat 
  En undersøgelse af det intense 
arbejdsliv
4.  Tonny Stenheim
  Decision usefulness of goodwill 
under IFRS
5.  Morten Lind Larsen
  Produktivitet, vækst og velfærd
  Industrirådet og efterkrigstidens 
Danmark 1945 - 1958
6.  Petter Berg
  Cartel Damages and Cost Asymmetries 
7.  Lynn Kahle
 Experiential Discourse in Marketing
  A methodical inquiry into practice 
and theory
8.  Anne Roelsgaard Obling
  Management of Emotions 
in Accelerated Medical Relationships
9.  Thomas Frandsen
  Managing Modularity of 
Service Processes Architecture
10.  Carina Christine Skovmøller
  CSR som noget særligt
  Et casestudie om styring og menings-
skabelse i relation til CSR ud fra en 
intern optik
11.  Michael Tell
  Fradragsbeskæring af selskabers 
ﬁ nansieringsudgifter
  En skatteretlig analyse af SEL §§ 11, 
11B og 11C
12.  Morten Holm
  Customer Proﬁ tability Measurement 
Models
  Their Merits and Sophistication 
across Contexts
13.  Katja Joo Dyppel
  Beskatning af derivater 
 En analyse af dansk skatteret
14.  Esben Anton Schultz
  Essays in Labor Economics 
 Evidence from Danish Micro Data
15.  Carina Risvig Hansen
  ”Contracts not covered, or not fully 
covered, by the Public Sector Directive”
16.  Anja Svejgaard Pors
 Iværksættelse af kommunikation
  - patientﬁ gurer i hospitalets strategiske 
kommunikation
17.  Frans Bévort
  Making sense of management with 
logics
  An ethnographic study of accountants 
who become managers
18.  René Kallestrup
  The Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign 
Credit Risk
19.  Brett Crawford
  Revisiting the Phenomenon of Interests 
in Organizational Institutionalism
  The Case of U.S. Chambers of 
Commerce
20.  Mario Daniele Amore
  Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance
21.  Arne Stjernholm Madsen
  The evolution of innovation strategy 
  Studied in the context of medical 
device activities at the pharmaceutical 
company Novo Nordisk A/S in the 
period 1980-2008
22.  Jacob Holm Hansen
  Is Social Integration Necessary for 
Corporate Branding?
  A study of corporate branding 
strategies at Novo Nordisk
23.  Stuart Webber
  Corporate Proﬁ t Shifting and the 
Multinational Enterprise
24.  Helene Ratner
  Promises of Reﬂ exivity
  Managing and Researching 
Inclusive Schools
25.  Therese Strand
  The Owners and the Power: Insights 
from Annual General Meetings
26.  Robert Gavin Strand
  In Praise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Bureaucracy
27.  Nina Sormunen
 Auditor’s going-concern reporting
  Reporting decision and content of the 
report
28.  John Bang Mathiasen
  Learning within a product development 
working practice:
  - an understanding anchored 
in pragmatism
29.  Philip Holst Riis
  Understanding Role-Oriented Enterprise 
Systems: From Vendors to Customers
30.  Marie Lisa Dacanay
 Social Enterprises and the Poor 
  Enhancing Social Entrepreneurship and 
Stakeholder Theory
31.  Fumiko Kano Glückstad
  Bridging Remote Cultures: Cross-lingual 
concept mapping based on the 
information receiver’s prior-knowledge
32.  Henrik Barslund Fosse
  Empirical Essays in International Trade
33.  Peter Alexander Albrecht
  Foundational hybridity and its 
reproduction 
 Security sector reform in Sierra Leone
34.  Maja Rosenstock
 CSR  - hvor svært kan det være? 
  Kulturanalytisk casestudie om 
udfordringer og dilemmaer med at 
forankre Coops CSR-strategi
35.  Jeanette Rasmussen
 Tweens, medier og forbrug
  Et studie af 10-12 årige danske børns 
brug af internettet, opfattelse og for-
ståelse af markedsføring og forbrug
36.  Ib Tunby Gulbrandsen
  ‘This page is not intended for a 
US Audience’
  A ﬁ ve-act spectacle on online 
communication, collaboration 
& organization.
37.  Kasper Aalling Teilmann
  Interactive Approaches to 
Rural Development
38.  Mette Mogensen
  The Organization(s) of Well-being 
and Productivity
  (Re)assembling work in the Danish Post
39.  Søren Friis Møller
  From Disinterestedness to Engagement 
  Towards Relational Leadership In the 
Cultural Sector
40.  Nico Peter Berhausen
  Management Control, Innovation and 
Strategic Objectives – Interactions and 
Convergence in Product Development 
Networks
41.  Balder Onarheim
 Creativity under Constraints
  Creativity as Balancing 
‘Constrainedness’
42.  Haoyong Zhou
 Essays on Family Firms
43.  Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen
 Making sense of organisational conﬂ ict
  An empirical study of enacted sense-
making in everyday conﬂ ict at work
2013
1.  Jacob Lyngsie
  Entrepreneurship in an Organizational 
Context
2.  Signe Groth-Brodersen
 Fra ledelse til selvet
  En socialpsykologisk analyse af 
forholdet imellem selvledelse, ledelse 
og stress i det moderne arbejdsliv
3.  Nis Høyrup Christensen
  Shaping Markets: A Neoinstitutional 
Analysis of the Emerging 
Organizational Field of Renewable 
Energy in China
4.  Christian Edelvold Berg
 As a matter of size 
  THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL 
MASS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS 
5.  Christine D. Isakson
  Coworker Inﬂ uence and Labor Mobility 
Essays on Turnover, Entrepreneurship 
and Location Choice in the Danish 
Maritime Industry
6.  Niels Joseph Jerne Lennon
  Accounting Qualities in Practice 
Rhizomatic stories of representational 
faithfulness, decision making and 
control
7.  Shannon O’Donnell
 Making Ensemble Possible
  How special groups organize for 
collaborative creativity in conditions 
of spatial variability and distance
8.  Robert W. D. Veitch
  Access Decisions in a 
Partly-Digital World
Comparing Digital Piracy and Legal 
Modes for Film and Music
9.  Marie Mathiesen
 Making Strategy Work 
 An Organizational Ethnography
10.  Arisa Shollo
 The role of business intelligence in   
 organizational decision-making 
11.  Mia Kaspersen
  The construction of social and 
environmental reporting
12. Marcus Møller Larsen
 The organizational design of offshoring
13. Mette Ohm Rørdam
 EU Law on Food Naming
 The prohibition against misleading   
 names in an internal market context
14. Hans Peter Rasmussen 
 GIV EN GED!
 Kan giver-idealtyper forklare støtte 
 til velgørenhed og understøtte 
 relationsopbygning?
15. Ruben Schachtenhaufen 
 Fonetisk reduktion i dansk
16. Peter Koerver Schmidt
 Dansk CFC-beskatning
  I et internationalt og komparativt 
perspektiv
17. Morten Froholdt
 Strategi i den offentlige sektor 
 En kortlægning af styringsmæssig   
 kontekst, strategisk tilgang, samt 
 anvendte redskaber og teknologier for  
 udvalgte danske statslige styrelser
18. Annette Camilla Sjørup
 Cognitive effort in metaphor translation
 An eye-tracking and key-logging study
19. Tamara Stucchi
  The Internationalization 
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 A Context-Speciﬁ c Study
20. Thomas Lopdrup-Hjorth
 “Let’s Go Outside”:
 The Value of Co-Creation
21. Ana Alačovska
 Genre and Autonomy in Cultural 
 Production
 The case of travel guidebook 
 production
22. Marius Gudmand-Høyer
  Stemningssindssygdommenes historie 
i det 19. århundrede
  Omtydningen af melankolien og 
manien som bipolære stemningslidelser 
i dansk sammenhæng under hensyn til 
dannelsen af det moderne følelseslivs 
relative autonomi. 
  En problematiserings- og erfarings-
analytisk undersøgelse
23. Lichen Alex Yu
 Fabricating an S&OP Process
  Circulating References and Matters 
of Concern
24. Esben Alfort
 The Expression of a Need
 Understanding search
25. Trine Pallesen
 Assembling Markets for Wind Power  
 An Inquiry into the Making of 
 Market Devices
26. Anders Koed Madsen
 Web-Visions
 Repurposing digital traces to organize  
 social attention
27. Lærke Højgaard Christiansen
 BREWING ORGANIZATIONAL 
 RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
28. Tommy Kjær Lassen
 EGENTLIG SELVLEDELSE
  En ledelsesﬁ losoﬁ sk afhandling om 
selvledelsens paradoksale dynamik og 
eksistentielle engagement
29. Morten Rossing
 Local Adaption and Meaning Creation  
 in Performance Appraisal
30. Søren Obed Madsen
 Lederen som oversætter
 Et oversættelsesteoretisk perspektiv 
 på strategisk arbejde
31. Thomas Høgenhaven
 Open Government Communities
 Does Design Affect Participation?
32. Kirstine Zinck Pedersen 
 Failsafe Organizing? 
 A Pragmatic Stance on Patient Safety
33. Anne Petersen
 Hverdagslogikker i psykiatrisk arbejde
 En institutionsetnograﬁ sk undersøgelse  
 af hverdagen i psykiatriske 
 organisationer
34. Didde Maria Humle
 Fortællinger om arbejde
35. Mark Holst-Mikkelsen
 Strategieksekvering i praksis 
 – barrierer og muligheder! 
36. Malek Maalouf
 Sustaining lean
 Strategies for dealing with
 organizational paradoxes
37. Nicolaj Tofte Brenneche
 Systemic Innovation In The Making
 The Social Productivity of 
 Cartographic Crisis and Transitions 
 in the Case of SEEIT
38. Morten Gylling
 The Structure of Discourse
 A Corpus-Based Cross-Linguistic Study
39. Binzhang YANG
 Urban Green Spaces for Quality Life
  - Case Study: the landscape 
architecture for people in Copenhagen
40. Michael Friis Pedersen
 Finance and Organization:  
 The Implications for Whole Farm 
 Risk Management
TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN
1992
1.  Niels Kornum
  Servicesamkørsel – organisation, øko-
nomi og planlægningsmetode
1995
2.  Verner Worm
 Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
 Kulturspeciﬁ kke interaktionsrelationer
 ved nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i
 Kina
1999
3.  Mogens Bjerre
 Key Account Management of Complex
 Strategic Relationships
 An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving
 Consumer Goods Industry
2000
4.  Lotte Darsø
 Innovation in the Making
  Interaction Research with heteroge-
neous Groups of Knowledge Workers
 creating new Knowledge and new
 Leads
2001
5.  Peter Hobolt Jensen
 Managing Strategic Design Identities
  The case of the Lego Developer Net-
work
2002
6.  Peter Lohmann
 The Deleuzian Other of Organizational
 Change – Moving Perspectives of the
 Human
7.  Anne Marie Jess Hansen
 To lead from a distance: The dynamic
  interplay between strategy and strate-
gizing – A case study of the strategic
 management process
2003
8.  Lotte Henriksen
 Videndeling
  – om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæs-
sige udfordringer ved videndeling i
 praksis
9.  Niels Christian Nickelsen
  Arrangements of Knowing: Coordi-
nating Procedures Tools and Bodies in
 Industrial Production – a case study of
 the collective making of new products
2005
10.  Carsten Ørts Hansen
  Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og
 effektivitet
TITLER I DBA PH.D.-SERIEN
2007
1.  Peter Kastrup-Misir
 Endeavoring to Understand Market
 Orientation – and the concomitant
 co-mutation of the researched, the
 re searcher, the research itself and the
 truth
2009
1.  Torkild Leo Thellefsen
  Fundamental Signs and Signiﬁ cance 
effects
 A Semeiotic outline of Fundamental
 Signs, Signiﬁ cance-effects, Knowledge
 Proﬁ ling and their use in Knowledge
 Organization and Branding
2.  Daniel Ronzani
 When Bits Learn to Walk Don’t Make
 Them Trip. Technological Innovation
 and the Role of Regulation by Law
 in Information Systems Research: the
 Case of Radio Frequency Identiﬁ cation
 (RFID)
2010
1.  Alexander Carnera
 Magten over livet og livet som magt
 Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens
